This website uses cookies to help us give you the best experience when you visit our website. By continuing to use this website, you consent to our use of these cookies.
Read more
Potential conficts of interest arise when IPO underwriters allocate IPO shares to their affiliated funds. We hypothesize that such nepotism incentives affect IPO pricing. Using a novel hand-collected dataset, we find support for this hypothesis in a regression discontinuity design (RDD): a one percentage point increase in affiliated allocations increases underpricing by 5.4 percentage points.
Our evidence suggests that nepotism has real monetary costs for IPO issuers. We also use our dataset to revisit a milder version of nepotism analyzed in prior studies, and we find much clearer support for it than prior work: we find a strong positive association between IPO underpricing and affiliated allocations, which strengthens when nepotism incentives are stronger.
In this contribution, we focus on the market for stewardship, as this has been developing in the UK. We observe that the 2020 UK Stewardship Code more...
We explore a novel survey on responsible investing by institutional investors around the world and match it to archival data on their equity portfolio...