This paper argues that a mitigated strict liability regime can incentivize Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) to produce ratings as accurate as the available forecasting technology
allows. A damage cap based on objective factors is introduced in order to avoid crushing liability. Moreover, CRAs are allowed to choose how much to commit to their predictions. CRAs may opt out of liability even entirely, unless their ratings are relevant for regulation. Finally, corrections in the relevant timeframe for the imposition of liability are introduced in order to protect CRAs from systemic risk.
In recent times, there has been an unprecedented surge in national security review (NSR) measures, with host jurisdictions implementing restrictions...
The phenomenon of groups of companies is very common in modern corporate reality. The empirical data on groups of companies are heterogeneous because...
The debate on banking regulation has been dominated by flawed and misleading claims. Such claims provided the basis for poorly designed rules. Despite...