Shareholders

When corporate law scholars explore shareholder litigation abroad, they often start by looking for types of shareholder litigation famili

We study if a CEO’s equity-based compensation affects the expected value generation in takeovers.

The AGM is often considered to play an important role in direct shareholder monitoring of directors and corporate blockholders.

There is considerable concern about the conflict of interest between the CEO and the shareholders when a firm is a target for an acquisit

We study investor activism promoting environmental, social and governance (ESG) improvements by means of a proprietary dataset covering 6

Proxy reforms shifting more power to shareholders can mitigate managerial agency problems but also empowers “special interest” activists.

This paper looks at shareholder activism from the perspective of the revision of the EU Shareholder Rights Directive, which was approved

This essay is a contribution to the forthcoming Oxford University Press Handbook of Corporate Law and Governance edited by Jeffery Gordon

Many policy-makers appear to subscribe to the view that granting shareholders more rights is better.

Boards and shareholders are increasingly using charter and bylaw provisions to customize their corporate governance.