Prof. Salvatore Miglietta discusses his winning paper (co-authored by Prof. Mike Burkart and Prof. Charlotte Ostergaard) at the ECGI Annual Members' Meeting in Berlin (2018).
This paper clarifies why corporate governance arrangements in public firms generally do not make use of judicial evaluations of boards’ and managers’ business decisions.
Prof. Yupana Wiwattanakantang (National University of Singapore) presents her paper on "Who is the Boss? Family Control without Ownership in Publicly-traded Japanese Firms" at the 2019 Global Corporate Governance Colloquia (GCGC) at Goethe University Frankfurt, Germany.
Prof. Bernard Black (Northwestern University School of Law and Kellogg School of Management) presents his paper on "Which Aspects of Corporate Governance Matter? Evidence from Emerging Markets" at the 2018 Global Corporate Governance Colloquia (GCGC) at Harvard University, USA.
Using hand-collected data on 691 corporate inversions from 11 home countries into 45 host destinations in 1996-2013, we document that corporations invert to destinations with lower tax rates and similar governance standards.
Mr. Chang Zhang (University of Warwick) presents his paper on "Value of Politically Connected Independent Directors: Evidence from the Anti-Corruption Campaign in China" at the 2019 Global Corporate Governance Colloquia (GCGC) at Goethe University Frankfurt, Germany.
Prof. Renee Adams (University of New South Wales) presents her paper on " Unsuccessful Teams" at the 2018 Global Corporate Governance Colloquia (GCGC) at Harvard University, USA. Discussion of the paper is then presented by Prof. Fabrizio Ferri (Columbia University).
Prof. Mark Roe (David Burg Professor of Law, Harvard Law School) presents his paper on "Three Ages of Bankruptcy" at the 2016 GCGC Conference in Stockholm. Discussion of the paper is then presented by Emeritus Prof. Hideki Kanda (University of Tokyo).
Hedge fund activism has recently spiked, almost hyperbolically. No one disputes this, but divergent explanations exist for it. Some see activist hedge funds as the natural champions of dispersed shareholders, who are not economically capable of collective action in their own interest.
This paper offers the first study of the shareholder welfare effects of poison pills and control share acquisition statutes in a research design that can support causal inference.
Prof. Paola Sapienza (Kellogg School of Management) discusses her work on Corporate Culture, at the ECGI Annual Members' Meeting in Barcelona (2019).
