Are courts effective monitors of corporate decisions? In a controversial landmark case,
the Delaware Supreme Court held directors personally liable for breaching their fiduciary
duties, signalling a sharp increase in Delaware?s scrutiny over corporate decisions. In our
event study, low-growth Delaware firms outperformed matched non-Delaware firms by 1% in the three day event window.
In contrast, high-growth Delaware firms under-performed by 1%. Contrary to previous literature, we conclude that court decisions can have large, significant and heterogeneous effects on firm value, and that rules insulating directors from court scrutiny benefit the fastest growing sectors of the economy.
What are the implications of artificial intelligence (AI) for corporate law? In this essay, we consider the trajectory of AI’s evolution, analyze the effects of its application on business practice, and investigate the impact of these...Read more
This paper explores the concept of abuse of law in the context of the choice of the state or country of incorporation: Can the choice of a particular jurisdiction constitute “abuse”? The case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (...Read more
This paper looks at the phenomenon of “defensive regulatory competition” in European corporate law following Centros, Überseering and Inspire Art. In order to retain control over the corporate governing private limited entities operating within...Read more
A new regulation issued in the end of 2013 as part of the anti-corruption campaign in China leads to a wave of resignation of politically connected independent directors (PCID). I find while firms with PCIDs have...Read more