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Using a new dataset of corporate voting-rights from 1971 to 2015, we find that young dual-class firms trade at a premium and operate at least as efficiently as young single-class firms. As dualclass firms mature, their valuation declines, and they become less efficient in their margins, innovation, and labor productivity compared to their single-class counterparts.
Voting premiums increase with firm age, suggesting that private benefits increase over maturity. Most sunset provisions that dual-class firms adopt are ineffective. Our findings suggest that effective, timeconsistent sunset provisions would be based on age or on inferior shareholders’ periodic right to eliminate dual-class voting.
This paper develops a theory of blockholder governance and the voting premium. A blockholder and dispersed shareholders first trade in a competitive...
The lack of board diversity is one of the most controversial topics in corporate board governance. We investigate one important influence on diversity...