This paper examines the effect of disclosure regulation on the takeover market. We study the implementation of a recent European regulation that imposes tighter disclosure requirements regarding the financial and ownership information on public firms.
We find a substantial drop in the number of control acquisitions after the implementation of the regulation, a decrease that is concentrated in countries with more dynamic takeover markets. Consistent with the idea that the disclosure requirements increased acquisition costs, we also observe that, under the new disclosure regime, target (acquirer) stock returns around the acquisition announcement are higher (lower), and toeholds are substantially smaller. Overall, our evidence suggests that tighter disclosure requirements can impose significant acquisition costs on bidders and thus slow down takeover activity.
The chapter provides an overview on EU Insider Law. It includes comparative remarks on US and explores insider law under the EU Markets in Crypto Assets...
The EU Takeover Bids Directive was passed twenty years ago with the main objective of promoting a single European takeover market. The primary mechanism...
In recent times, there has been an unprecedented surge in national security review (NSR) measures, with host jurisdictions implementing restrictions...