Activism and Empire Building

Nickolay Gantchev, Merih Sevilir, Anil Shivdasani

Series number :

Serial Number:

575/2018

Date posted :

September 27 2018

Last revised :

September 25 2018

SSRN Suggested citation Download this paper Open PDF

Keywords

shareholder activism •
Hedge Funds •
mergers and acquisitions •
Corporate governance •
empire building

We study the role of hedge fund activists in curbing empire building. We show that firms with poor acquisition records are more likely to become activist targets. Following activist intervention, targeted firms make fewer acquisitions but obtain substantially higher abnormal returns.

These firms avoid large transactions, diversifying deals, and refrain from announcing deals during merger waves. After an activist campaign, targets increase the pace of divestitures and achieve higher announcement and long-term returns from divestitures than firms without activist intervention. Our results are consistent with a treatment effect whereby the activists’ interventions both improve their targets’ acquisition strategy and lower reluctance to divest assets. Our findings highlight an important channel through which activists improve the efficiency of public companies.

View full abstract