Independent directors and controlling shareholders around the world

Independent directors and controlling shareholders around the world

Guido Ferrarini, Marilena Filippelli

Series number :

Serial Number: 

Date posted :

May 01 2014

Last revised :

June 16 2014
SSRN Share


  • Independent Directors • 
  • board of directors • 
  • board committees • 
  • board elections • 
  • monitoring board • 
  • controlling shareholders • 
  • Executive Remuneration • 
  • Related Party Transactions • 
  • self-dealing
In this paper, we examine independent directors as a legal transplant from dispersed ownership systems to concentrated ownership ones. We focus on Continental Europe, Japan, Brazil, Russia, India and China. Our main thesis is that independent directors have a different and relatively narrower role to perform in controlled corporations.
We also argue that in the law and practice of controlled corporations independent directors often play an even weaker role than economic theory would predict. In order to prove our thesis, we compare the legal regimes applicable to independent directors across countries. We find that the notion and functions of independent directors vary remarkably across our sample jurisdictions. Firstly, the role of independent directors is not always specified. Secondly, independent directors often play a role in audit committees and, less frequently, in nomination and remuneration committees. However, they are rarely tasked with the vetting of related-party transactions and other conflicts of interest situations. Moreover, controlling shareholders often perform some of the functions that are typical of independent directors in diffuse ownership, such as the hiring and firing of Managers and the setting of their remuneration. We conclude that the weak role of Independent directors in several countries shows that they are often appointed mainly to accommodate investors? preference for western-style corporate governance.


Real name:
Marilena Filippelli