Equity research analysts tend to cover firms about which they have favorable views. We exploit this tendency to infer analysts' preferences for corporate policies from their coverage decisions. We then use exogenous analyst disappearances to examine the effect of these preferences on corporate policies.
After an analyst disappears, firms change their policies in the direction opposite to the analyst's preferences. The influence of analyst preferences on policies is stronger for firms for which analyst coverage is likely to matter more: young firms, and firms with higher market valuations. Our results suggest that firms choose their corporate policies, in part, to be consistent with the preferences of their analysts.
We argue that CEOs have diﬀerent attitudes toward the ﬁrm’s stakeholders and that these diﬀerences in attitudes aﬀect the ﬁrm’s decision making. We hypothesize that these diﬀerences stem from diﬀerences in political ideology: Liberal CEOs, as...Read more
We examine how negative liquidity shocks to shareholders propagate to the firm. Analyzing regulatory changes to personal wealth taxation in Norway, we show that higher taxes on the home of private firms’ controlling shareholders are associated...Read more
We use a unique dataset to examine the link between ESG disclosure and quality through a cross-country comparison of disclosure requirements and stewardship codes. We find a strong relationship between the extent of ESG disclosure and the quality...Read more
The last decade has challenged the paradigm of the hedge fund industry as a unique performer. We identify three main factors that have affected the operation of hedge funds: competition from mutual funds, the market environment, and tighter...Read more