Skin-in-the-Game in ABS Transactions: A Critical Review of Policy Options

Skin-in-the-Game in ABS Transactions: A Critical Review of Policy Options

Jan Pieter Krahnen, Christian Wilde

Series number :

Serial Number: 
549/2018

Date posted :

January 22 2018

Last revised :

November 12 2021
SSRN Share

Keywords

  • structured finance • 
  • ABS • 
  • STS (simple • 
  • transparent • 
  • and standardized securitizations) • 
  • regulation • 
  • retention • 
  • Dodd-Frank Act

Relying on a hand-collected data set of European asset securitizations, we analyze risk retention, a key regulatory reform requirement after the global financial crisis. We find today’s ABS markets to be characterized by significant retention opacity, caused by differences in legal retention options and retained portions.

To improve the transparency of effective, rather than nominal, risk retention in the market, we propose a new, simple metric that captures the share of expected loss retained by the issuer. As to policy conclusions, we suggest to change the existing regulation by dropping the mandatory minimum retention and replacing it with a requirement for full transparency about effective risk retention.

Authors

Research Member
Center for Financial Studies (CFS), Leibniz Institute SAFE, Goethe University Frankfurt
Real name:
Christian Wilde