This website uses cookies to help us give you the best experience when you visit our website. By continuing to use this website, you consent to our use of these cookies.
Read more
We develop a theory of optimal bank leverage in which the benefit of debt in inducing
loan monitoring is balanced against the benefit of equity in attenuating risk-shifting.
However, faced with socially-costly correlated bank failures, regulators bail out creditors.
Anticipation of this generates multiple equilibria, including one with systemic risk in which
banks use excessive leverage to fund co
rrelated, inefficiently risky loans. Limiting leverage and resolving both moral hazards?insufficient loan monitoring and asset substitution?requires a novel two-tiered capital requirement, including a ?special capital account? that is unavailable to creditors upon failure.
Alibaba, the e-commerce giant that completed a record-breaking IPO in the United States in 2014 and in mid-2020 was valued at over $500 billion, is one of...
This article examines the economic underpinnings of the concept of corporate purpose, which has gained increasing attention from business academics,...