Disclosure Regulation and Corporate Acquisitions

Disclosure Regulation and Corporate Acquisitions

Pietro Bonetti, Miguel Duro, Gaizka Ormazabal

Series number :

Serial Number: 
654/2020

Date posted :

January 31 2020

Last revised :

January 31 2020
SSRN Share

Keywords

  • disclosure regulation • 
  • takeover market • 
  • takeover laws • 
  • mergers and acquisitions

This paper examines the effect of disclosure regulation on the takeover market. We study the implementation of a recent European regulation that imposes tighter disclosure requirements regarding the financial and ownership information on public firms.

We find a substantial drop in the number of control acquisitions after the implementation of the regulation, a decrease that is concentrated in countries with more dynamic takeover markets. Consistent with the idea that the disclosure requirements increased acquisition costs, we also observe that, under the new disclosure regime, target (acquirer) stock returns around the acquisition announcement are higher (lower), and toeholds are substantially smaller. Overall, our evidence suggests that tighter disclosure requirements can impose significant acquisition costs on bidders and thus slow down takeover activity.

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Authors

Real name:
Pietro Bonetti
Real name:
Miguel Duro