Active Short Selling By Hedge Funds

Active Short Selling By Hedge Funds

Jordan Bulka, Ian Appel, Vyacheslav Fos

Series number :

Serial Number: 
609/2019

Date posted :

July 01 2019

Last revised :

February 11 2020
SSRN Share

Keywords

  • Activist Hedge Funds • 
  • Short Selling

We examine the role of strategic communication in public short selling campaigns by hedge funds. Such campaigns are associated with abnormal returns for targets of approximately -7\% as well as changes in the behavior of stakeholders (e.g., other short sellers). The effects are driven by campaigns that feature specific allegations rather than general claims of overvaluation.

Campaigns are primarily undertaken by activist hedge funds, particularly those that have more experience or employ hostile tactics. Overall, our findings are consistent with models of strategic communication in which investor reputation and the credibility of allegations facilitates the flow of negative information into prices.

Authors

Prof.
Real name:
Ian Appel
Boston College
Real name:
Jordan Bulka