This paper studies the factors that influence the CEO succession decision in family firms
whose incumbent CEO is a member of the controlling family. The sample includes all
such firms from France, Germany and the UK. We propose a new measure of directors?
independence, which adjusts for various links with the controlling family. While we find that conventionally defined directors?
independence has no impact on the CEO succession decision, our corrected measure reduces the likelihood of the successor being another family member. There is also evidence that firms from France that are cross-listed in the UK or USA are less likely to appoint another family CEO.
This paper studies CEO re-appointment and succession events in listed family firms with an incumbent family CEO in France, Germany and the UK over 2001-2016. The paper explores whether family firms with a founder CEO are more likely to engage in...Read more
This paper examines the effect of board gender diversity on renewable energy consumption. Using a sample of 11,677 firm-year observations from the USA for 2008–2016, we find a positive relationship between board gender diversity and renewable...Read more
This paper studies how managers react to shareholder empowerment vis-à-vis governance provisions. We show that a staggered legislative change that increases noncompliance costs in the implementation of shareholder-initiated majority voting...Read more
In order to favor shareholder investment over a longer time horizon, Italy introduced loyalty shares in late 2014, which allow double voting rights after a two-year continuous holding period. Italian listed firms which adopted loyalty shares (...Read more