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In large U.S. corporations, founding families are the only blockholders whose control rights on average exceed their cash flow rights. We analyze how families achieve this separation between cash-flow and control rights, and at what cost.
We find that indirect ownership through trusts, foundations, limited partnerships, and other corporations is prevalent but rarely creates a wedge between cash-flow and control rights. The primary sources of the wedge are dual-class stock and voting agreements. Additional control is frequently obtained through board representation in excess of voting control, and through the presence of a family member as CEO or Chairman of the Board. We also find that the impact of control-enhancing mechanisms on firm value depends on the specific mechanism used: the effect is negative for dual-class stock and disproportional board representation, but positive for pyramids and voting agreements.
Alibaba, the e-commerce giant that completed a record-breaking IPO in the United States in 2014 and in mid-2020 was valued at over $500 billion, is one of...
Dynastic-controlled firms are led by founding family CEOs while the family owns an insignificant share of equity (defined as less than five percent)....