This is the first chapter in a volume on ?Boards and Shareholders in European Listed Companies: Facts, Context and Post-Crisis Reforms? (M. Belcredi and G. Ferrarini eds., Cambridge University Press forthcoming 2013).
We offer an overview of the volume, placing the same in the context of recent EU reforms and of corporate governance theory, and summarizing the main outcomes of the various chapters. In addition, we offer some policy perspectives based on the theoretical and empirical outcomes of the research project of which this volume is the product. We analyse four main topics in the corporate governance of European listed firms: board structure/composition and its interaction with ownership structure, board remuneration, shareholder activism and corporate governance disclosure based on the ?comply-or-explain? approach. For each of them, this volume provides new evidence and derives specific implications, relevant for the policy debate. Basically, proposals aimed at increasing disclosure and accountability at the European level look generally well-grounded: this is true, in particular, for disclosure about managerial compensation and compliance with national governance codes based on the ?comply-or-explain? principle. On the opposite, we suggest caution when evaluating proposals targeting specific governance arrangements, which may actually lead to unintended consequences. Even though the Commission has ? so far ? refrained from adopting an excessively intrusive stance, further analysis may be needed before intervening in the fields of board composition and shareholder activism.
The stylized fact that grounds much of the recent literature on common ownership is the parallel increase in the profitability of oligopolistic industries and common ownership. Some have argued that the growth in common ownership has caused the...Read more
We survey law firms, firms and institutional investors to better understand their preferred method of intracorporate dispute resolution in Brazil. Consistent with a number of theories, we find that these organizations prefer arbitration to...Read more
A 1970 New York Times essay on corporate social responsibility by Milton Friedman is often said to have launched a shareholder-focused reorientation of managerial priorities in America’s public companies. The essay correspondingly is a primary...Read more
This paper critiques an assessment by Bebchuk and Tallarita (BT) of the relative merits of shareholder and stakeholder governance. BT’s paper argues that stakeholder governance is either nothing more than enlightened shareholder value, or it...Read more