Professor Jun Yang

Professor Yang’s research focuses on corporate finance, corporate governance, executive compensation, and FinTech. Professor Yang’s work investigates opportunistic managerial behavior related to compensation peer benchmarking, executive pensions, and various factors that may affect the nature of director independence.

Academic Degrees

• Ph.D., Washington University in Saint Louis, 2005

Selected Publications

• Cai, Y., Xu, J., and Yang, J. (2021). Paying by Donating: Corporate Donations Affiliated with Independent Directors. Review of Financial Studies, 34(2), 618-660.
• Liao, L., Wang, Z., Xiang, J., Yan, H., and Yang, J. (2021). User Interface and First-hand Experience in Retail Investing. Review of Financial Studies 34(5), 4486-4523.
• Stefanescu, I., Wang, Y., Xie, K., and Yang, J. (2018). Pay Me Now (and Later): Pension Benefit Manipulation before Plan Freezes and Executive Retirement. Journal of Financial Economics, 127(1), 152-173.
• Beneish, M. D., Marshall, C., and Yang, J. (2017). Explaining CEO Retention in Misreporting Firms. Journal of Financial Economics, 123(3), 512–535.
• Xu, J., and Yang, J. (2016). Golden Hellos: Signing Bonuses for New Top Executives. Journal of Financial Economics, 122(1), 175-195.
• Faulkender, M., and Yang, J. (2013). Is Disclosure an Effective Cleansing Mechanism? The Dynamics of Compensation Peer Benchmarking. Review of Financial Studies, 26(3), 806-839.
• Baranchuk, N., MacDonald, G., and Yang, J. (2011). The Economics of Super Managers. Review of Financial Studies, 24(10), 3321-3368.
• Yang, J. (2010). Timing of Effort and Reward: Three-sided Moral Hazard in a Continuous-Time Model. Management Science, 56(9), 1568-1583.
• Faulkender, M., and Yang, J. (2010). Inside the Black Box: The Role and Composition of Compensation Peer Groups. Journal of Financial Economics, 96(2), 257-270.
• Baranchuk, N., Dybvig, P., and Yang, J. (2010). Renegotiation-Proof Contracting, Disclosure, and Incentives for Efficient Investment. Journal of Economic Theory, 145(5), 1805-1836.