Institutional Debt Holdings and Governance

Institutional Debt Holdings and Governance

Aneel Keswani, Anh Tran, Paolo Volpin

Series number :

Serial Number: 
613/2019

Date posted :

July 15 2019

Last revised :

July 12 2019
SSRN Share

Keywords

  • Corporate governance • 
  • institutional investors • 
  • agency costs of debt

Using data on the universe of US-based mutual funds, we find that two out of five fund families hold corporate bonds of firms in which they also own an equity stake. We show that the greater the fraction of debt a fund family holds in a given firm, the greater its propensity to vote in line with the interests of firm debt holders at shareholder meetings.

In addition, portfolio firms tend to make corporate decisions that appear more in the interests of debt holders than shareholders when mutual fund companies hold more of their debt as compared to their equity.

Authors

Real name:
Aneel Keswani
Real name:
Anh Tran