More and more companies appear with strange abbreviations behind their business name. Consider Chrysler Group LLC (instead of Inc.) or LVMH Montres and Joaillerie France SAS. Some even speak about the 'endangered corporate form' and point to the rise of the uncorporation.
This Primer examines how the uncorporation has evolved in the United States and, more recently, in other economies around the world. We find that the growth in non-listed business forms in Europe, Latin America and Asia have been shaped by a mixture of learning and professional advice arising from the company law review process, as well as the indirect influence of overseas business forms. We examine the main components of uncorporate business forms that are responsible for limiting transaction costs, curbing opportunism and creating organizational structures that are compatible with entrepreneurial expectations. We show the main differences between the partnership-type and corporate-type uncorporations, particularly the LLC in the United States (US-LLC), the SAS in France and Colombia, the LLP in United Kingdom (UK-LLP), Singapore (S-LLP), India (I-LLP) and Japan (Yugen Sekinin Jigyou Kumiai, J-LLP). We find that, given the pitfalls in the evolution of uncorporation laws, an international Model Act would be consistent with lower transaction and information costs and could help to encourage cooperation between firms situated in different jurisdictions.
We derive a measure that captures the extent to which overlapping ownership structures shift managers’ incentives to internalize externalities. A key feature of the measure is that it allows for the possibility that not all investors are...Read more
Two models dominate the debate on the theory of the firm. Under the management-power model, decision-making power exclusively belongs to corporate insiders (officers and directors). The competing shareholder-power model contemplates increasing...Read more
French listed companies can issue shares that confer two votes per share after a holding period of at least two years (loyalty shares with tenure voting rights). In 2014 the default rule changed from one-share-one-vote to loyalty shares. The...Read more
Short-termism has become a serious concern for corporate governance, and this has inspired a search for institutional arrangements to promote long-term decision-making. In this paper, we call attention to long-term ownership by industrial...Read more