This website uses cookies to help us give you the best experience when you visit our website. By continuing to use this website, you consent to our use of these cookies.
Read more
This paper investigates how a foreign firm's decision to cross-list on a U.S. stock exchange is related to the consumption of private benefits of control by its controlling shareholders. Theory has proposed that when private benefits are high, controlling shareholders are less likely to choose to list their firm's shares in the U.S.
because the higher standards for transparency and disclosure, as well as the increased monitoring associated with such listings, limit their ability to extract private benefits. Using ownership of control rights by the firm's controlling shareholder as a proxy for private benefits, we offer evidence that confirms this hypothesis with a sample of more than 4,000 firms from 31 countries. In particular, the probability that a firm will cross-list on a U.S. exchange is inversely related to the control rights held by the controlling shareholder and to the difference between the control rights and the cash flow rights owned by the controlling shareholder.
The firms listed on the stock market in aggregate contribute less to total non-farm employment and GDP now than in the 1970s. A major reason for this...
Alibaba, the e-commerce giant that completed a record-setting IPO in the United States in 2014 and was valued at over $700 billion in early 2021, is one of...
Dynastic-controlled firms are led by founding family CEOs while the family owns an insignificant share of equity (defined as less than five percent)....