Discussion of Brav & Lund:

Fund Flows, Financing Decisions, and Institutional Ownership of U.S. Public Equity

Martin Schmalz, Oxford SBS, CEPR & ECGI

Disclaimer: my personal views. Not the opinion of the PCAOB, its board, board members, or staff.

Overview


- My priors before reading this paper
- Challenges to my prior from this paper
 - A subset of the facts from the paper seriously challenge my priors
 - Great! Sufficient reason the paper makes an important contribution!
 - Trigger warning: some of my priors challenge the paper's priors

Comments

- 1. Clarification of the research question
- 2. Some questions on measurement (mostly for the authors)
- 3. Conversation starter: do the new facts support the policy messages?


My priors (with apologies for self-references)

My prior #1: Mergers & low fees drive increase in corporate <u>ownership concentration</u> by the Big-3




Amel-Zadeh, Kasperk & Schmalz (2023), "Mavericks, universal, and common owners"

My prior #2: declining "passive" fees shift savings from "bonds" to equity; from stocks to index funds



Schmalz & Zame (2023) "Does cheap diversification benefit investors?"

My prior #2: declining "passive" fees shift savings from "bonds" to equity; from stocks to index funds



Not wrong (underline added): "previous studies have focused <u>almost</u> exclusively on the idea that investors withdraw funds from actively managed funds and invest it in passive funds. "

My prior #3: a big part of aggregate payouts to equity holders are financed with debt

Financing Payouts

Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Forthcoming

82 Pages • Posted: 9 Dec 2014 • Last revised: 26 Apr 2024

Joan Farre-Mensa University of Illinois at Chicago - Department of Finance

Roni Michaely The University of Hong Kong; ECGI

Martin C. Schmalz CEPR; University of Oxford - Finance; CESifo; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Date Written: February 15, 2024

Abstract

We find that 43% of firms that make payouts also raise capital during the same year, resulting in 31% of aggregate payouts being externally financed, primarily with debt. Most financed payouts cannot be explained by payout-smoothing in response to volatile earnings or investment—rather, they are the result of firms persistently setting payouts above free cash flow. In fact, 25% of aggregate payouts could not have been paid without the firms simultaneously raising capital. Profitable firms with moderate growth use debt-financed payouts to jointly manage their leverage and cash, thus highlighting the close relationship between payout and capital structure decisions.

- Debt-financing of payouts implies gross flows to the equity market do not equal net inflows
- So we knew that.
- What we don't know: How big is the difference? Does it matter?

Farre-Mensa, Michaely & Schmalz, JFQA, 2024

My prior #4: variation in <u>common ownership</u> and driven by mergers and by active portfolio decisions

Republic S	%	File	Waste Mgmt	%	File	Rollins	%	File
Cascade Inv	34.1	13-D	Vanguard	8.3	13-F	LOR Inc	45.1	13-D
BlackRock	6.3	13-F	BlackRock	7.2	13-F	Vanguard	5.5	13-F
Vanguard	5.7	13-F	State Street	4.8	13-F	Stichting Pe.	3.7	13-F
State Street	3.3	13-F	Gates Found.	4.4	13-F	BlackRock	3.6	13-F
TRowe Price	3.2	13-F	Cascade Inv	3.9	13-G	State Street	2.2	13-F

Top 5 owners Q4 2020

Schmalz (2017), Amel-Zadeh, Kasperk & Schmalz (2023)

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Top 5 owners Q4 2020										

- Similar: Pershing's holdings of Domino's Pizza, Burger King, Chipotle's
- Variation *not* driven by passive index funds' holdings. Red herring.

Schmalz (2017), Amel-Zadeh, Kasperk & Schmalz (2023)

My prior #5: buybacks can impact ownership structure of individual firms




A Wells Fargo branch is seen in the Chicago suburb of Evanston, Illinois, February 10, 2015. REUTERS/Jim Young *Purchase Licensing Rights*

(Reuters) - Warren Buffett's Berkshire Hathaway Inc is seeking permission from the Federal Reserve to increase its ownership stake in Wells Fargo & Co , after reaching the 10 percent level that could prompt increased regulatory scrutiny.

According to papers obtained by Reuters on Friday, Berkshire said it learned in mid-March that its Wells Fargo stake, including 2.01 million shares held by Buffett, had reached 10.01 percent because of buybacks by the San Francisco-based bank, which decreased the number of shares outstanding.

Not just once.



Berkshire's BofA Stake Climbs Past 10% Amid Bank's Buybacks

- Buffett's company said it owns 950 million shares in lender
- The 10% threshold in banks often requires regulatory review

By Katherine Chiglinsky


July 26, 2019 at 12:02 AM GMT+2 Updated on July 26, 2019 at 1:56 AM GMT+2

□ Save

This article is for **subscribers only**.

Berkshire Hathaway Inc.'s stake in Bank of America Corp. crept above 10%, crossing a threshold that's caused the conglomerate headaches in the past, as the bank bought back its own stock.

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
What we know and didn't know

- So, I also knew buybacks can and occasionally do increase ownership stakes of non-participating shareholders
- What we didn't know (I think):
 - How big is the difference between gross and net flows into equity?
 - How big is the effect of buybacks on the increase in % ownership of particular investors?
 - Does it quantitatively matter to help understand (or "explain"?) the growth of institutional ownership in U.S. equities?

How the paper challenges / moves / complements my priors


How this paper moves my priors

• **Quantitatively speaking**, the increase of "Big-3" % U.S. corporate ownership is <u>not</u> due to gross inflows into Big-3 funds but due to relative shifts & buybacks causing negative equity market flows.



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That seems to matter for macro-finance models!

Comment 1: Clarification of the research question


Clarification of the research question

- Do you wish to offer a decomposition of the growth of *institutions*? Or of growth of ownership at the **issuer level**?
 - Why this matters: Cascade is a small firm, but a big common owner.
 - Growth of institution only implies growth of issuer-level ownership if everyone holds a value-weighted portfolio. That is not so.
 - Ownership in paper: hard-wired feature of *institution;* doesn't vary by *issuer*.
- Or is it about "why certain institutions have / their ownership has grown faster than others"?
 - Then, that's a cross-sectional question? (My prior: fees, mergers.)
 - Not a question about whether negative market flows explain slow increase in institution size in the time series?

Comment 2: questions on measurement

Check on assumptions behind decomposition


- Paper: passive funds don't participate in repurchases
 - Is that so?



P is holding a value-weighted "market" portfolio

Illustration of an arguable assumption

Picture after issuer 1 repurchased 50% of its shares, without P participating



P is no longer holding a value-weighted market portfolio!

Makes me wonder: do passive funds really not sell into repurchases / rebalance?

More questions on assumptions

- "The sum of all funds' assets under management must equal the value of the market: $\sum AUMit = Mt$."
 - If institutional ownership is 100% of the market at all times, how can there be % ownership growth of institutional investors?

Questions on other assumptions

• In the appendix, for the authors

Why only use 13-F institutional investor data?

- Calculating Tesla ownership without E. Musk seems problematic?
 - Also: should we really call all non-13F owners "retail investors"?
 - LOR, Inc?
- Corporateownershipdata.com also has Form-3/4/5 data
 - Publicly available. Join in the effort and help improve!



Comment 3: do policy suggestions follow from the analysis?

Do the policy conclusions necessarily follow from the analysis?

- To be clear: The facts, taken at face value, move my prior!
 - They clearly matter for macro models. Sufficient, to my taste!
- But do they have the implications for policy the authors suggest?
 - "Radical" proposals to address anticompetitive effects of common ownership
 - "Premature" concerns about lacking effort to improve governance by "passive" institutions depend on assuming continued growth. (Do they?)
 - "Drastic" changes to the industrial organization of asset management (concretely: whether voting should be under centralized control)

- "Big-3 cumulatively own less than 20% of the market."
 - Yes. That's <u>on average</u>. Driven by smaller, non-S&P 500 companies.
 - In single-class S&P 500 firms, <u>average</u> ownership approaches 25%.

Why does <u>average</u> ownership matter for governance? Isn't what matters the ownership of particular firms / industries?

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
Why does <u>average</u> ownership matter for governance? Isn't what matters the ownership of particular firms / industries?

CoreCivic	Common Stock Equivalent Held	% Of CS0 ▽	GEO		Common Stock Equivalent Held 🖓	<u>% Of CS0</u> 🖓
BlackRock, Inc. (NYSE:BLK)		16.749	BlackRock, Inc. (NYSE:BLK)	~	19,299,229	14.479
			The Vanguard Group, Inc.	\mathbf{v}	13,576,093	10.185
The Vanguard Group, Inc. 🔍 🗸	12,431,888	11.174				
			FMR LLC	~	8,350,131	6.265
River Road Asset Management,	8,659,179	7.783				
LLC			UBS Asset Management AG	~	6,337,106	4.754
FMR LLC	5,067,435	4.555				
	_,		Goldman Sachs Group, Investment Banking and Securities Investments	~	6,137,948	4.605
State Street Global Advisors, Inc.	4,263,987	3.833	State Street Global Advisors, Inc.	~	4,611,475	3.460

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Amel-Zadeh, Kasperk & Schmalz (2023)

- Take at face value, the result that corporate actions drive % growth in Big-3 ownership
- Does that invalidate Bebchuk & Hirst (2019) prediction that

"the combined average ownership stake of the Big Three will rise to 27.6% in ten years, and to 33.4% of S&P 500 equity in twenty years."

?

• Or are you saying the prediction may be valid, but not for the reason they state?

• "Vanguard's ownership continues to trend upward, <u>but</u> its scaled flows have declined more recently towards zero."

Does the <u>latter</u> make previous proposals to improve governance less urgent?

Isn't whether rather than why Vanguard continues to grow the question?

Recall: The effect of V's ownership doesn't depend on the <u>intention</u> to own a lot, or an intention to have effects on governance or competition.

Competition concerns are <u>NOT</u> about collusion. (Antón et al. JPE 2023)

(Similar: banking regulatory ownership thresholds don't depend on intent?)

Provocative claim: It doesn't really matter <u>for governance</u> which mechanical feature caused the growth in ownership. The level of ownership matters.

- Antitrust regulators should scrutinize mergers of asset managers for their impact on product market of portfolio firms
 - I agree!
 - Does that follow from the novel part of the analysis, that % ownership growth comes from buybacks?
- In sum, I think the findings matter! In particular for quantitative macro-finance models.
 - Do they also matter for governance?

Summary

Summary

- Exceptionally careful writing (e.g. not: "index funds")
- Clear contribution (AFAIK) to document to which extent growth of % ownership by institutions is driven by corporate actions vs market inflows vs relative shifts across funds.
- Conversation starter: do the facts support the policy conclusions?

Appendix

Appendix

- Do passive flows react to past performance?
- Is that right? "a dollar flow to a small institution affects ownership far more than it does at a larger institution."
- Aren't there taxes on distributions / realized gains that should get reflected in the accounting?

Comments on IV, Implications for law

- Most correct and complete coverage of the common-ownership literature in a recent law review paper. Thank you!
 - (Though misses responses to Dennis et al. showing their claims are factually incorrect.)
- No: the idea of common ownership is <u>not</u> that horizontal shareholders would prefer "collusion"
 - All shareholders, horizontal or not, prefer collusion
 - Horizontal ownership obviates the need for collusion because it reduces incentives to compete (Rotemberg 1984), or it causes higher prices because it reduces incentives to invest in cost-reducing governance (Antón et al. JPE 2023)
- Harm need not come from *institutional* common ownership!
 - Non-13F data are important! Bill Gates! Pershing!