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We study shareholder voting in a model in which trading affects the composition of the shareholder base. In this model, trading and voting are complementary, which gives rise to self-fulfilling expectations about proposal acceptance. We show...Read more
This paper studies how managers react to shareholder empowerment vis-à-vis governance provisions. We show that a staggered legislative change that increases noncompliance costs in the implementation of shareholder-initiated majority voting...Read more
In order to favor shareholder investment over a longer time horizon, Italy introduced loyalty shares in late 2014, which allow double voting rights after a two-year continuous holding period. Italian listed firms which adopted loyalty shares (...Read more
Using a novel text-based measure of top management team diversity, covering over 70,000 top executives in over 6,500 U.S. firms from 1999 to 2014, we show that analyst forecasts are systematically more pessimistic for firms with more diverse top...Read more