We investigate how company-level corporate governance practices and country-level legal investor protection jointly affect company performance. We find that in any legal regime a few specific governance practices improve performance.
Companies with good governance practices operating in stringent legal environments, however, show a valuation discount relative to similar companies operating in flexible legal environments. At the same time, a stronger country-level regime does not reduce the valuation discount of companies with weak governance practices. Our analysis suggests a threshold level of country development above which stringent regulation hurts the performance of well governed companies or has a neutral effect for poorly governed companies.
In recent times, there has been an unprecedented surge in national security review (NSR) measures, with host jurisdictions implementing restrictions...
The phenomenon of groups of companies is very common in modern corporate reality. The empirical data on groups of companies are heterogeneous because...
The debate on banking regulation has been dominated by flawed and misleading claims. Such claims provided the basis for poorly designed rules. Despite...