The Future of Disclosure: ESG, Common Ownership, and Systematic Risk

The Future of Disclosure: ESG, Common Ownership, and Systematic Risk

John Coffee

Series number :

Serial Number: 
541/2020

Date posted :

September 09 2020

Last revised :

February 26 2021
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Keywords

  • Black/Scholes Option Pricing Model • 
  • Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) • 
  • Common ownership • 
  • Disclosure • 
  • ERISA • 
  • Externalities • 
  • Index Fund • 
  • institutional investor • 
  • SEC Sole Interest Rule.

The U.S. securities markets have recently undergone (or are undergoing) three fundamental transitions: (1) institutionalization (with the result that institutional investors now dominate both trading and stock ownership); (2) extraordinary ownership concentration (with the consequence that the three largest U.S.

institutional investors now hold 20% and vote 25% of the shares in S&P 500 companies); and (3) the introduction of ESG disclosures (which process has been driven in the U.S. by pressure from large institutional investors). In light of these transitions, how should disclosure policy change? Do institutions and retail investors have the same or different disclosure needs? Why are large institutions pressing for increased ESG disclosures?

This article will focus on the desire of institutions for greater ESG disclosures and suggest that two reasons underlie this demand for more information: (1) ESG disclosures overlap substantially with systematic risk, which is the primary concern of diversified investors; and (2) high common ownership enables institutions to take collective action to curb externalities caused by portfolio firms, so long as the gains to their portfolio from such action exceed the losses caused to the externality-creating firms. This transition to a portfolio-wide perspective (both in voting and investment decisions) has significant implications but also is likely to provoke political controversy. In its final hours, the Trump Administration adopted new rules that discourage voting based on ESG criteria and thus by extension chill ESG investing. This controversy will continue.

As more institutions shift to portfolio-wide decision making, there is an optimistic upside: externalities may be curbed by collective shareholder action. But, there are also downsides, including that the disclosure needs of individual investors and institutional investors will increasingly diverge, and serious conflicts can arise. Of course, not all institutional investors are indexed or even diversified, but those that remain undiversified (for example, hedge funds) logically have the perspective of an option-holder and favor greater risk-taking. Once again, retail investors have different perspectives and preferences than institutional investors. The SEC should seek to serve the needs of these different classes, rather than subordinate them to an assumed common standard.

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