Price and Probability: Decomposing the Takeover Effects of Anti-Takeover Provisions

Price and Probability: Decomposing the Takeover Effects of Anti-Takeover Provisions

Vicente Cuñat, Mireia Giné, MARIA GUADALUPE

Series number :

Serial Number: 
474/2016

Date posted :

August 01 2016

Last revised :

August 18 2016
SSRN Share

Keywords

  • Takeover premium • 
  • anti-takeover provisions • 
  • shareholder proposals

This paper studies the effects of anti-takeover provisions on takeovers and identifies the channels through which they create or destroy value for firms, as well as for the economy as a whole.

We provide causal estimates – that also deal with the endogenous selection of targets – showing that voting to remove an anti-takeover provision increases the takeover probability by 4.5% and garners a 2.8% higher premium, which results from increased competition for less protected targets. We also find evidence of net value creation in the economy stemming from more related acquisitions and targets being matched to more valuable acquirers.

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Authors

Dr
Real name:
Vicente Cuñat
Research Member
Department of Finance, London School of Economics
Real name:
MARIA GUADALUPE