Law Series A Simple Theory of Takeover Regulation in the United States and Europe Working Paper Author/Authors Guido Ferrarini University of Genoa Geoffrey Miller New York University Law School Series number: 139/2010 Date published: 01 Jan 2010 Last revised: 08 Jan 2010 Quick links Access Paper on SSRN Categories Takeovers Keywords European Takeovers, hostile bids, Takeover Defences, Takeover Directive, Breakthrough Rule, Neutrality Rule, Reciprocity Published in Cornell International Law Journal Volume 42 Issue 3 Fall 2009
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