Using a new dataset of corporate voting-rights from 1971 to 2015, we find that young dual-class firms trade at a premium and operate at least as efficiently as young single-class firms. As dualclass firms mature, their valuation declines, and they become less efficient in their margins, innovation, and labor productivity compared to their single-class counterparts.
Voting premiums increase with firm age, suggesting that private benefits increase over maturity. Most sunset provisions that dual-class firms adopt are ineffective. Our findings suggest that effective, timeconsistent sunset provisions would be based on age or on inferior shareholders’ periodic right to eliminate dual-class voting.
We analyze the impact of a large shareholder disclosing its voting decisions prior to shareholder meetings on final vote outcomes for management and...
This paper analyzes the reputational effects of forced CEO turnovers on outside directors. We find that directors interlocked to a forced CEO turnover...