Following surprise independent director departures, affected firms have worse stock and
operating performance, are more likely to restate earnings, face shareholder litigation,
suffer from an extreme negative return event, and make worse mergers and acquisitions.
The announcement returns to surprise director departures are negative, suggesting that
the market infers bad news from surprise departur
es. We use exogenous variation in
independent director departures triggered by director deaths to test whether surprise
independent director departures cause these negative outcomes or whether an anticipation of negative outcomes is responsible for the surprise director departure. Our evidence is more consistent with the latter.
Mergers and acquisitions are often motivated by the intention of creating value from intangible assets. We develop a novel word list of intangibles and apply it to takeover announcements. Deals presented with more “intangibles talk” complete more...Read more
Cross-border venture capital (VC) investments play an important role in the scaling up of high-growth companies. However, policymakers worry that foreign VC investments transfer the majority of economic activity to the investor country. On the...Read more
This paper provides an overview of the academic literature on the market for corporate control, and focuses specifically on firms’ performance around and after a takeover. Despite the aggregate M&A market amounting to several trillions USD on...Read more
Recent scholarship considers anticompetitive effects of common concentrated ownership. Empirical evidence reporting that common concentrated owners (“CCOs”) are associated with higher prices and lower output poses a sharp challenge to antitrust...Read more