This paper studies the factors that influence the CEO succession decision in family firms
whose incumbent CEO is a member of the controlling family. The sample includes all
such firms from France, Germany and the UK. We propose a new measure of directors?
independence, which adjusts for various links with the controlling family. While we find that conventionally defined directors?
independence has no impact on the CEO succession decision, our corrected measure reduces the likelihood of the successor being another family member. There is also evidence that firms from France that are cross-listed in the UK or USA are less likely to appoint another family CEO.
CEOs of public companies have influence over the political spending of their firms, which has been attracting significant attention since the Supreme Court decision in Citizens United. Furthermore, the policy views expressed by CEOs receive...Read more
Exploiting the 2009 amendments to Regulation S-K, we provide unique evidence on the first-time disclosure of the reasons firms state for combining (separating) the roles of CEO and chairman. The stated reasons support both agency theory and...Read more
Using more than 50,000 firm-years from 1988 to 2015, we show that the empirical relation between a firm’s Tobin’s q and managerial ownership is systematically negative. When we restrict our sample to larger firms as in the prior literature, our...Read more
We examine the potential for management-worker alliances when employees have substantial voting rights, and how such alliances affect the balance of power between managers and shareholders. We find that substantial employee voting rights...Read more