This website uses cookies to help us give you the best experience when you visit our website. By continuing to use this website, you consent to our use of these cookies.
Read more
This paper investigates whether non-executive directors associated with good (bad) board decisions are subsequently rewarded (penalized) in the market for directors.
This question is addressed by assessing whether the post-acquisition performance of acquiring companies influences the number of non-executive directorships that non-executives involved in these acquisitions hold subsequent to the acquisition. We find that non-executives on the boards of acquirers that increase (omit or cut) their dividend subsequently hold more (fewer) non-executive directorships in listed companies. Our findings suggest that the non-executive labor market is efficient and rewards (penalizes) non-executives for good (bad) acquisitions.
This paper has a dual aim: it aims to contribute to the substance of comparative corporate law and it aims to advance the methodology of comparative legal...
This paper empirically examines the Capital Purchase program (CPP) under TARP that was used by the U.S. government to bail out distressed banks with...