When Shareholders Disagree: Trading After Shareholder Meetings

When Shareholders Disagree: Trading After Shareholder Meetings

Sophia Zhengzi Li, Ernst Maug, Miriam Schwartz-Ziv

Series number :

Serial Number: 

Date posted :

February 01 2019

Last revised :

July 27 2020
SSRN Share


  • shareholder meetings • 
  • voting • 
  • disagreement • 
  • trading • 
  • Volume

This paper analyzes how trading after shareholder meetings changes the composition of the shareholder base. Analyzing daily trades, we find that mutual funds reduce their holdings if their votes are opposed to the voting outcome. Trading volume is high even when stock prices do not change, peaks on the meeting date, and remains high up to four weeks after shareholder meetings.

The results support models based on differences of opinion, which predict that shareholders’ beliefs may diverge more after observing voting outcomes. Hence, trading after meetings creates a more homogeneous shareholder base, which has important implications for corporate governance.


Real name:
Miriam Schwartz-Ziv
Michigan State University
Real name:
Sophia Zhengzi Li