The forthright brand of shareholder activism hedge funds deploy became during the 2000s a significant feature of Canadian corporate governance. This paper examines hedge fund activism ?Canadian style.? The paper characterizes the interventions hedge funds specialize in as ?offensive?
shareholder activism and uses a heuristic device, ?the market for corporate influence?, to identify the variables that dictate how frequent such activism is likely to be. This analytical structure is used to explain why hedge fund activism has become part of the Canadian corporate governance landscape and has displaced at least partly a Canadian shareholder ?culture of passivity.?
In firms with multiple blockholders governance via exit is affected by how blockholders react to each others' exit. Institutional investors, who hold the majority of equity blocks, are heterogeneous in their incentives. How do these incentives...Read more
How do active managers engage with portfolio firms? And, what role does monitoring and engagement play in their trading decisions? We use proprietary data from a large UK active asset manager with a long-standing commitment to stewardship to...Read more
Understanding an entrepreneurial finance ecosystem requires an appreciation of how different investors interact with each other. Angels and venture capitalists constitute two very important investors in start-ups. We develop and empirically test...Read more
This paper studies how managers react to shareholder empowerment vis-à-vis governance provisions. We show that a staggered legislative change that increases noncompliance costs in the implementation of shareholder-initiated majority voting...Read more