Institutional Investor Activism and Engagement

Institutional Investor Activism and Engagement

  • 10 - 11 December 2017
  • Tel Aviv & Jerusalem, Israel

** Click here to access the event summary report **

 

Jointly organized by

 

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

The School of Business Administration, the Hebrew University Jerusalem

London Business School Center for Corporate Governance

Raymond Ackerman Family Chair in Israeli Corporate Governance, Bar-Ilan University

 

 

Organizing Committee

 

Marco Becht, Solvay Brussels School, ECGI and CEPR

Julian Franks, London Business School, ECGI and CEPR

Assaf Hamdani, Hebrew University of Jerusalem and ECGI

Beni Lauterbach, Bar-Ilan University and ECGI

Hannes Wagner, Bocconi University, Milan

Yishay Yafeh, Hebrew University, ECGI and CEPR

 

 

Confirmed Participants

 

Ian Appel, Boston College

Alon Brav, Duke University and ECGI

Jill Fisch, University of Pennsylvania and ECGI

Slava Fos, Boston College

Mariassunta Giannetti, Stockholm School of Economics and ECGI

Thomas Hellmann, University of Oxford

Cliff Holderness, Boston College

Robert Jackson, Columbia Law School

Doron Levitt, Wharton

Jörg Rocholl, ESMT Berlin and ECGI

Russ Wermers, University of Maryland

Bernie Black, Northwestern University and ECGI

Andrew Ellul, Indiana University and ECGI

Yaniv Grinstein,  Cornell University and ECGI

Assaf Hamdani, Hebrew University of Jerusalem and ECGI

Ehud Kamar, Tel Aviv University and ECGI

Eugene Kandel, Hebrew University of Jerusalem and ECGI

Amir Licht, Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya and ECGI

Miriam Schwartz Ziv, Michigan State University

Michael Weisbach, Ohio State University

 

 

With financial support from

 

European Corporate Governance Research Foundation (ECGRF)

Norwegian Finance Initiative (NFI)

Raymond Ackerman Family Chair in Israeli Corporate Governance

The Center for Empirical Studies of Decision Making and the Law at the Hebrew University

The I-Core Program of the Planning and Budgeting Committee and the Israel Science Foundation, Grant no. 1821/12

 

This conference is supported by:

    

10 December - Day 1

09:30
- 09:45

Registration and Coffee

09:45
- 09:55

Greetings

09:55

Session 1

09:55
- 10:40

The Allocation of Corporate Power between Shareholders and Managers

Back to full programme

The Allocation of Corporate Power between Shareholders and Managers

Time:
09:55h
- 10:40h

Speakers

Conference Documents

Back to full programme

Corporate governance through voice and exit: Evidence from Standard Life Investments

Time:
10:40h
- 11:30h

Speakers

Discussants

Conference Documents

11:30
- 11:45

Coffee

11:45

Session 2

Back to full programme

Public Pension Funds and Corporate Political Activism

Time:
11:45h
- 12:35h

This paper analyzes agency con icts between U.S. public pension funds and other shareholders. It studies the landmark decision by the U.S. Supreme Court on Citizens United v. FEC, which opens new doors for political activism by business. At the ruling, politically connected  rms held by public pension funds have lower announcement returns. After the ruling, these  rms remain engaged in political connections and experience a relative increase in ownership by public pension funds. Our evidence is consistent with public pension funds having a preference for more traditional forms of political activism, a preference not shared by other investors.

Speakers

Discussants

Conference Documents

12:35
- 13:45

Lunch

13:45

Session 3

Back to full programme

A Collaborative Model of the Corporation

Time:
13:45h
- 14:35h

Two models of the corporation dominate legal discourse. The first is the management-power model, which is premised on vesting corporate insiders -- officers and directors -- with primary decision-making power. The second is the shareholder-power model which contemplates increased shareholder power to reduce managerial agency costs and self-dealing. Both models assume that insiders and shareholders engage in a competitive struggle for corporate power and address, descriptively and normatively, the appropriate allocation of that power.

Corporate law and practice have moved beyond existing theories of the corporation framed in terms of a competitive power struggle between insiders and shareholders, however. Increasingly, the insider- shareholder dynamic in the modern corporation is collaborative, not competitive. This Article responds to this development, defending a collaborative model of the corporation on both descriptive and normative grounds. In particular, the Article uses game theory to demonstrate how insider-shareholder collaborations are likely to produce complimentary information that increases firm value.

The collaborative model offers several insights for corporate governance. First, it suggests that, to enhance collaboration, core governance provisions should be the product of bilateral action involving both insiders and shareholders. Second, board insulation mechanisms should require shareholder input. Finally, doctrines constraining director use of corporate information should facilitate rather than frustrating information sharing between activist directors and their principals. In turn, implementation of these principles requires rethinking and adapting several existing principles of corporate law.

Speakers

Discussants

Conference Documents