Insider Trading and Networked Directors

Insider Trading and Networked Directors

Marc Goergen, Luc Renneboog, Yang Zhao

Series number :

Serial Number: 
573/2018

Date posted :

September 11 2018

Last revised :

September 06 2018
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Keywords

  • insider trading • 
  • Director Networks • 
  • Network Analysis • 
  • Centrality • 
  • Opportunistic Trading • 
  • Routine Trading

We analyze the relation between insider trading and the networks of executive and non-executive directors in UK listed companies.

While most existing studies focus on firm-specific private information, we find that non-firm-specific information - such as information on other companies and information on industry and market trends - plays an important role in insider trading behaviour and performance. Well-connected directors trade shares less frequently and for smaller values. However, their transactions are more profitable, especially when they make consecutive opportunistic purchases in multiple companies on whose boards they sit. Taken together, well-connected directors are likely to outperform their peers with inferior networks.
 

Authors

Real name: 
Yang Zhao