Equity research analysts tend to cover firms about which they have favorable views. We exploit this tendency to infer analysts' preferences for corporate policies from their coverage decisions. We then use exogenous analyst disappearances to examine the effect of these preferences on corporate policies.
After an analyst disappears, firms change their policies in the direction opposite to the analyst's preferences. The influence of analyst preferences on policies is stronger for firms for which analyst coverage is likely to matter more: young firms, and firms with higher market valuations. Our results suggest that firms choose their corporate policies, in part, to be consistent with the preferences of their analysts.
Understanding an entrepreneurial finance ecosystem requires an appreciation of how different investors interact with each other. Angels and venture capitalists constitute two very important investors in start-ups. We develop and empirically test...Read more
We use equity crowdfunding data to ask how fundraising amounts can be explained by what entrepreneurs ask for, versus what investors want to invest. The analysis exploits unique features of crowdfunding where entrepreneurs not only set investment...Read more
This study documents how group trademarks, comprising the business group’s name and logo, can be used for the benefit of controlling families at the expense of outside minority shareholders. Using a sample of business groups in Korea, we find...Read more
US corporate law and, in particular, Delaware law, which leaves ample room to freedom of contract, has been one of the reasons for the successful creation and financing of startups in Silicon Valley. We analyze the Italian attempt to modernize...Read more