The Power of the Narrative in Corporate Lawmaking

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Abstract

The notion of stock-market-driven short-termism relentlessly whittling away at the American economy’s foundations is widely accepted and highly salient. Presidential candidates state as much. Senators introduce bills assuming as much. Corporate interests argue as much to the Securities and Exchange Commission and the corporate law courts. Yet the academic evidence as to the problem’s severity is no more than mixed. What explains this gap between widespread belief and weak evidence?

This Article explores the role of narrative power. Some ideas are better at being popular than others. The concept of pernicious stock market short-termism has three strong qualities that make its narrative power formidable: (1) connotation — the words themselves tell us what is good (reliable long-term commitment) and what is not (unreliable short-termism); (2) category confusion — disparate types of corporate misbehavior, such as environmental degradation and employee mistreatment, are mislabeled as being truly and primarily short-termism phenomena emanating from truncated corporate time horizons (when they in fact emanate from other misalignments), thereby making us view short-termism as even more rampant and pernicious than it is; and (3) confirmation — the idea is regularly repeated, because it is easy to communicate, and often boosted by powerful agenda-setters who benefit from its repetition.

The Article then highlights the real-world implications of narrative power — powerful narratives can be more certain than the underlying evidence, thereby leading policymakers astray. For example, a favorite remedy for stock-market-driven short-termism is to insulate executives from stock market pressure. If lawmakers believe that short-termism is a primary cause of environmental degradation, anemic research and development, employee mistreatment, and financial crises — as many do — then they are likely to focus on further insulating corporate executives from stock-market accountability. Doing so may, however, do little to alleviate the underlying problems, which would be better handled by, say, stronger environmental regulation and more astute financial regulation. Powerful narratives can drive out good policymaking.

Keywords: corporate governance, short-termism, hedge funds, shareholder activism, behavioral economics, securities regulation, agency costs, research and development, narrative, political economy, corporate interests

JEL Classifications: D72, E71, G18, G34, G38, G41, K22, L21

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INTRODUCTION

The concept of how stock-market-driven short-termism damages the economy is simple and powerful: executives, confronted with a demanding stock market of traders and activists, focus too much on boosting the immediate quarterly financial statements, rather than on the business’s long-term health. Employee well-being, critical research and development, and

* Harvard Law School and Harry Radzyner Law School, respectively. Thanks go to Lucian Bebchuk, Jesse Fried, Jeffrey Gordon, Robert Jackson, Geoffrey Miller, David Hirschleifer, Christophe Moussu, Holger Spamann, Michael Troege, Joshua White, and participants in workshops at ESCP-Europe, the European Law & Economics Association, Harvard Law School, Oxford Law School, Vanderbilt Law School for comments, and to Marcelo Moreno Bonassa, Raffaele Felicetti, Abdurrahman Kayiklik, and Kathy Zhang for research assistance.
long-run capital investment all deteriorate. Because in this view the stock market blocks so many large companies from thinking for the long term, the economy suffers.

The main culprits in this popular view are stock traders and shareholder activists, who are looking for a quick profit and bend large public corporations’ investments to align with the traders’ and activists’ short-run time horizons. Among policymakers, the media, and executives, the consensus is that the short-termism problem is widespread and pernicious—and getting worse. Presidents and presidential candidates say so. Joe Biden wrote an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal, entitled *Short-Termism Saps the Economy.* Corporate law judges also excoriate it. Stock market regulators, responding to political pressure, move combatting short-termism up on their agenda.

Yet the academic evidence for stock-market-driven short-termism as seriously damaging the economy is inconclusive and contested. Surely some companies are, as charged, excessively short-term. But the evidence of grave economy-wide damage is sparse and some of it negative. After all, the largest stock-market capitalizations in the United States are accorded Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Google—all longer-term-oriented companies whose current stock prices cannot be justified by their current earnings.

What explains this wide gap between contradictory academic evidence and assured perniciousness in the popular view? In this Article we examine the role of narrative power. The short-termism idea is popular not because the evidence is conclusive but because the negatives are easily stated, easily understood, and regularly repeated, while the positives (although they appear in the data) need a few moments to visualize and articulate. We highlight the psychological, behavioral bases that make the strongly negative narrative quite believable on its own, as well as the interest-group dynamics that the narrative bolsters. The narrative is persuasive on its own and is also firmly pushed by those who benefit from its being widely believed.

Three strong persuasive channels are in play: connotation, category confusion, and confirmation.

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1 See *infra* notes 4, 30, 60, 114 & 116 and accompanying text (Joseph Biden, Hilary Clinton, Marco Rubio, Donald Trump).
2 Joe Biden, *How Short-Termism Saps the Economy,* WALL ST. J., Sept. 28, 2016, at A13. For the 2020 update, see David Brooks, *President Biden’s First Day—Imagining Jan. 20, 2021,* N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2020 (“asked . . . to describe the big forces that have flattened working-class wages over the decades . . . Biden pointed to two institutional failures—[one being the] broken [character of] Washington and [the other being] the way Wall Street forces business leaders to focus obsessively on the short term.”).
3 See *infra* notes 76, 117 & 118 and accompanying text.
4 In July 2019, for example, the Securities and Exchange Commission—powerful on stock market and short-termism regulation—organized a roundtable on how it could better combat stock-market-driven short-termism. SEC Chair Jay Clayton, Statement on Short-Term/Long-Term Management of Public Companies, July 18, 2019, www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/ statement-clayton-071819. The event appears to have resulted from a presidential tweet pushing the SEC to examine short-term quarterly reporting’s negative impact.
Connotation and vocabulary matter. Initial connotations condition our thinking before we examine evidence.5 With “short-termism,” the initial connotations—of instability, unreliability, uncertainty, and a refusal to follow through—make it seem worse than it is. By contrast, long-termism’s connotations—of reliability, steadfastness, and stable planning—make it seem more desirable. The words themselves evoke a mental image of stock traders frenetically buying and selling, in contrast to construction workers in hard hats building a durable factory. Why do we say that the initial connotations make short-termism seem worse that it is? A deeper analysis than most people’s initial impression would point out the converse: long-term corporate decisionmakers can be stubborn and self-interested, while short-term decisionmakers can be flexible and innovative.6 Yet the public and political sensibilities often hinge on the immediate connotations.

Narrative power depends not just on the connotations that surround how our minds initially receive the idea, but also on how often our environment reminds us of the idea. This is where category confusion comes in. With corporate short-termism, salient phenomena not arising from distorted time horizons are regularly but incorrectly labeled as corporate short-termism. Environmental degradation, for example, is often portrayed as due to stock-market short-termism, when it primarily emanates from the corporation’s ability to offload costs externally to third parties, not from investors’ time horizon. The corporation cheapens its operations to save money at the environment’s expense, thereby benefiting not just short- but also long-term investors. The real policy issue is who pays, not when they pay.7 But when disparate problems such as toxic pollution or employee mistreatment are mislabeled and lumped with truly short-term phenomena (of distorted corporate time horizons), policymakers and the public view short-termism as more rampant and pernicious than it is.

Confirmation and repetition further bolster the belief that it is a major economy-wide problem. The idea is boosted by both naturally-recurring repetition, and intended, interest-driven repetition. Naturally-recurring confirmation comes not just from the real instances of time distortion but also from the just-mentioned category confusion. Interest-driven repetition comes from influential players—namely executives and directors—who benefit if lawmakers believe financial market short-termism is pernicious enough to justify further executive autonomy from financial markets. Since some firms surely are perniciously too short term, these influential agenda-setters can sincerely and vividly identify, emphasize, and replay discovered instances and build supporting narratives. Negative stories of short-termism transmit

7 We see environmental degradation and related climate issues as first order economic issues for the nation and the planet. They are not, however, corporate short-termism issues and thinking that they are will produce ineffective policies. We write this Article partly to better direct the environmental debate away from corporate time horizon issues to real (but harder) regulatory solutions.
well, whereas stories of positive aspects of market feedback to end poor investments are complex and opaque, often dying before their retelling.

Connotation, confusion, and confirmation combine to make the short-termism narrative popularly seen as a major cost to the economy. Stories of real short-termism transmit well, whereas stories of real adaptability are too complex to retell. Opinion leaders state the idea and, if it transmits well and if listeners are receptive, the idea takes off. Repetition reinforces belief. The idea becomes strongly encoded into our brains (because it’s concrete, seems real and deep, with confirming stories) and is frequently cued by our environment (because people’s experiences remind them of it). It persists and prospers as we repeat it to ourselves and to others.

Other academic disciplines are moving faster than law in understanding how narrative power can determine business, economic, and political outcomes. Political scientists and sociologists have long acknowledged the role of narratives in driving lawmaking. And economists have begun recently to grapple with the idea. The recent book by Nobel-Prize-winning Robert Shiller, appropriately entitled *Narrative Economics*, is a case in point. Another comes from another Nobel Laureate, George Akerlof, who criticizes other economists for not paying enough attention to how simple stories influence behavior. Yet another is in David Hirshleifer’s 2020 presidential address to the American Finance Association. And while the legal literature is not devoid of narrative analysis, corporate legal

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12 George A. Akerlof, *Sins of Omissions and the Practice of Economics*, 58 J. ECON. LIT. 405 (2020) (“softer” inputs such as powerful “stories” are often more important than “harder” and easier-to-measure inputs).
14 E.g., Alex Raskolnikov, Narratives Versus Facts in Distributional Debates (Colum. L. Sch. Working paper, 2019); WILLIAM HALTON & MICHAEL MCCANN, DISTORTING THE LAW: POLITICS, MEDIA AND THE LITIGATION CRISIS 137 et seq. (2004) (noting that tort reform was boosted by the belief in a “litigation crisis,” when the on-the-ground evidence was that there was no such crisis); Joseph J. Thordike, *The Durability of a Dysfunctional Tax: Public Opinion and the Failure of Corporate Tax*, 21 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 347, 359 (2012).
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scholarship has largely ignored narrative power. It is time to adopt the tools now available in adjacent disciplines to analyze narrative power in corporate law.

Historically, the plumbing of corporate and securities law rarely engaged public sentiment, thereby making it understandable that corporate law analysis has traditionally focused on factors such as doctrinal path or corporate performance, and ignored the role of narratives. But in an era of increasing populism and burgeoning social media, such as ours, popular narrative, widespread perception, and notions of how-it-will-play in the media are becoming increasingly important in corporate lawmaking. Corporate purpose, stock markets short-termism, stock buybacks, and executive compensation are issues of popular and political discourse, not just of specialists’ analysis. Just this past year, the Business Roundtable—the elite organization of the CEOs of the 200 largest American firms— reframed how they saw corporate purpose. They put shareholders last on their list of stakeholders that needed CEO loyalty. The statement generated wide media discussion, with general circulation media articles triggering thousands of readers’ comments. The kind of narrative analysis we blueprint here will increasingly be needed to understand how corporate law is made.

* * *

A few words on methodology and scope are in order to clarify what we can and cannot show about narrative power. Narrative power has been understudied not just because some scholars have thought it to be unimportant but also because it is fuzzy, making it difficult to capture in neat models or statistical proof or hard lawyer-like logic. Narratives often “sit in the background and are rarely expressed when decisions are made...,” Robert Shiller said. “Thus it becomes difficult to establish a connection between the narratives and the action.” Yet, as he and others have recognized, that challenge should not deter us from trying to better understand narratives’ increasing role. Our analysis here is a first

15 While the power of narrative is not addressed in corporate law thinking in the way that Akerlof, Hirshleifer, and Shiller have started to address it in economics and finance, we are aware of two fine legal efforts to examine a distant cousin to narrative power, in examinations of the gaps between reality and belief in corporate law thinking via symbols and myths. See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbolic Corporate Governance Politics, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1997 (2014); Jonathan R. Macey, The Central Role of Myth in Corporate Law (May 25, 2020), www.ssrn.com/abstract=3435676. Analysis of narrative power does not depend on an underlying falsity to the concept examined. Some narratives, unlike most myths, are true, but weak and fail in policymaking.

16 See generally PEPPER CULPEPPER, QUIET POLITICS AND BUSINESS POWER (2011).


19 See the New York Times comment list for Gelles & Yaffe-Bellany, supra note 18.

20 Schiller, supra note 11, at 93.

21 Id.
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exploratory step toward uncovering narratives' role in corporate law rules' formation and judicial decisionmaking. We address the challenge in studying narratives by examining not just the sensibility and logic of the situation but also the content of media coverage, dictionary definitions, and professional memos. We synthesize insights from the burgeoning, multidisciplinary literature on why favored ideas proliferate and beat out other ideas, emphasizing especially thinking from cognitive linguistics (on how connotations condition beliefs), communication science (on how the media agenda is set), and behavioral economics (on why managers emphasize the perniciousness of stock-market short-termism).

We then link narrative power to traditional political economy modes of inquiry, showing how previously puzzling gaps in political economy explanations for laws' passage or failure can be bridged via narrative power. Political economy analysis has persisting puzzles as to why seemingly powerful interest groups can fail and why some proposals that are clearly in the public interest can also often fail. When the narrative is strong, it bolsters both. An analytically strong argument on the merits can fail if it lacks an underlying persuasive narrative. Raw political power can also fail if not embedded in a convincing, easy to repeat, publicly-oriented narrative. That is often the case because the public can be, and often is, repelled by media discoveries of raw power machinations, fueled by campaign donations and other behind-the-scenes influence. But powerful interest groups win more readily when wielding a powerful narrative that legitimizes their claims in the court of public opinion and in the minds of policymakers. To ignore narrative because its influence is difficult to measure, and difficult to untangle from the merits and raw power alone, would be an analytic mistake.

We focus on the narrative power of the short-termism controversy. As a result, this Article’s narrative analysis will resonate most strongly with those who, like us, see the evidence that short-termism causes great economy-wide damage as weak. But it should also interest those persuaded that stock-market-driven short-termism is a major economic problem. After all, major problems are regularly diagnosed incorrectly, and few business problems enter mainstream media and Washington policymaking circles in the way that the stock-market-driven short-termism idea has. Even a reader who finds the prevailing short-termism narrative accurate should want to account for how and why it became so publicly salient. We do that accounting here.


23 See infra notes 139-162 and the accompanying text.

24 Akerlof, supra note 13.

The Article proceeds in five parts. Part I outlines the gap between the consensus and the evidence about short-termism. Our goal is not to weigh one view against the other, but rather to show the issue has no powerful academic consensus, while it nevertheless is backed by a powerful political consensus.

Parts II-IV explain the gap between wide belief and mixed evidence, emphasizing the three conduits of narrative power. Part II analyzes connotation and vocabulary. Short-termism connotes negative qualities that powerfully condition further thinking. The idea wins without analysis, as the words themselves tell us what is good and what is not.

Part III demonstrates how category confusion leads corporate derelictions only distantly related to short-termism—pollution, employee mistreatment, and financial crises—to be mistakenly labeled as stock-market-driven short-termism. Confusion over the breadth of short-termism leads the media and policymakers to see it as wider, deeper, and more pernicious than it is, inducing them to be more conclusive than is justified.

Part IV emphasizes the role of confirmation and repetition. The short-termism narrative is repeated often and naturally: instances of true short-termism become vivid and are seen as representative and widespread, not as derelictions resting on one end of a spectrum. The media favors repeating easy-to-state short-termism stories; and repetition also comes from opinion leaders—such as executives, notable financiers, and politicians—who influence the public and media agenda. These opinion leaders believe in it and benefit from having stock-market-driven short-termism being widely feared.

Part V shows why the power of narrative matters. First and importantly, we add to political economy analysis by showing (we believe for the first time) how narrative power overcomes classic debilities that corporate interests face in influencing the polity. Classic political economy tells us that even powerful interests will fail to influence lawmakers when free-riding inside the interest group debilitates the interest group’s efficacy, because each member wants the favorable law but hopes that the others will pay up and lobby lawmakers. If enough of those in the group think that way, nothing happens. However, a narrative once produced is cheap to repeat and thereby becomes a public good to the interest group, which rallies around it. Second, corporate interests lacking a public interest narrative for their proposed laws can, and often do, face backlash in the media and the polity. Narrative analysis also helps explain why some public-oriented merits arguments win: powerful narratives provide a justification that is easy for lawmakers to communicate to one another and to their constituents. Legislators and

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sometimes even judges need to sell their ideas; narratives with power sell better than complex academic data.

Part V also examines how a narrative’s power obscures other corporate governance problems that are more difficult to explain. Powerful narratives such as short-termism can crowd out good policymaking. We show several likely instances of the stock market short-term narrative crowding out that could be leading to mistaken notions of how best to combat an American R&D shortfall, increased levels of concentration in the economy, and other ills afflicting the American economy, such as environmental degradation and employee mistreatment.

* * *

We emphasize that we focus here not on the truth or falsity of the short-termism narrative (although we have a view on its truth), but on why it is influential and popular. Truth boosts popularity but is only part of the political story. The political process rejects well-known truths and accepts as true highly disputed ideas.

Combining an attractive idea that is grounded enough in reality with plausible even if disputed evidentiary support can propel an idea farther and with more certainty than would the actual evidence alone. Influential interests cannot always obtain their goals unless those goals resonate with a narrative rhetoric that persuades lawmakers, voters, and the media. Narrative analysis is needed, and we expect will be needed more in the future, to explain why some corporate issues grip lawmakers and others do not.

I. THE DOMINANT NARRATIVE: STOCK MARKET SHORT-TERMISM CAUSES SERIOUS ECONOMY-WIDE DEGRADATION

This Part highlights the unresolved, disputed nature of the evidence of short-termism’s impact on the American economy and contrasts it with the consensus public and political view that it severely damages the economy. We do not here assess the ultimate truth or falsity of the stock-market’s impact. Our aim is more modest, namely, to show the gap. Whereas scholars are quite divided, public discourse is quite certain.

A. Public Consensus

In the court of public opinion, the notion goes largely unquestioned and has been gaining saliency: the short-term-focused stock market’s vociferous demands on corporate executives damage the whole economy. Major media mentions of short-termism are rising sharply: mentions of financial short-termism in the past five years in the New York Times are five times as
frequent as those for the preceding fifteen.27 And “a widespread consensus among managers, among boards, and even among major institutional shareholders, [holds] that . . . short-term pressures . . . are causing boards and managers to manage their companies suboptimally. . . .”28

Respected business and political leaders repeat the narrative and reinforce the consensus. Jamie Dimon, the head of JPMorgan Chase, and Warren Buffett, the iconic investor, write in the Wall Street Journal under the headline “Short-Termism is Harming the Economy.”29 National political leaders like Joseph Biden say the same.30 Democratic and Republican Senators alike attack short-termism for holding America back.31 Government commissions and blue-ribbon government-sponsored studies conclude that “short-termism [is] damaging the economy as a whole.”32 It blocks the jobs and future that we want.

B. Evidentiary Uncertainty

This consensus is not mirrored in academic work, which is highly contested.

The studies examine whether a defined category of firms—activist-influenced, quarterly-oriented, or institutional-investor-owned—is more short-term than firms outside the category.33 Some researchers find that

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27 The New York Times data comes from our own Factiva search. We controlled for the number of articles published over the period (by putting the number of mentions in the numerator and the number of articles in the denominator). Others have found similar increase in Wall Street Journal mentions. Kim M. Willey, Stock Market Short-Termism: Law, Regulation, and Reform 2 (2019).


30 Biden, supra note 2, at A13: Brooks, supra note 2, at A24 (Biden says Wall Street short-termism is one of the two big institutional features holding back workers in the United States).


public firms invest less than privately owned counterparts;³⁴ others that institutional investor strength in a firm improves R&D.³⁵ Some researchers find that shareholder activists do not sacrifice long-term results,³⁶ others that they do.³⁷ There is no consensus and, while a reader might determine one side to have the better of it (and we think the evidence for the problem being intermittent and not severe or systemic is the better view), a sound accounting of the academic work needs a “but see” citation after every major article cited.

Theory is not uniform either. Granted, information blockages in diffuse securities markets could induce some stockholders to value firms based on immediate, salient information, like quarterly earnings, and disregard subtle technological information, as Jeremy Stein showed—an explanation supporting the presence of short-termism. But, even relentlessly short-term focused activists who will not own their stock for long do not want their companies to lose out in the long-term—they just want them to win big in the short-term. Yet because companies’ long-term value often follows from pursuing short-term value, Lucian Bebchuk shows, even short-term activists can, and often will (even unintentionally), promote their companies’ long-term success.³⁹

Further, even when some firms are excessively focused on the short-term (as some surely are), other firms have the incentive to pick up the shortfall. The shortfall need not be a major economy-wide problem as long as


³⁸ Jeremy Stein, Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia, 96 J. POL. ECON. 61 (1988). But see Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Lars A. Stole, Do Short-Term Objectives Lead to Under- or Overinvestment in Long-Term Projects? 48 J. FIN. 719 (1993); Barzaza & Talley, supra note 5 (executives prefer longer-term projects which are more difficult for dispersed outsiders to monitor).

³⁹ Bebchuk, supra note 36.
enough other public firms (or private firms or venture capital) do enough of the long-term business that short-term firms shirk.\textsuperscript{40} And besides, public stock markets could still promote long-termism overall, if they provide better access to long-term financing than private firms have.\textsuperscript{41}

* * *

Whether short-termism is wide and deep is thus an empirical issue, and the empirical evidence is contested. Yet the narrative of stock-market short-termism is likely to influence lawmakers more than divided academic work in low-circulation journals. There is more public talk of stock-market short-termism’s detrimental impact than data supporting a broad, pernicious economic impact. Why is that?

II. CONNOTATION

Again, we focus on why the short-termism narrative is popular, not on its truth. Truth can support a narrative’s popularity, but, more so now than before, an idea’s popularity does not hinge on its truth.\textsuperscript{42}

One channel that affects popular belief is the narrative’s name and its connotations, which imprint an initial picture on our minds. Initial connotations condition further thinking, creating presumptions of validity and power, or of invalidity and irrelevance. The “short-termism” words come with strongly negative connotations, rooted in deep-seated cultural and cognitive predispositions.

A. The Vocabulary of Short-Termism

Some basics: short-termism need not be bad, nor must long-termism be good. Short-term abandonment of a failed technology is good. Long-term investment in a factory whose product has no future is not.

But the connotations of short- and long-termism do not bring that indeterminacy to the fore of the speaker’s or listener’s consciousness. Most of us want to be seen as long-term (and, hence, reliable and steadfast), not short-term (and, hence, disloyal, unreliable, and capricious).

Dictionary definitions embed these differences, with short-termism but not long-termism defined pejoratively—as having a cost but no intrinsic value.\textsuperscript{43} Even the \textit{Financial Times}—the highly-respected newspaper that is

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\item \textsuperscript{40} Roe, \textit{supra} note 33, at 993.
\item \textsuperscript{41} Feldman et al., \textit{supra} note 34.
\item \textsuperscript{42} Hamid Foroughi, Yiannis Gabriel & Marianna Fotaki, \textit{Leadership in a Post-Truth Era: A New Narrative Disorder?} 15 LEADERSHIP 135 (2019).
\item \textsuperscript{43} \textit{Compare} “short-termism” in \textit{COLLINS ENGLISH DICTIONARY} (12th ed., 2014) (“the tendency to focus attention on short-term gains, often at the expense of long-term success or stability”) and “short-}
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hardly antagonistic to stock markets and finance—embeds negatives when it defines short-termism, which it says is “value-destructive,” comes at the expense of the long-term, and undermines market credibility.44

Both the short- and long-term have near-synonyms with contrary connotations. Consider: do we prefer adaptable (and, hence, short-term) players to inflexible (long-term) players? Do we prefer supple minds, whose conclusions adapt as they observe changing facts,45 to bullheaded players who persist with old, outmoded plans?

![Figure 1. Short-Termism’s Negative and Long-Termism’s Positive Connotations](image)

The upper-right bold-faced, green connotations in Figure 1 are the usual positive qualities of long-term management. The lower-left bold-faced red connotations are the usual negative qualities of short-term management. The other lists indicate the logically plausible alternatives for each, which reverse their connotative quality.


Consider long-termism’s negatives: Is rigid inflexibility good? Is staying with the buggy whip playing for the long-term? Are the following long-term attributes that the stock market should support: old-fashioned, hidebound, stuck, unchanging, so last-century? “Long-term” can be the label for unthinking adherence to long-established ways of doing things, even when new facts call for changing the old approach. Figure 1 contrasts the usual connotations with the real spectrum of qualities.

The bottom-line here: short-term theorists have captured the rhetorical high ground. Language and its “overtones, connotations, and implications” can shape our substantive thoughts. Connotations of morality, intentionality, and seriousness attach to differing words whose meanings are substantially similar, with the word chosen shaping action and attitude.

Short-termism’s negative overtones are rooted in deep-seated cultural norms. Religious norms extol long-term incentives to resist short-term temptations. Heaven awaits those who resist short-term temptations. More secularly, the long-term latches onto strong moral hooks, “exploit[ing] our high regard for self-discipline and foresight,” as David Hirshleifer states, and tapping into concepts as simple as the fable of the ant and the grasshopper. Indeed, civilization plausibly depended on humans shifting from immediate hunter-gatherer norms to longer-term agricultural norms: planting seeds today for harvesting in the longer-term.

Famous research bolsters this idea. Patience is a key to success, we are told; children’s futures can be predicted based on whether they can resist eating one marshmallow now in return for two later. Successful

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46 Cognitive linguistics is the relevant academic field here, studying the relationship between language and psychology. Hao Liang et al., Future-Time Framing: The Effect of Language on Corporate Fraud Orientation, 29 ORG. SCI. 1093, 1095 (2018); Job Y. Jindo, Toward a Poetics of the Biblical Mind: Language, Culture, and Cognition, 59 VETUS TESTAMENTUM 222, 231 n.29 (2009).


49 MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 155–84 (1905, 1958). Skeptics note that European capitalism began in Catholic northern Italy and that Protestantism’s investment in human capital—children needed to read the Bible and, hence, could read—was more important than its psychological value structure. The persist dominance of Weberian thinking, despite the countercurrents, could be an instance of our cultural preference for discipline and the long run.

50 David Hirshleifer, Psychological Bias as a Driver of Financial Regulation, 14 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 856, 868 (2008). As far as we can tell, Hirshleifer is the first to have made this point.

51 Id.; see also David Hirshleifer, Investor Psychology and Asset Pricing, 56 J. FIN. 1533 (2001).


53 Walter Mischel, Yuichi Shoda & Monica I. Rodriguez, Cognitive and Attentional Mechanisms in Delay of Gratification, 21 J. PERS. SOC. PSYCHOL. 204 (1972) (the famous marshmallow experiment). Later replications diminished its power (e.g., Tyler W. Watts et al., Revisiting the Marshmallow Test: A Conceptual
personalities can absorb current pain for later gain. Stock-trading markets are seen as chaotic and undisciplined; corporate executives must, in this imagery, impose order on a tumultuous market for us to achieve economic welfare.

To make sense of our world, we use precooked thought structures. For politics and public opinion, metaphors can be as vital as analysis and data.

### B. The Vocabulary of Legitimate Political Rhetoric: Capitalism, Socialism, and Anti-Americanism

The vocabulary of short-termism is a rhetorically acceptable way to reject the basic economic arrangements in American society that cannot otherwise readily be legitimately rejected.

Even with the increasing acceptance in some political circles of democratic socialism—viz. Senator Bernie Sanders and Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez—rejecting capitalism in the United States is typically politically unpersuasive. But condemning the stock market as too short-term allows the speaker to reject current arrangements, without rejecting capitalism. Critics of Wall Street can say “we respect the judgment of long-term, steadfast capitalist investors on the proper direction for this company and the economy. Long-term investors represent true, venerable American capitalism. But we reject the illegitimate skullduggery of overnight traders and activists, who lack commitment and are only looking to make a quick buck. We do not accept what they do to their companies, to their managers, to their factories, and to their employees. They are unreliable. They are short-term. They are not true long-term capitalists.”

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59 As Nate Silver quipped when analyzing recent public opinion polls: “‘Socialist’ goals . . . are often quite popular. But ‘socialism’ as a brand or label is really unpopular.” Nate Silver (@NateSilver538), Twitter (Mar. 3, 2019, 9:06 AM), https://twitter.com/natesilver538/status/1102236198858833937?lang=en.
60 See Elizabeth Warren, *End Wall Street’s Stranglehold on Our Economy*, https://elizabethwarren.com/plans/wall-street (campaign’s plan would “require[] big American corporations to focus on the long-term interests of all of their stakeholders—including workers—rather than on the short-term financial interests of Wall Street investors”).
Short-termism thus becomes a means of criticizing, say, corporate America’s stockholder orientation, despite the fact that shareholder primacy is in a different conceptual category than the corporate time horizon: shareholder or nonshareholder orientation tells us who is served, not when they’re served. The next Part elaborates.

III. CATEGORY CONFUSION

Broad phenomena not arising from distorted time horizons are widely but incorrectly labeled as corporate short-termism. Degrading the environment, taking dangerous financial risks, skirting sound regulation, and mistreating employees and stakeholders are all seen as primarily caused by stock-market short-termism. When they are mislabeled and lumped with truly short-term phenomena, we see short-termism as more rampant and pernicious than it is.

Corporate critics should be wary of blaming such bad behavior on short-termism. Doing so leads critics to misidentify the true causes. Even without any stock-market short-termism, this bad behavior would persist.

A. Environmental Degradation and Global Warming

The long-term-oriented corporation willingly incurs short-term costs that protect the environment over the long-run, or so conventional wisdom has it. One report says: “The short-term payback periods of financial markets take precedence over the long-term time horizons of ecological and social systems.” Another states that a prime reason “why . . . markets [do]
not . . . promot[e] a sustainable economy . . . is [financial market] short-termism—for which the capital markets can be fairly criticized.[66]

This thinking mistakenly categorizes the problem: It’s not that long-term shareholders incur the costs of environmental degradation while short-term shareholders benefit. Rather, bad corporate citizens (and both their long- and short-term shareholders) profit from cheaper production that pollutes, since others suffer from the pollution. Even firms that think solely of the long-term will pollute if they prioritize their selfish benefits over the external social costs. This is a problem of externalities, not short-termism.

Corporate pollution burns up societal resources in the short-term at the expense of societal well-being in the longer-term. The firm that over-consumes hydrocarbons for today’s profit at the expense of future civilization-threatening global warming benefits itself while society suffers in the long-term. But the operative mechanism is that the polluter does not pay most of the pollution’s cost while it profits from overusing hydrocarbons.67 The proper remedy is not to alter the firms’ time horizons, but to alter their incentives to externalize, via, say, a carbon tax.

A DuPont episode illustrates. Long seen as “one of the most distinguished of . . . U.S. corporation[s]”68 and a dedicated long-term organization,69 it was embroiled in one of the major environmental debacles of our time. For six decades, DuPont discharged a highly toxic chemical into the environment when it made Teflon. The company knew of both the danger and the human body’s inability to rid itself of the toxin. Yet it refused inexpensive abatement. Executives counted on keeping inculpating information from the public and the government, which they did for decades.70 DuPont’s long-term horizon did not stop it from polluting.

True, there’s a lag between a polluter’s act and the polluter getting caught; for most polluters the profits are immediate and the cost of getting caught comes later, as it was for DuPont. But this time horizon consideration should not obscure that the problem was primarily an “externality”: DuPont captured the benefits while others suffered the costs. Even without a time lag,

MOSAIC: CRAFTING LONG-TERM ECOLOGICAL AND SOCIETAL SOLUTIONS 84, 96 (Sanjay Sharma et al., eds. 2007).


67 Sławinski & Bansal, supra note 64, at 533.


69 Delaware’s former Chief Justice Strine lauded DuPont’s “track record of long-term investment and better-than-typical treatment of constituencies other than stockholders.” Leo E. Strine, Jr., Corporate Power Is Corporate Purpose I: Evidence from My Home Town, 33 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 176 (2017).

the temptation to externalize the costs is great. A shareholder who held DuPont’s stock for the 60-year long-term profited from its 60 years of Teflon pollution.\textsuperscript{71} DuPont did not pollute because it was pressured by hedge-fund activists or was fixated with quarterly reporting; it polluted because its internal organizational conscience broke down and DuPont’s long-term pollution paid off for long-term shareholders.\textsuperscript{72}

Similar analysis applies at the individual decision-maker level. If the executive with a 5-year time horizon (until his or her retirement) pollutes and knows that the source will not be identified until the executive is gone from the enterprise, then time horizon issues could be in play. But if the executive judges that the pollution is unlikely to be discovered or that, even if discovered, its full costs will not be tagged to the firm, then time horizon distortion is not the critical debility. \textit{Asymmetric information} and \textit{third-party effects} are. The DuPont scenario had the firm polluting for the long-term while not expecting to be discovered. Rewarding whistleblowing and facilitating liability are plausible cures; aligning the executives’ interests with those of long-term shareholders is not a cure—because DuPont’s pollution benefited \textit{long-term} and short-term shareholders.

* * *

Again, our purpose here is not to prove that stock-market-driven short-term proclivities have never exacerbated pollution or fraud, only that it is unlikely to be a large contributor to global warming, excess methane, and spoliation of aquifers, and that it will not prevent corporate fraud. The social problem often emanates from a misdirected shareholder orientation. One does not cure such problems with a longer time horizon.

B. Employees and Stakeholders

Critics decry executives and corporations for not being attentive to employees and local communities, to the spirit of government regulation, or to societal value in general,\textsuperscript{73} and characterize these problems as induced by stock-market short-termism.\textsuperscript{74} Firms fail to train workers for the long haul

\textsuperscript{71} \textit{Id.} Moreover, the stock market as a whole could neglect catastrophic climate outcomes that affect long-term stock returns, hurting both the planet and the stock market. But the market as a whole suffers because each firm (and increasingly each nation) externalizes a large fraction of the climate costs.

\textsuperscript{72} \textit{Cf.} Pat Akkey & Ian Apple, Environmental Externalities of Activism (working paper, Jan. 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3508808 (hedge fund activism actually has a salutary effect on target firm emissions, via better management and reduced activity from a substandard organization).

\textsuperscript{73} \textsc{Ralph Nader, Mark Green & Joel Seligman, Constitutionalizing the Corporation: The Case for the Federal Chartering of Giant Corporations} 1–25 (1976); Einer Elhauge, \textit{Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest}, 80 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 733, 745 (2005).

because executives focus on this quarter’s profits and not on what trained, more satisfied employees can produce over the long-haul.

For example, the recent British Prime Minister contrasted the goals of “transient shareholders” with the well-being of “[w]orkers [who] have a stake, local communities [which] have a stake, and often the whole country [which] has a stake.” And (former) Chief Justice Strine of the Delaware Supreme Court—Delaware’s courts are the most important for U.S. corporate law—was an acerbic critic of stock-market short-termism who moved seamlessly from short-termism to stakeholders when examining the modern corporation’s problems.

A phrase widely used—sustainability—captures this idea. Sustainable activities are to be encouraged; short-term unsustainable actions are to be discouraged. Sustainability, like long-termism, yields its own powerful narrative that increasingly influences policymakers. Critics say that companies once saw but no longer see “that investing in workers, communities and other stakeholders [i]s key to sustainable profits.” “[B]usiness tends to fall victim to short-term financial markets, whereas society tends to embody longer-term challenges[.]”

This criticism reprises a common 1970s and 1980s accolade for the Japanese firm. The Japanese firm invested heavily in employee training because, it was said, it had a long-run focus. It’s now understood that the timing issue was spurious. Instead, robust American labor markets impeded corporate training because the trained employee could leave the first firm—thereby encumbering the training firm with expenses that the new firm would not incur. Japanese firms’ training was bolstered by Japan’s rigid labor market. Employees could not jump from one firm to another. Whether the Japanese package (more training, but low mobility) was better for employees

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76 Leo E. Strine, Jr., Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite? A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System, 126 YALE L.J. 1870, 1871 (2017) (“In the back and forth about short-term effects on stock price . . . the flesh-and-blood human beings our corporate governance system is supposed to serve get lost.”).

77 Slawinski & Bansal, supra note 64, at 532 (“[T]he tension between short term and long term is connected intimately to the tension between business and society.”); ALLEN L. WHITE, TRANSFORMING THE CORPORATION 2 (2006), www.corporation2050.org/pdfs/5Corporations.pdf:


80 Slawinski & Bansal, supra note 64, at 532.

than the American package (less training, but more mobility) was questioned.82 Bottom-line: the employee training problem was not a time horizon issue, but hinged on the training firm’s capacity to recover training expenses. Couching a shortfall in employee training as short-termism makes critics, media, voters, and policymakers see more short-termism than there is.83

C. The Financial Crisis

A housing bubble grew during the first decade of the 21st century until it burst at the decade’s end, causing a worldwide financial crisis and unleashing political forces that today still disturb the polity and the economy.

Analysts saw short-termism as a core cause. The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission—the government’s official inquiry—castigated short-term executive compensation in banks as causing the crisis.84 Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner said the same: “[i]ncentives for short-term gains [from executive compensation] overwhelmed the checks and balances meant to mitigate the risk of excess leverage.”85 Empirical work, however, is divided: some conclude that the timing of compensation had no impact on a financial firm’s vulnerability in the crisis,86 while others detect a correlation.87

But the idea is widely believed. Even the Financial Times—again, not an anti-finance skeptic—says that “analysis of the global economic downturn points to [the] short-termism of financial institutions and lenders as root cause.”88 The Times does not mention the contrary—and, to many analysts,

83 As with pollution, time horizons are secondary. Here, the firm creates a positive externality of trained workers but cannot, in a fluid labor market, capture that value. For the environment, the firm creates a negative externality that it often does not pay for.
88 See supra note 44 (emphasis supplied).
more persuasive—explanation: namely banks transferred the huge risks of losses from themselves to taxpayers and the economy. 89

That is, the costs of the crisis and of bank failures were borne not just by the banks’ shareholders and executives, but by the government (via the government’s deposit insurance fund and government-funded bailouts), and by the rest of us in the United States (and the global economy). Short- versus long-term time horizons were less important than that much of the risk and cost of financial failure was not absorbed by the banking institutions taking the risks.

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One might reply to our analysis of pollution, employees, and finance that although the critics’ words are wrong—the problems do not arise from distorted time horizons—they are still identifying corporate maladies that need remedy. Political actors simplify the discussion and mislabel categories, the critic could concede, but their goals are sound. That’s enough.

Our purpose here is not just clarity of thought. Misperceiving social problems as time horizons brings forward poor policy responses. An example: a common purported cure for stock-market short-termism is to give executives more discretion to ignore shareholders. But if senior executives profit from environmental degradation or financial risk-taking (because their firms’ profits rise over both the long- and short-run by pushing corporate costs out and onto society), then the environment will not improve and the financial system will remain too risky even with more executive discretion. Category confusion confuses policymakers. If policymakers, the media, and the politically aware consider environmental degradation, employee mistreatment, and financial firm risk-taking as short-termism problems, then they will misidentify remedies for the problems. And, more, they will perceive much more stock-market-driven short-termism than there is. We address this feature next.

IV. CONFIRMATION AND REPLICATION

Repetition reinforces belief. 90 If an idea is easy to state believably, then it is easily repeated and belief in the idea is reinforced. Repetition reinforces belief because most people are not scientists seeking disconfirming evidence


of prior views; people typically seek, retain, and believe confirming evidence.\textsuperscript{91}

The short-termism idea is easy to state and understand. It therefore repeats easily. It also enjoys interest-driven repetition from those who benefit from it.\textsuperscript{92} The combination of a narrative with the tools to become popular on its own and interest groups with the tools to boost it further spreads the narrative and makes it more popular.

A. Confirmation via Category Confusion

An initial confirming source is the real short-termism that executives, the media, and policymakers see. But there is more to confirm the view. In Part III, we saw that much corporate misbehavior is miscategorized as driven by short-termism when it has little to do with time horizons. As a result, citizens, executives, journalists, and policymakers constantly see corporate actions that they (1) view as pernicious and (2) label as short-term. Consequently, the idea is reinforced whenever we read of an oil pipeline leak, a corporate fraud, or a financial failure. Social psychologists call this phenomenon “a broad idea habitat:” if our environment regularly reminds us of a belief, it then persists, prospers, and spreads.\textsuperscript{93}

B. Confirmation inside Professional Silos

Repetition also comes from those who benefit from wide belief. They sincerely believe the narrative to be true and promote it. The media is interested in the narrative for their own reasons, thereby giving business leaders a ready audience. The narrative makes for a good story with emotional hooks that satisfy listeners, viewers, and readers. Indeed, mentions of stock market short-termism in major newspapers have substantially increased.\textsuperscript{94}

Another megaphone for those with an interest is professional memoranda and newsletters, which regularly repeat that short-termism is a problem. Real instances of short-termism are documented and repeated. Contrary instances are explained otherwise and left aside, unrepeated.

Prestigious law firms retained by executives and boards to fight stockholder influence promote the narrative in their memos, which are distributed to clients and the media, and published in leading corporate governance blogs.\textsuperscript{95} The memos bolster executives’ resolve to fight off


\textsuperscript{92} More on the interests behind the short-termism narrative below, in Part V.

\textsuperscript{93} See Berger & Heath, \textit{supra} note 8, at 196–97; Hirshleifer & Teoh, \textit{supra} note 8, at 162.

\textsuperscript{94} See \textit{supra} note 27 & accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{95} See infra notes 120 & 124–126 and Appendix 1.
The Narrative and the Interests

shareholders. Executive consultants do the same. McKinsey, the major managerial consulting company, writes regularly how boards and executives should handle stock market short-termism. It sponsors the FCLT think tank (for “Focusing Capital on the Long Term”), which promotes “concrete steps [that executives] and their powerful organizations can take to give executives breathing room.” FCLT produces white papers on short-termism and pushes its members to combat it.


This produces an echo chamber, with those inside it hearing the view constantly confirmed and rarely questioned that short-termism is a pervasive economy-wide problem.

C. Confirmation via Managerial Biases

Executives’ well-documented biases—over-confidence, for example—can lead them to perceive short-termism as even more pervasive than it is: over-optimism.

Executives’ over-optimism is “the effect that is best studied in managers.” It breeds executives’ belief that corporate expansion will make

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100 E.g., J.B. Heaton, Managerial Optimism and Corporate Finance, 31 FIN. MGMT. 33 (2002).

money. When shareholders, activists, and hedge funds oppose expansion, executives see the opposition as rooted in short-termism, rather than in legitimate disagreement on corporate strategy. They complain (to the media, to their lawyers, and to one another), thereby reinforcing their own and others’ beliefs in its pernicious pervasiveness.

This is not to say that the executives are always wrong; surely they often face misguided pressures from uninformed stockholders. The point is that the executives, according to this psychological literature, interpret recurring disagreements with shareholders as driven by the stock-market’s short-termism when only some are.

V. THE INTERESTS AND THE LAWMAKERS: HOW NARRATIVE POWER CONDITIONS CORPORATE LAWMAKING

The psychology of stock-market-driven short-termism strengthens two major political conduits that emphasize stock-market-driven short-termism. The first conduit is the public’s general anti-Wall Street predilection. Politicians can win over voters with anti-short-termism messaging (and they also thereby further repeat and confirm the idea). The second conduit runs from executives to politicians: the narrative helps executives persuade policymakers to insulate the executives from Wall Street pressures. The anti-short-termism narrative reduces the visibility of policymakers’ favoritism toward corporate managers. With the short-term narrative dominating the discourse, policymakers do not appear to voters to be favoring managers; the politicians are instead fighting stock-market-driven short-termism’s destructiveness, which is seen as hurting all of us. Sections A-C analyze how the short-termism narrative conditions corporate lawmaking, while Section D shows how a powerful narrative can crowd out good policymaking. Section E extrapolates the analysis to core public choice issues to demonstrate how strong narratives can shore up weaknesses in explaining how the interests can win.

A. How the Narrative Affects Political Leaders

To the extent that lawmakers view stock-market short-termism as seriously damaging the economy, they presume that Wall Street is in the wrong and that steadfast long-term executives are in the right. The narrative’s
persuasive power thereby lowers the cost to executives of getting their preferred policies from judges, legislators, and regulators.

The stock-market short-termism narrative resonates with an anti-Wall-Street view.104 The closing of a business, with machinery grinding to a halt and workers leaving the factory gates for the last time, is vivid, whereas a market signal that a business has no future is not.105 When businesses close, political leaders often act. They justify their fight to save a local business and constituents’ jobs as rescuing innocent, loyal employees hurt by pernicious Wall Street short-termism.

The closing of the Wausau Paper company’s major Wisconsin mill and senatorial reaction illustrates. Political leaders said that the hedge fund activists forced the mill’s closure—throwing lifetime employees out of work and devastating the mill’s town. The closing motivated Wisconsin’s Democratic senator, Tammy Baldwin, joined by Georgia’s Republican senator, David Perdue (paper factories employ many in Georgia) to seek to sharply reduce hedge funds’ sway. They described their bill as a “bipartisan reform to protect Main St from Wall St hedge funds” so as to “fight against increasing short-termism in our economy.”106 Predatory activists, they said, “demand[ ] short-term returns like buybacks at the expense of investments in workers, R&D and the company’s long-term future.”

The senators succinctly stated the short-termism reasons why:

[A] growing chorus . . . believe[s] short-termism is holding America back . . . .
[S]hort-termism . . . is the focus on short time horizons by both corporate managers and financial markets. It results in corporate funds being used for payouts to shareholders in the form of dividends and buybacks rather than investment in workers, R&D, infrastructure, and long-term success.107

But paper manufacturing was in a long-term decline in the United States when Wausau closed its Wisconsin mill. Stock analysts had long criticized Wausau for persisting too long with fine-quality paper, whose profitability was devastated by digital documents and email replacing paper reports and mailed letters, while not expanding its household paper products,
which sold well. Incumbent management closed the mill when much of its machinery was already technologically obsolete. “It would have been the eventual [i.e., long-run] outcome regardless,” said one company executive. “It was a market dynamic as opposed to a [short-term] hedge fund strategy.” But the political impact differed from the business analysis: a mill closes, so senators blame Wall Street short-termism, promote vivid imagery of Wall Street “wolf packs” hunting down companies to close and jobs to eliminate, and propose legislation to slow Wall Street influence.

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For policymakers, the stock-market short-termism concept is salient and believable. Politicians, legislators, and judges tap into the idea. It’s a broad-spectrum, politically diverse set, including: 2016 presidential candidate Hillary Clinton, Vice President and 2020 presidential candidate Joseph Biden, SEC Commissioner Daniel Gallagher, President Donald Trump, Senators Baldwin, Merkley and Perdue, Senator and 2020 presidential candidate Elizabeth Warren, and corporate law judges, such as Delaware’s former Chief Justice Leo Strine and former Justice Jacobs.

The broad range of policymakers in the prior paragraph shows loose coalitions of unlikely allies: Left and right politics (think of the Biden/Clinton seeking employee well-being allying with executives seeking autonomy); left politics and corporate America (note Vice President Biden’s careful words in the Wall Street Journal: “I’m not blaming CEOs”). Within corporate America, the short-termism banner unites segments of Wall Street and Main Street: executives and their representatives envision coalescing with money

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109 Alon Brav, J.B. Heaton & Jonathan Zandberg, Failed Anti-Activist Legislation: The Curious Case of the Brokaw Act, 11 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L 229 (2018). The hedge fund had not obtained board seats and its business strategy was unclear—whether to shift products or close facilities was not announced. But the possibility that pressure without power was in play is clearly possible.
110 Kessler, supra note 108.
111 E.g., William A. Galston, Clinton Gets It Right on Short Termism, WALL ST. J., Jul. 29, 2015.
112 Biden, supra note 30.
115 Supra note 31.
119 Biden, supra note 30.
managers for a better America—one with more security and autonomy for top executives.120 Financiers with a public, nearly political, profile (think of Blackrock’s Larry Fink and JPMorgan Chase’s Jamie Dimon) join the anti-short-termism rhetoric.121

Acoustic separation122 facilitates the rhetorical alliances: one channel has management saying short-termism means managers need autonomy; a second channel has liberal politicians saying short-termism means the corporation must do more for employees. They each reject the stock market’s short-termism, but emphasize differing rationales.

To corroborate the link between short-termism and managerial insulation—the first deep short-termism policy channel—we coded the well-followed short-termism posts of prominent management lawyers on Harvard’s corporate governance blog.123 The posts not only lament stock market short-termism or state that it’s seriously damaging the American economy, but also recommend curing it by insulating executives from stock market pressure. We identified 33 managerial-originated posts decrying short termism, with 31 of them calling for legislation, judicial interpretation,125 or private ordering126 to give executives more leeway.

We also confirmed the second deep short-termism political channel: that of liberal politics, which links stock-market short-termism to employee maltreatment and seeks reversal. We searched LexisNexis for every instance where a senator or a presidential candidate alluded to stock-market short-termism.127 In 18 of the 30 instances in our sample, the politician emphasized that employees and other nonshareholder groups pay a price for stock-market short-termism.128 In ten, the politician said short-termism hurts both long-

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121 See Dimon & Buffett, supra note 29.
123 Appendix 1, infra.
125 E.g., Lipton, Corporate Governance in Crisis Times, supra note 32.
126 E.g., Lipton, supra note 120; Martin Lipton, Corporate Governance: The New Paradigm, HARV. L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jan. 11, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/01/11/corporate-governance-the-new-paradigm/ (warning investors not side with activists even once, or else managers will be deterred from thinking long-term).
127 See Appendix 2, infra. The search was in LexisNexis’ All News category, filtered for the U.S.: “short-termism AND [senator OR sen. OR candidate].” The timeframe was 2009-2018 (as it was for the Lipton search).
128 See, e.g., Ben White & Annie Karnie, Clinton’s Wall Street Hedge, POLITICO, Jul. 23, 2015 (Hillary Clinton attacked short-termism that was “hurting workers and slowing the U.S. economy”).
term shareholders and other stakeholders. Only twice did the politician emphasize the negative impact of stock-market short-termism on a company’s growth. The upshot is that when these politicians raise the stock-market short-termism banner, they seek more power for, better treatment of, and more investment in, workers.

Hence, denouncing short-termism means saving jobs for some, insulating managers for others, and reducing pollution to yet others. These rhetorical coalitions make it easier for lawmakers to buy into one short-termism story or another. The narratives overlap. Short-termism is a rhetorical big tent.

### B. How Executives and their Allies Use the Narrative

Confirmation and transmission come also from the resources devoted to repeating it. Powerful groups with resources and a compelling narrative can succeed more easily than weak groups lacking resources and ready access to media, and with only a complex, hard-to-understand story to sell. These dynamics become evident when we examine (1) who flies the short-termism flag, (2) how those who fly it benefit if it is widely believed, and (3) how a powerful narrative can overcome basic debilities of interest group organization.

As Part IV showed, those who fly the banner are often executives and their professional allies. “Message ringmasters” are high-end leaders whom policymakers and the media respect: leaders of the bar can qualify, as can business leaders, like Dominic Barton, the long-time CEO of McKinsey, the powerhouse management consulting firm. There are other short-term

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130 See, e.g., Ben Jacobs, Hillary Clinton Decries Wall Street’s Quarterly Capitalism in Tax Reform Pitch, THE GUARDIAN, Jul. 24, 2015 (claiming that her plan “would encourage investors to focus on ‘long-term growth’”). Clinton criticized short-termism as harming workers (supra note 128) and long-term investors (id). When she spoke to a NYU Stern Business School audience, however, she emphasized long-term shareholder value; elsewhere the focus was on employees. This illustrates the acoustic separation effects with the short-termism narrative: a speaker can cater to different audiences using one broad narrative.


notables,133 think tanks,134 and industry associations of the executives themselves, such as the Business Roundtable.135

These business leaders are formidable agenda-setters.136 They enjoy credibility and ready access to business journalists, who depend on executives for information and analysis.137

To reiterate: Our point is not that executives and their allies picked a transparently false concept up off the ground, and then contorted it into a widely-believed idea. Rather, there was an intermittent and real problem that could be vividly visualized via real, concrete instances (our point in previous sections). Its academic truth or falsity as strongly hurting the economy was inconclusive, yet the concept mapped onto popular goals and popular concepts. On top of that, well-positioned interests promoted the resulting narrative (our point in this section).

Executives and their professional allies benefit from a widespread belief in the short-termism narrative. The narrative conditions lawmakers to accord executives more autonomy from stock markets. And it flatters executives’ self-image by allowing them to view themselves not as pursuing their self-interest but as heroically overcoming the shortsightedness of financial markets for the good of all.

More subtly, the powerful narrative can help executives coopt public anger—diverting the backlash against Corporate America and turning it into an animus against Wall Street.138 Recall the persistent connection in pro-managerial publications between the diagnosis (stock markets are plagued by


137 Cf. Maria Grafström & Karolina Windell, The Role of Infomediaries: CSR in the Business Press During 2000–2009, 103 J. BUS. ETHICS 221, 232 (2011) (arguing that executives and consultants strongly affect how the media treats corporate social responsibility issues). In theory, muckraking journalism, were it more widespread, could counter this.

short termism) and the proposed cure (insulate boards and managers from stock market pressure and accountability). A naked narrative of “let’s free up executives and eliminate executive and board oversight” would not persuade most lawmakers, the media, and that part of the public that is concerned with executive accountability. Corporate executives are not intrinsically popular in America. But the anti-short-termism stance asks for the same policy that executives would want if they asked explicitly for more autonomy. And that anti-short-termism “ask” is much more legitimate. Asking lawmakers directly to insulate managers would carry a higher price tag than couching the reform as fighting short-termism by insulating boards. Legislators and judges might not, and we believe would not, comply.

This is not to challenge the sincerity of the idea’s promoters. Some have surely experienced the short-termism problem and truly believe it to be a broad, costly economy-wide issue. But it is hardly unusual for people to believe in the reality of contested propositions that favor their interests.

C. How the Narrative Affects the Corporate Lawmakers

We can see how the narrative affects public opinion. Can we detect it affecting corporate lawmakers directly?

In Delaware. Consider that the most influential corporate judicial player of the last two decades adopted the short-termism narrative in his off-the-bench writings, acerbically, powerfully, and persistently. And consider further, more generally, the shift over the decades in Delaware’s corporate law courts’ approach: the courts were moderate in the mid-1980s on takeovers, permitting takeovers but not making them easy—a result that incurred management’s and their representatives’ ire. Delaware then shifted to become more protective of boards and executives from shareholders and, later, activists. We cannot prove that the rise of the short-termism narrative was the sine qua non (nor do we think it was the sole causal input) for this shift. But we see a clear direction of the narrative boost; we can see it at work even though it is hard to measure its exact strength relative to other vectors (merits and direct political influence). We note the simple fact that first intrigued us: the flourishing of the short-termism narrative coincided with the shift to judicial decisions that corporate proponents of stock-market-driven short-termism would want.

Consider the plight of Polaroid in the Delaware courts. When shareholder activists pressured the camera and filmmaker, management resisted, using the rhetoric of resisting short-termism for a more privileged...

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139 E.g., Appendix 1, infra; Benoit, supra note 99 (“A group of executives and investors . . . calling itself ‘Focusing Capital on the Long Term,’ batted around ideas on what concrete steps they and their powerful organizations can take to give executives breathing room . . . .”). See also Heaton, supra note 142, at n.51 (detailing how BlackRock’s Larry Fink raised in the group meeting the possibility of relaxing institutional investors’ fiduciary duties).

140 See supra notes 76 & 117.
The Delaware corporate courts supported management and its long-term practices. Yet Polaroid was failing to face up to digital photography’s threat to traditional film photography, and its resistant management kept their long-term strategic emphasis on photo-chemistry. The company went bankrupt a few years later and was soon shut down.

At the SEC. We saw earlier how Washington, D.C. politicians state the narrative. In addition, advocates to the SEC regularly justify their preferences with arguments derived from stock market short-termism as something to diminish and corporate long-termism as something to bolster. When the SEC opens up rulemaking efforts on the allocation of authority between shareholders and executives, the public submissions to the SEC regularly invoke short-termism rationales. How much they affect the ultimate decision is difficult to gauge; but in our view it is quite telling that those who seek to persuade the SEC to adopt or withdraw a proposal think that the short-termism narrative could be central to their persuasive effort. They put the short-termism narrative front and center.

One recent example: when Silicon Valley interests sought SEC approval of a new corporate structure enhancing the voting rights of some stockholders (via a variant on dual-class stock, which accords some stockholders more votes than others), they promoted the effort as creating a Long Term Stock Exchange. For the most part, the structure would benefit company founders, who would get enhanced control. As academic work has shown, whether this control would foster the long-term or the short-term is uncertain. The static control could induce longer-term sclerosis (and therefore be detrimental to the long-run) because the founder’s extra votes could enable him or her to stay in control even after becoming ineffective. The structure’s benefit would be in motivating entrepreneurs to start up more

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141 Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 257, 268 (Del. Ch. 1989). Defending the long-term would not, however, said the defenders, harm short-term shareholders. Id., at 283.
143 Peter Buse, The Camera Does the Rest: How Polaroid Changed Photography 79 (2016) (Polaroid sees the digital future but fails to adapt); Andrea Nagy Smith, What Was Polaroid Thinking? (Insights from Yale School of Mgmt.), www.insights.som.yale.edu/insights/what-was-polaroid-thinking (Polaroid executives believe through the 1990s that in the long-run “customers would always want a hard-copy print” and not just an image on a screen).
145 See the unpublished appendix cataloging the many instances short-termism being raised in SEC submissions, usually seeking greater executive autonomy.
firms, because, ex ante, founders are thought to be likely to balk at opening their company up to more stockholders—doing so often leads them to lose control of the company.\textsuperscript{148} Enhanced votes allow them to keep control even when the company sells more stock to raise money and so they are more likely to start up a new venture.\textsuperscript{149} Which effect—sclerosis vs. more start-ups—is stronger is hard to evaluate in the abstract, but has very little to do with the promoters’ marketing effort to the SEC.\textsuperscript{150}

That marketing effort tied itself to the long-termism narrative, starting right with its title—a Long Term Stock Exchange—and continuing through the proposals’ recitations of short-termism sapping the economy, quoting from the commentators we have called “message ringmasters” (the corporate law firms, management consultants, and business think tanks that excoriate short-termism).\textsuperscript{151} Others might dispute whether “long-term” branding sells an idea; but we point out that the proponents of the Exchange effort (sophisticated players in dealing with the SEC) highlighted it to the SEC. In seeking support from the SEC and the public, they think the long-term branding of the Exchange (and its purportedly anti-short-term quality) would sell well to corporate lawmakers.

**D. How Powerful Narratives Can Crowd Out Good Policymaking**

The prior section indicated how a dominant narrative can affect corporate lawmaking. But its relevance is wider and more general. Powerful narratives can crowd out good policies that suffer from weaker narratives even if they have stronger evidentiary foundations. Even if the merits underlying the narrative are sound, a strong narrative “buys” the idea a higher priority on lawmakers’ crowded policy agenda.

A likely example: Stock-market short-termism is blamed for weakened R&D in the United States. Yet corporate R&D has not been falling in the United States. In fact, it’s rising faster than the economy is growing.\textsuperscript{152} (Perhaps it should be rising even more.) But government R&D for basic technologies—which has been a mainstay of American prosperity since World War II—has fallen precipitously. Excessively attending to stock-market short-termism may well take policymakers, the media, and the


\textsuperscript{149} Id.

\textsuperscript{150} Cf. Macey, supra note 15 (“sometimes perfectly good rules are propped up by myths because the actual . . . justifications . . . are too complex or too politically incorrect.”).

\textsuperscript{151} SEC, supra note 146, at 14075 (“Many academics, commentators, market participants, as well as certain current and former members of the Commission have voiced concerns regarding so-called ‘short-terms’), citing the sources we reported in notes 96, 97, 113, 124, 125 & 126

\textsuperscript{152} BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, NATIONAL INCOME AND PRODUCT ACCOUNTS, Table 5.6.5, lines 2 & 6 (2020), http://www.bea.gov/itable/ (last accessed May 20, 2020).
public’s eyes from more substantial shortfalls and the better ways to remedy the R&D decline.

E. How Narratives Can Boost Merits’ Persuasiveness and Reduce the Interests’ Political Vulnerabilities

A critic of our analysis might object that if the power of the interests is strong enough, or if policymakers’ view on the merits is clear enough, then the result is foreordained. Or if merits-oriented policymakers want a result strongly enough, they will get it. The narrative does not make a difference.

The criticism cannot be fully countered, as we cannot test what the policy results would be with and without the vivid narrative. But the critic would have the same problem: how do we know that the interests or the merits would have prevailed without a powerfully persuasive narrative? They might have lost.

We can, however, demonstrate (1) abstractly, how a powerful narrative can interact with the interests and the merits, bolstering them and potentially curing long-standing basic impediments to their success and (2) concretely, that the interests do bring forward the narrative, presumably because they think it makes a difference.

Traditional political economy. In traditional political economy analysis, the “public interest approach” emphasizes the importance of the merits and sees policymakers largely deciding based on what would make the best policy for the American people. In contrast, the “public choice approach” emphasizes the interests of the policymakers themselves and the groups that influence them. Sometimes the interests’ goals align with the merits, sometimes they do not. Campaign contributions, votes, or future job opportunities can secure favorable policies, even if they are not in the public interest.

Yet much theory and empirics now show that neither the merits nor the interests regularly succeed alone. They both matter but their strength ebbs and flows across issues and times.

A good narrative can make an interest-group’s story persuasive; it can make public-regarding policymakers perceive a need for action. Power and perception are affected by the persuasiveness of the supporting narrative. Explanation follows.

155 See generally Preventing Regulatory Capture (Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss, eds., 2014).
156 E.g., James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It (1989) (policymakers are guided by their mission, as they perceive it).
Public-regarding backlash that weakens the interests. Interest groups suffer from two, often debilitating, features that can stymie even the rich and the powerful from winning in the political arena. One, their very actions create an opposite, often equal and sometimes greater, political force when politicians recoil if they fear that the interests’ visible influence will be “radioactive.” That “radioactivity” would afflict them when the media broadcast the interests’ raw influence and deride the politicians’ acquiescence. The public could readily be appalled by the politicians. The interests must avoid this backlash.158

This debility can be overcome with a powerful narrative.159 A persuasive narrative gives a public interest quality to the group’s political pressure. Indeed, when powerful, narrow interest groups win, it’s because they managed to couch their favored policy as one that is in the public interest. Wal-Mart has fought organized labor with the narrative that their low prices serve the American consumer.160 Executives have sought autonomy by using the short-termism narrative to bolster the case that Wall Street is hurting the economy and hardworking middle-class Americans.

When politicians can package a policy as being in the public interest (for the economy, for the average American, for taxpayers, for America itself), they will be more successful than if pushing it as benefiting a powerful interest group or a select cohort of voters.161 Ideas have power.162

Applied here, these dynamics operate on steroids, since the “short-termism” narrative unites two important interests—executives seeking autonomy with employees seeking stability. Politicians can decry short-termism without alienating either. The two—management and employees—typically are not united in either the diagnosis of what ails America or in what policies they want to fix it.

The rhetoric of stock-market short-termism lowers the costs of favoring managerial interests for lawmakers, such as the Delaware legislature, its judiciary, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and other lawmakers. It lowers the visibility of their favoritism: “We’re not doing management’s bidding,” they can say (and believe, retaining a self-image of their own public-spirited evenhandedness). “We’re fighting to make the economy

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159 Id.; Bruce Yandle, Bootlegger and Baptists: The Education of a Regulatory Economist, 7 REGULATION 12 (1983).

160 Trumbull, supra note 158, at 206.

161 Special interests are better poised to win when their interests fit a moral story, even if the moral story is at odds with the underlying interest. Yandle, supra note 159; Hirshleifer, supra note 50, at 869 (the short-termism idea embeds moralistic thinking).

162 E.g., Dani Rodrik, When Ideas Trump Interests: Preferences, Worldviews, and Policy Innovations, 28 J. ECON. PERS. 189, 194 (2014) (vested interests rarely gain much traction without the support of good ideas and narratives); James Kwak, Incentives and Ideology, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 253, 257–58 (2014) (special interest groups win because they are better at flexing their ideological muscles).
better, to make investment for the long-term more likely, to make a better, stronger country for us all.”

Narratives can solve or reduce the interest groups’ debilitating free-riding problem. The second classic political economy weakness of interest groups is that they can fail because they must coordinate actions and costs; free rider problems afflict them, as they afflict so many other groups. An ostensibly powerful group can readily fail if its members cannot coordinate, as Mancur Olson’s famous analysis emphasized.\(^{163}\)

To expand, a public choice critic of our narrative view might (mistakenly) say: “If the short-term narrative were unavailable to support executive autonomy, the interests would simply spend more. They still would win. They would make larger campaign contributions. They would lobby harder. No narrative, no problem.” But this criticism is inapt for two reasons: it’s externally capped because, first, as seen above, naked spending with only their private interest as a justification risks public backlash. And, second, the interest groups’ ability to spend is “internally” capped, by its inability to coordinate and get its members to contribute.

Securing a favorable policy is a public good for the interest group, because one executive benefiting from laws conferring greater autonomy cannot exclude other executives from gaining that autonomy too, even if those other executives did not lobby or contribute to procuring it.\(^{164}\) The interest group—namely, American executives in public companies owned by the stock market—is very large. It’s the kind of group that Mancur Olson showed would often be weakened by free-rider debilities.

Enter the narrative. A powerful narrative, once created, is cheap to repeat. Traditional interest group efforts, in contrast, require constant investment: policymakers change via election, reelection, and promotion, so campaign contributions and other influence must constantly be refreshed. With narratives, by contrast, once someone—a law firm, a business reporter, happenstance—creates the narrative, it becomes a public good to those who benefit from it.\(^{165}\)

Once a narrative latches on, it requires less maintenance and is less easily debilitated by free-rider problems. If there is a public consensus regarding issue X, a new politician replacing the defeated incumbent need not be wooed, lobbied, and supported by the interest group as assiduously with campaign contributions if the new player is part of the belief system. A latently powerful interest group does not need to perfectly organize and


\(^{164}\) Id.

\(^{165}\) A strong narrative gathers strength from dynamics similar to “network effects”: an individual’s or politician’s “consumption” of the narrative (by listening, believing, and repeating) not only does not reduce the quantity of narrative available, but increases its power, persuasiveness, and value. Recall the discussion in Part IV of the power of an easy-to-repeat narrative: the more people use it, the more each of us is likely to believe it, and thus the narrative becomes more valuable for the interest group. Strong narratives can cascade.
constantly “tax” its members to achieve political influence, as long as it has a strong narrative backing its influence efforts. 166

Adding the narrative power vector clarifies the importance of public salience in corporate lawmaking. Salience in public opinion often impedes corporate interests, as incumbent powerful interests lose their advantage because policymakers now need to cater to the public. 167 Our analysis here explains why salience can help purportedly merits-based lawmaking, by providing an easy-to-communicate explanation.

But at times salience can have the opposite effect and help the interest group, if that group can package its message in a public-regarding narrative that becomes widespread and generally believed. If a narrative is (1) salient and (2) wraps what would otherwise be executive self-interest (more autonomy) inside a public-regarding narrative (fighting stock-market short-termism, which is killing the economy), salience then helps the interests. Powerful narratives can help narrow interest groups get the policies they want even on issues of high salience. And in our era of increasing populism, salience in corporate lawmaking may become much more continuous and less intermittent than in the past, as corporate law is now not as often made in hidden political corridors—a change that makes mastery of narratives all the more important to the interest groups.

**CONCLUSION**

We do not expect lawmakers to regularly and scientifically investigate in depth the pluses and minuses of policy. Narratives, impressions, and interests drive policymakers. Evidence is only part of the picture. Popular narratives, perceptions, and opinions have traditionally not been in play for much corporate lawmaking, however, because corporate law is technical and does not typically attract public scrutiny. 168 But in our era of burgeoning populism, popular narrative and its concomitant how-it-will-play in the media obsession are each destined to play increasingly important roles in corporate lawmaking.

To better understand the channels through which popular narratives can influence corporate law, we analyze a specific, ongoing issue: the wide perception of stock-market short-termism as hammering capital investment, employee well-being, and the American economy’s R&D prowess. The narrative is simple: stock traders and shareholder activists, looking for a quick

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166 Trumbell, *supra* note 158, at 124 (“a single common narrative can focus the attention of the group, while coordinating the activities of activists, groups, businesses, politicians, and regulators around a single set of policies”).


168 One exception is the structure of financial institutions, which historically attracted populist scrutiny.
profit, systematically induce large public corporations to manage for the short run. Among policymakers, the media, and executives, the view is one-sided that the problem is a pERNious and worsening economy-wide scourge.

Yet a wide gap separates this broadly-held belief—which is being discussed more frequently than ever in the media and is endorsed by political leaders like Joseph Biden—and the disputed academic evidence as to its importance. While there is surely some such short-termism, the evidence of deep economy-wide damage is sparse, and points to its not being a deeply debilitating problem. We have in this Article provided psychological, behavioral, and complementary interest-group analysis for why public belief, media attention, and policymakers’ statements outrun the mixed academic evidence.

This exploratory analysis of the short-term narrative will resonate most strongly with those who see the evidence for severe stock-market-driven short-termism as weak, because for them our analysis explains why a weak idea prospers. But even those who see deleterious short-termism as well-supported should want to know why what they see as a good idea prospers, when so many other good ideas do not.

The answer in our analysis is the power of the stock-market short-termism narrative, with much of the idea’s popular strength lying in its connotation, in category confusion, and in its wide confirmation.

Short-termism’s connotations—of instability and unreliability—make it seem more pERNious than it is. The long-term’s connotations—of dependability and steadfast loyalty—make it seem more desirable than it really is. A long-term corporate decisionmaker could be stubborn and unimaginative, while short-term decisionmakers could be flexible and adaptable. Vocabulary matters. Connotation matters. Were the vocabulary and connotations different, the presumptions would be different. Although only one extra level of thinking makes short-termism’s connotation ambivalent, much that we conclude in life comes from our initial reaction, not further analysis. The deleterious immediate connotation conditions all that comes afterward.

Confusion strengthens the immediate perception of pERNiousness. Too many common, undesirable corporate qualities are mistakenly thought to emanate from distorted, short-term thinking, when they in fact emanate from other corporate distortions. This confusion leads people to think that there’s more pERNious short-termism than there is, when there are instead
more categories of corporate problems than just stock-market-driven short-termism. Corporate environmental degradation is seen as emanating from stockholders’ short-term orientation. But this is largely incorrect; it emanates primarily from third-party effects: neither the corporation, nor its shareholders, nor its executives suffer the full consequences of environmental degradation. Others do.

*Confirmation* deepens the belief that stock-market short-termism is a major economy-wide problem. The idea is easy for the media to state and repeat. Confirmation comes partly from the confusion described in the prior paragraph—observers see environmental degradation, financial crises, and employee mistreatment, all of which they mistakenly label as short-termism; and they then conclude that the American corporation is distressingly short-term focused. Confirmation also comes from intended repetition; executives and directors benefit if financial market short-termism justifies yet more autonomy for executives from financial markets. They and their professional allies repeat the short-termism charge and vividly identify, emphasize, and replay discovered actual instances and supporting narratives.

* * *

Academic corporate work typically analyzes lawmaking for its expected impact on corporate well-being, for its fidelity to doctrinal tradition, and for its responsiveness to interest group pressure. We explore here another analytical mode—namely, how an idea’s narrative power can strengthen a merits-based idea in a way that the merits alone could not, or empower an interest group in a way that its latent power could not.

Given the fuzzy and highly context-specific nature of narratives, narrative analytics should focus on one narrative at a time, and so we limited our inquiry to one timely and impactful narrative, namely, stock-market-induced short-termism. Yet much of the blueprint we provide here can also be applied to other influential corporate and business law narratives. Historical examples include applying narrative analytics to understand why corporate lawmaking in the 1980s shifted first to disciplining greedy, underperforming executives and then to blocking greedy raiders.170

Indeed, juxtaposing the short-termism narrative’s impact with that of other possible narratives that did not take off is a promising avenue for future research. In the 1980s example just mentioned, a perhaps equally-compelling narrative was then in play of executives at public companies entrenching themselves for power, prestige, and pay at the expense of shareholders, employees, and society overall. And for a time, corporate lawmakers in Washington and in Delaware were sympathetic with that narrative and were

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The Narrative and the Interests

much less pro-management than they are today. Some financiers promoted that narrative with trenchant language; in popular culture it was embedded in the movie *Wall Street* and in particular, in Gordon Gekko’s famous “greed is good” speech in the movie. However, that narrative faded because the media no longer bought in, or because it faced opposition by narrative entrepreneurs who promoted an alternative, more powerful narrative, namely, that stock-market-driven short-termism was causing American economic decay.

Study of narrative power is developing apace in adjacent disciplines, like economics and finance, such as in new exploratory analyses by two Nobel Prize winners and the president of the American Financial Association. This analysis is largely missing, however, from corporate law. It is time to start bridging this gap in corporate legal scholarship, as the power of popular ideas is likely to become more important in shaping corporate lawmaking in upcoming years. We have here shown how narrative analysis can be incorporated. For example, content analysis can show how broad the “idea habitat” for a certain narrative is. With short-termism, we saw that the corporate and media environment regularly raises the eclectic short-termism notion; they propagate the idea in ways that make it easy for people to retrieve it from memory, helping it to persist and prosper as it is repeated. Information cascades can convince many that there’s a problem as they rely on the opinions of others. A groupthink then evolves, seeing short-termism as a deep and widespread problem, not an intermittent and occasional one.

Advocates to policymakers can obtain a more favorable hearing by categorizing their targeted problem as short-termism. Interest groups can fail if their influence is too visible and creates a backlash; a public-regarding narrative can shield them from that backlash.

And public-regarding public servants cannot be expected to search the academic literature for evidence to weigh; they need a narrative to illustrate what they believe and to communicate it with other lawmakers. Policymakers can justify their decisions by aiming them at short-termism. Critics of American capitalism can shrug off being labelled as outcasts by rhetorically supporting capitalism in general, but rejecting the bent results attributed to

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172 Carl Icahn, a prominent “raider,” was particularly effective with the media. He still is. See, e.g., Matthew W. Ragas et al., *Agenda-Building in the Corporate Sphere: Analyzing Influence in the 2008 Yahoo!Icahn Proxy Contest*, 37 PUB. RELATIONS REV. 257 (2011).

173 In *Wall Street*, a popular movie of the era, the takeover entrepreneur, played by Michael Douglas, seeks stockholders’ votes for action, justifying what he is doing in moving on a declining company by stating that greed, by motivating him to deal with lackluster management, to make the company better, and to eliminate failed investments, is good.


stock-market short-termism. And executives seeking autonomy can persuade SEC policymakers, senators, judges, and themselves that they are not simply self-interested when they seek more autonomy but are fundamentally fostering the American economy’s long-term health.

Ideas have power. Simple ideas with easily visualized imagery can be attractive and credible even before evidence is weighed. Combine an attractive idea having some genuine evidentiary support with influential interests that want the idea believed, and one can see why some corporate policies, laws, and rules succeed, while others do not.


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176 This truncated appendix has a sample of 10 entries. The full analysis is in the online appendix.
Appendix 2: Content Analysis of Politicians’ Attacks on Short-Termism: Damage to Employees

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177 This truncated appendix uses a sample of 10 entries. The full appendix is available online.
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