Corporate Governance in the Presence of Active and Passive Delegated Investment

Corporate Governance in the Presence of Active and Passive Delegated Investment

Adrian Aycan Corum, Andrey Malenko, Nadya Malenko

Series number :

Serial Number: 
695/2020

Date posted :

August 26 2020

Last revised :

March 03 2021
SSRN Share

Keywords

  • Corporate governance • 
  • delegated asset management • 
  • Passive Funds • 
  • index funds • 
  • competition • 
  • Investment Stewardship • 
  • engagement

We examine the governance role of delegated portfolio managers. In our model, investors decide how to allocate their wealth between passive funds, active funds, and private savings, and fund fees are endogenously determined. Funds' ownership stakes and fees determine their incentives to engage in governance.

Whether passive fund growth improves governance depends on whether it crowds out private savings or active funds. In the former case, it improves governance even though it is accompanied by lower fund fees, whereas in the latter case it can be detrimental to governance. Overall, passive fund growth improves governance only if it does not increase fund investors' returns too much. Regulations that decrease funds' costs of engagement can be opposed by both fund investors and fund managers even though they are value-increasing.

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Authors

Real name:
Adrian Aycan Corum
Real name:
Andrey Malenko