We develop a theory of optimal bank leverage in which the benefit of debt in inducing
loan monitoring is balanced against the benefit of equity in attenuating risk-shifting.
However, faced with socially-costly correlated bank failures, regulators bail out creditors.
Anticipation of this generates multiple equilibria, including one with systemic risk in which
banks use excessive leverage to fund co
rrelated, inefficiently risky loans. Limiting leverage and resolving both moral hazards?insufficient loan monitoring and asset substitution?requires a novel two-tiered capital requirement, including a ?special capital account? that is unavailable to creditors upon failure.
Banks are special, and so is the corporate governance of banks and other financial institutions as compared with the general corporate governance of non-banks. Empirical evidence, mostly gathered after the financial crisis, confirms this. Banks...Read more
The global financial crisis highlighted the interconnectedness of international financial markets and the risk of contagion it posed. The crisis also emphasized the importance of supranational regulation and regulatory cooperation to address that...Read more
We examine the link between CEO overconfidence and speed of adjustment (SOA) of cash holdings for listed US firms. We find a negative effect of overconfident CEOs on the SOA. Further, CEO overconfidence increases the asymmetry in the SOA between...Read more
This article argues that there is a fundamental mismatch between the nature of finance and current approaches to financial regulation. Today’s financial system is a dynamic and complex ecosystem. For these and other reasons, policy makers and...Read more