Published in
Published in:
Publication Title:
AKEOVERS IN ENGLISH AND GERMAN LAW
Description:
J. Payne, ed., p. 33-63, Hart, 2002
Takeovers, Secrecy, and Conflicts of Interest: Problems for Boards and Banks
Real name:
Fellow, Research Member
Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law
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