In this paper, I analyse the rise of mandatory structure of bankers? pay in Europe as outcome of criticism of pre-crisis remuneration practices at financial institutions. Whether flawed bankers? pay contributed to the financial crisis is still debated amongst scholars. It appears more likely that insufficient prudential regulation and flawed risk management contributed to banks?
undertaking risks that were later proven to be excessive from a societal perspective. All this would have suggested improving risk management systems and reforming areas of prudential regulation such as capital adequacy and organizational requirements, rather than intervening directly on bankers? incentives. Nonetheless, governments and legislators, under the pressure of the media and public opinion, proceeded to extensive reforms of bankers? remuneration, with reference to both the top executives and other risk-taking/high-earning employees at various levels of the institutions concerned. Indeed, the FSB principles and standards cover not only remuneration governance and disclosure, but also remuneration structures. Both the fixed and the variable remuneration components and the relationship between the same are subject to detailed regulation. As a result, the international standards have nature of ?rules? and have been implemented as such. The EU in particular has followed a strict approach to the implementation of the FSB standards and has also departed from the latter by introducing an unprecedented cap on variable remuneration in CRD IV. I analyse this cap from a legal and economic perspective, showing that its rationale is flawed and that unintended consequences may derive from it as a result. Moreover, the cap is inconsistent with other aspects of CRD IV which incorporate the international standards on variable pay.
Credit ratings have been shown to be imperfect and sometimes biased measures of risk. Has this affected their use in unregulated settings? Using textual analysis, we measure the use of credit ratings in investment mandates of fixed income mutual...Read more
We provide an extensive analysis of the payout policy of U.S. banks during the crisis to examine potential risk-shifting and signaling motives of banks. We estimate an empirical model of bank payouts to assess the extent to which changes in...Read more
Shocks that hit part of the financial system, such as the subprime mortgage market in 2007, can propagate through a complex network of interconnections among financial and non-financial institutions. As the financial crisis of 2007-2009 has shown...Read more
This paper investigates what we can learn from the financial crisis about the link between accounting and financial stability. The picture that emerges ten years after the crisis is substantially different from the picture that dominated the...Read more