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This paper studies how managers react to shareholder empowerment vis-à-vis governance provisions. We show that a staggered legislative change that increases noncompliance costs in the implementation of shareholder-initiated majority voting...Read more
Using data on the universe of US-based mutual funds, we find that two out of five fund families hold corporate bonds of firms in which they also own an equity stake. We show that the greater the fraction of debt a fund family holds in a given...Read more
This article offers a theory of mutual fund voting to answer when mutual funds should vote on behalf of their investors and when they should not. It argues that voting authority for mutual funds ought to depend upon: (1) whether the fund...Read more
This paper studies mutual fund voting in proxy contests using a comprehensive sample of voting records over the period 2008 - 2015, taking into account selective targeting by activists. We find that firm, fund, and event characteristics generate...Read more