The forthright brand of shareholder activism hedge funds deploy became during the 2000s a significant feature of Canadian corporate governance. This paper examines hedge fund activism ?Canadian style.? The paper characterizes the interventions hedge funds specialize in as ?offensive?
shareholder activism and uses a heuristic device, ?the market for corporate influence?, to identify the variables that dictate how frequent such activism is likely to be. This analytical structure is used to explain why hedge fund activism has become part of the Canadian corporate governance landscape and has displaced at least partly a Canadian shareholder ?culture of passivity.?
A 1970 New York Times essay on corporate social responsibility by Milton Friedman is often said to have launched a shareholder-focused reorientation of managerial priorities in America’s public companies. The essay correspondingly is a primary...Read more
A high profile public debate is taking place over one of the oldest questions in corporate law, namely, “For whom is the corporation managed?” In addition to legal academics and lawyers, high profile business leaders and business school...Read more
We study the contribution of directors to firm resilience by assessing the relative importance of their advisory and monitoring roles at times of crisis. Based on manually collected US data, we document that four bord-related variables affect...Read more
We examine whether engagement on environmental, social and governance (ESG) issues can benefit shareholders by reducing firms’ downside risk, measured using the lower partial moment and value at risk. Using a proprietary database, we provide...Read more