Corruption-related disclosure in the banking industry: Evidence from GIPSI countries

This paper empirically investigates corruption-related disclosure in the banking industry, aiming to identify the most relevant theories which explain why financial institutions disclose corruption-related information to the public in their annual financial reports. Using a total sample of 88 banks from the GIPSI countries during the period 2011-2019, our results reveal that, on average, banks involved in corruption issues disclose less on corruption-related information than banks not involved in any corruption scandal. Moreover, banks not involved in corruption cases disclose even more information after other banks’ corruption events become public. These basic relationships, however, are shaped by the characteristics of each particular country in terms of control of corruption and the specific regulation on non-traditional banking activities. Our results are robust to different specifications of econometric models, and to alternative empirical methods accounting for potential reverse causality and sample selection concerns.