Implicit Communication and Enforcement of Corporate Disclosure Regulation

Implicit Communication and Enforcement of Corporate Disclosure Regulation

Ashiq Ali, Jill Fisch, Hoyoun Kyung

Series number :

Serial Number: 
635/2019

Date posted :

November 13 2019

Last revised :

August 12 2020
SSRN Share

Keywords

  • Implicit Communications • 
  • Corporate Disclosure Regulation • 
  • SEC Enforcement • 
  • Regulation Fair Disclosure

This study examines the challenge of implicit communication -- qualitative statements, tone, and non-verbal cues -- to the effectiveness of enforcing corporate disclosure regulation.

We use a Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) setting, given that the SEC adopted the regulation recognizing that managers can convey non-public information privately not just through explicit quantitative disclosures but also through implicit communication. In a highprofile enforcement action, however, the court focused on a literal examination of the manager’s language rather than his positive spin to conclude that the SEC had been “too demanding” in examining the manager’s statements and that its enforcement policy was “overly aggressive.” We provide empirical evidence suggesting that selective disclosure from managers to financial analysts increased significantly after the court’s ruling. We also report survey responses from 60 securities lawyers with Reg FD expertise which support the proposition that this increase in disclosure is more likely due to an increase in implicit communication than in explicit communication or any other reason. Our results highlight the challenges associated with enforcing corporate disclosure regulation in the context of implicit communication.

Published in

Published in: 
Date: 
Friday, October 25, 2019

Authors

Real name:
Ashiq Ali
Real name:
Research Member, Board Member
University of Pennsylvania Law School
Real name:
Hoyoun Kyung