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A central challenge in the regulation of controlled firms is curbing rent extraction by controllers. As independent directors and fiduciary duties are often insufficient, some jurisdictions give minority shareholders veto rights over related-party transactions.
To assess these rights’ effectiveness, we exploit a 2011 Israeli reform that gave minority shareholders veto rights over related-party transactions, including the pay of controllers and their relatives (“controller executives”). We find that the reform curbed controller-executive pay and led some controller executives to resign or go with little or no pay in circumstances suggesting their pay would be rejected. These findings suggest that minority veto rights can be an effective corporate governance tool.
Alibaba, the e-commerce giant that completed a record-breaking IPO in the United States in 2014 and in mid-2020 was valued at over $500 billion, is one of...
Dynastic-controlled firms are led by founding family CEOs while the family owns an insignificant share of equity (defined as less than five percent)....