Twentieth century Japan provides a remarkable laboratory for examining how an externally imposed institutional and regulatory intervention affects the ownership of corporations. In the first half of the century, Japan had weak legal protection but strong institutional arrangements. The institutions were dismantled after the war and replaced by a strong form of legal protection.
This inversion resulted in a switch from Japan being a country in which equity markets flourished and ownership was dispersed in the first half of the century to one in which banks and companies dominated with interlocking shareholdings in the second half of the century.
This paper critiques an assessment by Bebchuk and Tallarita (BT) of the relative merits of shareholder and stakeholder governance. BT’s paper argues that stakeholder governance is either nothing more than enlightened shareholder value, or it...Read more
We address a puzzle whereby lending marketplaces, aimed at directly connecting retail lenders and borrowers, retreat from auctions and take on the role of price setting and credit allocation, despite evidence that retail investors possess...Read more
We investigate how state Universal Demand statutes (UD) affect recruitment and retention of outside directors. UDs require plaintiffs to obtain board support before a derivative suit can commence. This requirement significantly increases the...Read more
We find that ownership changes much less over time in private firms than in public firms. The average largest shareholder in private (public) Norwegian firms keeps the same stake in 82% (14%) of two consecutive years. In private firms past...Read more