Finance Series Self-expropriation versus self-interest in dual-class voting: the Pirelli case study Working Paper Author/Authors Marco Bigelli University of Bologna Stefano Mengoli Series number: 294/2010 Date published: 01 Jan 2009 Last revised: 29 Dec 2010 Quick links Access Paper on SSRN Categories Dual Class Shares Voting Keywords shareholders expropriation, Shareholders voting, dual-class shares, Conflict of interest, Media independence
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