This paper, which was prepared for a University of Illinois College of Law symposium
honoring Prof. Larry Ribstein, examines the origins of the market for corporate control
in the United States. The standard historical narrative is that the market for corporate control took on its modern form in the mid-1950s with the emergence of the cash tender offer.
Using hand-collected data from newspaper reports, we show that there in fact were numerous instances during the opening decade of the 20th century where a bidder sought to obtain voting control by purchasing shares on the stock market. Moreover, share-forshare exchange tender offers were used to make takeover bids as early as 1901, and cash tender offers can be traced back to at least the mid-1940s. We argue that the way in which cash tender offers came to dominate the market for control after World War II can be explained primarily by changes in the pattern of share ownership and of the opportunities bidders had for ?managing? the stock price of intended targets.
What are the implications of artificial intelligence (AI) for corporate law? In this essay, we consider the trajectory of AI’s evolution, analyze the effects of its application on business practice, and investigate the impact of these...Read more
We empirically examine whether and how the doctrine of enhanced judicial scrutiny that emerged from Revlon and its progeny actually affects M&A transactions. Combining hand-coding and machine-learning techniques, we assemble data...Read more
Efficient contracting depends upon imposing risk on the party with superior access to information. Yet the parties in mergers and acquisitions transactions now commonly use Representation and Warranty Insurance (“RWI”) to shift this risk to a...Read more
The analysis of corporate governance has been a one-sided affair. The focus has been on “internal” accountability mechanisms, namely boards and shareholders. Each has become more effective since debates about corporate governance began in earnest...Read more