Series:
Finance
Agency versus Hold-up: Benefits and Costs of Shareholder Rights
Agency versus Hold-up: Benefits and Costs of Shareholder Rights
Series number :
Serial Number:
500/2017
Agency versus Hold-up: Benefits and Costs of Shareholder Rights
Dr.
Real name:
Christoph Wenk
University of Zurich
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