This paper investigates how banks and finance companies operate in a family business
group. Using uniquely detailed ownership data from Thailand, we find that the controlling
families extensively use pyramids to control banks and finance companies and assign
different lending strategies across pyramidal tiers.
Lower-tier banks tend to extend loans more aggressively and perform more poorly, while upper tier banks carry out more pro?table investments. After the crisis hit, upper-tier banks survived and almost all lower-tier banks went bankrupt. Our results suggest that the multilayer organizational structure of bank ownership can affect a bank´s lending behavior and its resistance to economic shocks.
We find that ownership changes much less over time in private firms than in public firms. The average largest shareholder in private (public) Norwegian firms keeps the same stake in 82% (14%) of two consecutive years. This evidence suggests that...Read more
Banks are special, and so is the corporate governance of banks and other financial institutions as compared with the general corporate governance of non-banks. Empirical evidence, mostly gathered after the financial crisis, confirms this. Banks...Read more
This article argues that there is a fundamental mismatch between the nature of finance and current approaches to financial regulation. Today’s financial system is a dynamic and complex ecosystem. For these and other reasons, policy makers and...Read more
We analyze compensation design in banks. Specifically, we document associations with firm characteristics, time-series trends, pay-for-performance sensitivities, performance based pay, and the sensitivity of firm-related wealth to changes in...Read more