Corporate Control, Dual Class, and the Limits of Judicial Review

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Abstract

Companies with a dual-class structure have increasingly been involved in high-profile battles over the reallocation of control rights. Google, for instance, sought to entrench its founders’ control by recapitalizing from a dual-class into a triple-class structure. The CBS board, in contrast, attempted to dilute its controlling shareholder by distributing a voting stock dividend that would empower minority shareholders to block a merger it perceived to be harmful. These cases raise a fundamental question at the heart of corporate law: What is the proper judicial response to self-dealing claims regarding reallocations of corporate control rights?

This Article shows that the reallocation of control rights raises an inevitable tradeoff between investors’ protection from agency costs and the controller’s ability to pursue its idiosyncratic vision, making the value of different allocations of control rights both firm specific and individual specific. It is thus inherently impossible to create objective valuation models for the reallocation of control rights. The impossibility of creating reliable valuation models sets the limits of judicial review: The legal tools long used by Delaware courts to adjudicate conflicts over cash-flow rights, such as entire fairness review, are fundamentally incompatible with the adjudication of conflicts over reallocations of control rights. This Article explores the policy implications of this insight and suggests that courts treat reallocations of control rights as questions of charter interpretation as to who has the power to decide such reallocations and avoid reviewing the discretion to use that power. Courts should enforce the decision of the parties as to reallocations of control rights and apply the business judgment rule when the charter is silent.

Keywords: control rights, agency costs, idiosyncratic vision, dual class, corporate law, entire fairness, self-dealing, valuation, Delaware courts

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CORPORATE CONTROL, DUAL CLASS, AND THE LIMITS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

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INTRODUCTION

In 2012, Google’s board approved a proposal amending Google’s charter to authorize the issuance of a new class of nonvoting Class C stock.¹ Prior to this proposed recapitalization, Google’s capital structure was comprised of one-vote-per-share Class A shares, primarily held by public shareholders, and ten-votes-per-share Class B shares, primarily held by Google’s

founders, Larry Page and Sergey Brin. Under this dual-class structure, Google had the ability to raise capital, incentivize employees, and acquire other corporations by issuing Class A shares, while preserving control over the company in the hands of Class B shareholders. However, this strategy faced an upper limit—if enough Class A shares were issued, eventually the voting power of Class B shares would be diluted to the point of the founders losing control.

Google’s authorization of Class C shares was a strategic response to this unwelcome hiccup: After the recapitalization, Google would be able to issue as many Class C shares as it deemed necessary for business purposes, without ever threatening to dilute the founders’ control. This move, therefore, reallocated control rights from the public shareholders to the company founders, and enabled them to keep their control over the company even as it continued to issue new shares. Of course, the recapitalization required board approval and a shareholder vote to amend the company’s charter. But these procedures offered little meaningful protection because Page and Brin held a majority of voting rights. Thus, the charter amendment could be, and in fact was, approved with the two founders’ votes, and against the objection of Class A common shareholders—even though Page and Brin were clearly self-interested.


3. See Anita Anand, Complexities in Firms with Dual Class Shares, 3 Annals Corp. Governance 184, 193 (2018) (defining “dual-class shares” as a type of capital structure involving “the issuance of two or more different classes of shares whereby one class (the ‘superior’ class) has more voting rights than shares held, while the other class (the ‘subordinate’ class) has fewer voting rights relative to the shares held”).

4. To understand the intuition, assume that at the start there were 100 Class A shares and 100 Class B shares. Since Class B has 10 times the votes of Class A, the founders would have 1,000 votes and the public would only have 100 votes (almost 91% of the voting rights was in the hands of the founders). But if over time the number of Class A shares increased and reached 1,000 shares, then both classes of shares would have 1,000 votes (only 50% of the voting rights would accrue to the founders). From then on, any increase in the number of Class A shares would leave the founders with fewer than 50% of the votes.


Class A shareholders swiftly responded to the recapitalization by bringing a breach of fiduciary duty lawsuit in Delaware. The plaintiffs argued that the recapitalization was a form of “self-dealing” that should be reviewed under Delaware’s long-standing regime of entire fairness. The Google defendants, however, claimed that the decision ought to receive the deferential business judgment protection. Ultimately, the parties settled the dispute on the eve of the trial. The Google litigation thus left unanswered the key doctrinal question as to whether entire fairness, business judgment, or some intermediate level of scrutiny is the appropriate standard of review for “midstream” reallocations of control rights—that is, changes to a company’s existing allocation of control rights.

Subsequent to the Google settlement, several other dual-class firms announced midstream recapitalizations from dual-class to triple-class structures. First, Facebook and InterActiveCorp (IAC) proposed to create a new class of nonvoting stock through a charter amendment. However, after being targeted with suits by their respective shareholders, who argued that these recapitalizations amounted to unfair self-dealing, both Facebook and IAC withdrew their proposed recapitalization plans. Another company adopted a more cautious approach, and structured the recapitalization ex ante in a way that complied with the entire fairness review. Lastly, the board of CBS Corporation (CBS), also a dual-class company, recently proposed to unilaterally reallocate control rights from the controlling shareholder to the public shareholders—rather than, as its

Columbia Law Review} ("Only about 12.7 percent of Google’s Class A stockholders . . . voted in support of issuing the Class C stock. That’s a pretty poor showing by any measure.").


9. Id. at 32 (“Self-dealing is present where, as here, special benefits from a potential transaction flow to the controller.”).

10. See id. at 32 and accompanying text.


12. See infra note 90 and accompanying text.

13. See infra note 98 and accompanying text.

14. See infra note 99 and accompanying text.

15. See IRA Tr. FBO Bobbie Ahmed v. Crane, No. 12742-CB, 2017 WL 7053964, at *6–9 (Del. Ch. Dec. 11, 2017) (noting that “entire fairness review” would apply to the plaintiff’s claim); see also infra notes 99–104 and accompanying text.
predecessors had done, from the public shareholders to the controller. In the face of what it viewed as a merger proposal that would harm the company, the board announced its plan to dilute the controller by distributing voting shares as a stock dividend to all classes of shares (voting and nonvoting), thereby empowering the minority shareholders to block the merger. Yet again, the resulting suit ended in settlement.

These cases raise a fundamental question of corporate law: What is the appropriate standard of review for conflicts over the reallocation of control rights at controlled companies? This question has not been explored, and it is far from an obscure academic inquiry. Recapitalizations like Google’s are likely to recur as controlled companies that go public continue to employ multiclass share structures, thereby increasing the likelihood of future recapitalizations and other midstream reallocation of control rights. Yet, while a long line of Delaware case law has addressed disputes over various forms of midstream reallocations of control rights, the Delaware courts have not yet adopted a clear approach concerning the standard of review that applies to these reallocations of control rights.

16. See CBS Corp. v. Nat’l Amusements, Inc., No. 2018-0342-AGB, 2018 WL 2263385, at *2 (Del. Ch. May 17, 2018). The plan would have diluted the controller’s voting power from approximately 80% to about 17%. Id.

17. Id.


19. By “controlled company,” this Article refers to those companies whose shareholder base is such that one shareholder owns a majority of the company’s voting stock.

20. In his article on hostile takeovers, Ron Gilson argues that courts lack competence to determine whether it is “fair” to leave control with management or the bidder. See Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 Stan. L. Rev. 819, 824–27 (1981). Gilson, however, does not address conflicts over the reallocation of control rights in controlled companies. Moreover, he explains that the problem with fairness review of control contests is that courts lack the competence to review what are essentially business decisions. See id. at 827 (arguing that such a fairness inquiry “raises the same issue of judicial competence which justifies a restrictive judicial role with respect to the duty of care”). By contrast, this Article posits that the problem is the absence of acceptable methodologies for valuing control rights.


22. See infra section I.B.

23. Even if parties to recapitalization litigation continue to settle their disputes, the correct standard of review remains central for bargaining at the settlement stage. In particular, uncertainty in the case law risks not only inaccurate assessments of the strength of cases but also increased aversion to pursuing midstream recapitalizations at all. For instance, Facebook not only paid a huge sum of money in attorney’s fees but also withdrew its recapitalization altogether. Jef Feeley & Sarah Frier, Facebook to Pay $67.5 Million in Fees in Suit over Shares, Bloomberg: Technology (Oct. 25, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-10-24/facebook-to-pay-67-5-million-in-fees-in-non-voting-shares-suit (on file with
The doctrinal confusion, this Article argues, is driven by a fundamental shortcoming of corporate law. Delaware critically relies on fiduciary duties and judicial review under the entire fairness standard to govern self-dealing and other conflicts of interest at both controlled and widely held companies. This Article shows, however, that the legal framework that governs self-dealing—the entire fairness analysis—cannot and should not be applied to conflicts over the reallocation of control rights. Entire fairness review requires courts to make an objective determination of the “fair price” of the transaction at issue. Economists have developed valuation models for many types of cash-flow rights, like specific assets and entire companies, that aid courts in determining fair price. Similar economic models for valuing the reallocation of control rights simply do not exist.

Moreover, this Article posits that developing an economic model that objectively values the reallocation of corporate control rights is an inherently futile task because the value of control rights is firm specific and individual specific. The allocation of control rights raises an inevitable tradeoff between investors’ protection from agency costs and the controller’s ability to pursue its idiosyncratic vision, thus making the value of different allocations of control rights both firm specific and individual specific. Economic theory is capable of abstracting away from specific attributes of an asset (such as a factory) in order to approximate the value of that asset. Yet economic theory cannot abstract away from the specific firm and the specific personality of a controller (such as Mark Zuckerberg).
or Sergei Brin) without excluding from the valuation analysis the very specific characteristics that make control valuable in that particular controller’s hands.  

Without a reliable valuation model, Delaware’s entire fairness framework breaks down: Not only will ex post judicial determinations of “fair price” be impeded by the impossibility of reliably pricing corporate control rights, but also ex ante attempts to secure minority shareholder approval will be thwarted by the lack of a reliable valuation backstop.  

Negotiating in the shadow of the law is impossible when the parties cannot reliably estimate how a court will determine a fair price.

In light of the impossibility of valuing control rights—and consequent courts’ inability to apply entire fairness review—how should courts regulate conflicts over reallocation of control rights? This Article argues that Delaware should resolve control rights conflicts by determining, as a matter of contractual interpretation, which party has the authority to reallocate control rights under the company’s charter. The parties—controllers and minority shareholders—are best left to agree ex ante on the voting rule that will govern midstream reallocations of control rights. Therefore, courts’ principal task should be to determine whether the controller can reallocate control rights without receiving the approval of the minority shareholders. Delaware courts should then defer to the arrangements on which the parties had initially agreed and forgo any attempt to evaluate the fairness of reallocation of control rights. As long as the charter grants the controller the power to reallocate control rights, courts should apply the business judgment rule to a controller’s choice to recapitalize. All other methods will fail in the absence of objective valuations.

This approach not only avoids costly litigation and the valuation issues implicated by control rights but also encourages clear drafting of the initial allocation of control rights in the corporate charter. And if the charter is silent, courts should craft a default rule that balances the potential loss of idiosyncratic vision (which results from giving the minority reallocation authority) with the potential increase of agency costs (which results from

29. See infra section II.B; cf. Zohar Goshen & Richard Squire, Principal Costs: A New Theory for Corporate Law and Governance, 117 Colum. L. Rev. 767, 811 (2017) (“If firms were identical . . . then any reallocation of control rights between investors and managers would increase one type of cost and decrease the other type by equal amounts . . . . [O]nly when firms have different attributes [do] differences in governance structures matter, as each firm aims at finding its optimal structure.”).

30. See infra section III.A.1.

31. See infra section III.B.

32. Applications of contract law principles are not uncommon in the corporate law space. In particular, the rights of bondholders in Delaware have traditionally been resolved as a matter of contract interpretation. See, e.g., Dale B. Tauke, Should Bonds Have More Fun?: A Reexamination of the Debate over Corporate Bondholder Rights, 1989 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 1, 8 (“In determining what rights and protections holders of publicly issued bonds of solvent corporations have against adverse corporate action, courts have traditionally looked to contract law.”).
giving the controller reallocation authority). More specifically, Delaware’s longstanding pre-Google precedents, studies of market performance, and changing market realities in public companies’ shareholder power all weigh in favor of preserving the traditional default rule that protects against the loss of idiosyncratic vision by granting controllers business judgment rule protection in decisions of midstream reallocations of control.

The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows: Part I discusses the Delaware case law on resolving cash-flow and control rights disputes in controlled companies. While Delaware has developed a clear, sophisticated governing regime to adjudicate cash-flow rights, in the case of control rights conflicts, Delaware has struggled and ultimately been inconsistent in its approach. Part II explains this inconsistency by demonstrating the inevitable tradeoff that underlies the allocation of control rights. Moreover, Part II explains why developing a reliable methodology for valuing reallocations of control rights is a futile task that will make the application of Delaware’s existing corporate law regime impossible. In light of the foregoing insights, Part III considers how courts should approach conflicts over control rights in controlled companies and ultimately proposes that courts resolve these conflicts through interpretation of the company charter.

I. Cash-Flow Rights, Control Rights, and Corporate Law

An important goal of corporate law is to protect public investors in controlled companies from opportunistic self-dealing by a controlling shareholder. Delaware relies on its expert courts to restrict self-dealing, and these courts have developed a sophisticated doctrinal framework for that purpose. This Part describes the application of this framework to two types of disputes between controllers and minority shareholders: (1) disputes concerning the allocation of cash-flow rights; and (2) disputes concerning the allocation of control rights, including midstream recapitalizations. While courts and commentators have emphasized the need to

33. See infra Part II.
34. See infra section III.B.2.
constrain self-dealing, they have not examined the distinction between conflicts over cash-flow rights and control rights and its implications.

Section I.A explains that Delaware courts have generally applied the entire fairness standard of review to conflicts over cash-flow rights. Section I.B shows that Delaware courts, when addressing conflicts over control rights, have not followed a uniform approach, thereby creating uncertainty over the law governing those conflicts. The overview in this Part not only illuminates some of the more puzzling pieces of Delaware’s corporate law doctrine but also frames the argument that the legal tools governing the reallocation of cash-flow rights should not apply to reallocations of control rights.

A. Cash-Flow Rights

Cash-flow rights determine who will receive a corporation’s economic value, such as its profits and capital gains, as well as how much value they will receive and when they will receive it.37 Disputes over the allocation of cash-flow rights in controlled companies arise when the controlling and minority shareholders disagree as to the proper allocation of value precipitated by the business. Generally speaking, cash-flow rights conflicts involve either a transaction in which the controller stands on one side and the controlled corporation on the other or an action taken by the corporation that results in reallocation of discernable economic value from the minority to the controller (both cases are commonly referred to as self-dealing).38 For instance, minority shareholders and a controller might dispute whether the price offered to minority shareholders by the controller in a so-called “freezeout” merger was fair;39 or they might dispute whether an asset sold to, or acquired from, the corporation by the controlling owner was priced fairly.40

37. See Goshen & Hamdani, Idiosyncratic Vision, supra note 28, at 578, 584 (describing how sole-owner entrepreneurs retain cash-flow rights in the form of rights to all income from the business).

38. See id. at 571, 605–10 (describing self-dealing transactions and other behavior that can result in disproportionate reallocation of value to the controller).

39. See Guhan Subramanian, Fixing Freezeouts, 115 Yale L.J. 2, 5 n.1 (2005) (“A freezeout is a transaction in which a controlling shareholder buys out the minority shareholders in a publicly traded corporation . . . .”).

40. See, e.g., Americas Mining Corp. v. Theriault, 51 A.3d 1213, 1218 (Del. 2012) (discussing a challenge by minority shareholders to the company’s acquisition of its controller’s 99.15% interest in another company on the grounds that the acquisition was at an inflated price); In re Straight Path Commc’ns Inc. Consol. Stockholder Litig., No. CV 2017-0486-SG, 2018 WL 3120804, at *8 (Del. Ch. June 25, 2018) (discussing, in relevant part, an allegation by minority shareholders that the controlling shareholder had breached his fiduciary duties by selling some of the company’s intellectual property assets for six million dollars to settle an indemnification claim, when an existing consent decree had valued the assets at fifty million dollars).
In Delaware, the regime that governs self-dealing is the entire fairness standard. In practice, however, controlling shareholders engaging in self-dealing have a choice: They can either submit the transaction to a judicial evaluation of its fairness or forgo such judicial review by voluntarily agreeing to a set of procedural conditions. Depending on the controller’s decision, Delaware courts will apply one of two alternative frameworks to cases of self-dealing involving cash flows: (1) entire fairness review, or (2) review under the business judgment rule when the self-dealing transaction was conditioned on receiving the approval of both the majority of the minority shareholders and a special independent committee (together known as the MFW conditions). Section I.A.1 discusses the first of these frameworks, while section I.A.2 discusses the second.

1. Entire Fairness Review. — The Delaware courts normally apply the entire fairness standard to cases of self-dealing. Traditionally, under the entire fairness standard, a controlling shareholder bears the burden of proving the transaction’s fairness. Reviewing a transaction under “entire fairness” expressly requires scrutiny, not only of the process by which a transaction took place (“fair dealing”) but also of the price of the transaction itself (“fair price”). Effectively, this means that in controlled companies, the controller is free to force a self-dealing transaction on the minority, so long as this transaction is subsequently subjected to an objective valuation of its fairness.

41. See infra section I.A.1.

42. A third alternative in which the entire fairness review applies but with a shift in the burden of proof is also possible. See Kahn v. Lynch Comm’ns Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1117 (Del. 1994) (“An approval of the transaction by an independent committee of directors or an informed majority of minority shareholders shifts the burden of proof on the issue of fairness from the controlling or dominating shareholder to the challenging shareholder-plaintiff.”). This Article does not discuss this alternative because it does not add any insight to the analysis.

43. See Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 644 (Del. 2014) (introducing the MFW conditions).

44. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 703, 711 (Del. 1983) (describing how transactions involving potential self-dealing concerns invoke the entire fairness standard).

45. See, e.g., Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 937 (Del. 1985) (“The concept of fairness has two aspects, fair dealing and fair price, both of which must be examined together in resolving the ultimate question of entire fairness.”).

46. For expositional convenience, this Article disregards the potential role of the board when its approval is required for self-dealing transactions. The extent to which boards—even without the judicial review—can be relied upon to resist powerful controllers is beyond the scope of this Article. For analysis of the challenges facing the oversight role of independent directors and potential reforms, see generally Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamidiani, Independent Directors and Controlling Shareholders, 165 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1271 (2017).

47. See Zohar Goshen, The Efficiency of Controlling Corporate Self-Dealing: Theory Meets Reality, 91 Calif. L. Rev. 393, 426 (2003) (“If challenged in court, the interested shareholder must demonstrate both fair dealing and a fair price to satisfy the ‘entire fairness’ test.”).
Entire fairness review is fundamentally reliant upon the ability and competence of a third party—in this case, the Delaware courts—to perform an objective valuation of the disputed transaction. Given the need to determine fair price, Delaware courts faced with cash-flow disputes are routinely tasked with establishing the objective value of entire companies, business divisions, specific assets, and so on, in order to determine the appropriate payment owed to the dissenting minority shareholders.48 To do so, courts rely on valuation models, developed by economists for the pricing of assets,49 such as the Discounted Cash-Flow (“DCF”) model.50 Applying valuation models is challenging for most courts, as it requires at least some understanding of financial theory. Despite nontrivial challenges to performing an objective valuation of the multifaceted assets and companies involved in conflicted transactions, Delaware courts, with their unique mastery of financial valuation techniques developed by economists, have been quite successful at applying the entire fairness review to cash-flow disputes in controlled companies.51

To be sure, Delaware courts might disagree with the valuation methods offered by parties to the litigation or with the inputs that should be used in a specific case.52 Delaware courts also have occasionally rejected the valuation conclusions of parties to a litigation and instead conducted an independent valuation.53 Yet, despite these disagreements, courts do

48. See R. Scott Widen, Delaware Law, Financial Theory and Investment Banking Valuation Practice, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 579, 579 (2008) (“Delaware courts have developed a surprisingly large body of law regarding the proper analytics for valuing businesses. Most of this law has been developed in the context of adjudicating appraisal rights of dissenting shareholders in corporate M&A or going-private transactions.”).


51. See, e.g., William A. Groll & David Leinwand, Judge and Banker—Valuation Analyses in the Delaware Courts, 116 Pa. St. L. Rev. 957, 959 (2012) (“[T]he Delaware courts have become quite sophisticated in reviewing valuation analyses and are thoroughly conversant in the related, highly technical financial arcana.”); Widen, supra note 48, at 581 (“Delaware courts have become increasingly sophisticated in their understanding of business valuation techniques.”).

52. See, e.g., In re Appraisal of DFC Glob. Corp., No. CV 10107-CB, 2016 WL 3753125, at *1 (Del. Ch. July 8, 2016), rev’d sub nom. DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P., 172 A.3d 346 (Del. 2017) (“I conclude that the most reliable determinant of fair value of DFG’s shares is a blend of three imperfect techniques: a discounted cash flow model incorporating certain methodologies and assumptions each expert made and some of my own, the comparable company analysis respondent’s expert performed, and the transaction price.”).

53. See In re ISN Software Corp. Appraisal Litig., C.A. No. 8388-VCG, 2016 WL 4275388, at *6 (Del. Ch. Aug. 11, 2016) (rejecting the valuations of the testifying experts and opting instead to adjust the inputs to the DCF model per the court’s judgment).
not devise their own methodologies for valuing cash-flow rights.\textsuperscript{54} As the next Parts argue, the fact that no financial technique can credibly value control rights undermines courts’ competence to adjudicate conflicts over the reallocation of these rights.

2. Voluntary MFW Conditions. — Under Delaware law, controlling shareholders that wish to avoid costly litigation and the uncertainty associated with judicial “fairness” review can \emph{voluntarily} condition the execution of a conflicted transaction upon receiving the support of both the majority of the minority and a negotiating “special committee” of independent and disinterested directors.\textsuperscript{55} When these conditions are met, Delaware courts do not apply entire fairness review. Instead, they will apply the highly deferential business judgment rule and avoid scrutiny of the transaction.\textsuperscript{56} In these cases, therefore, Delaware courts focus more on whether the minority shareholders were fully informed and uncoerced when voting upon the transaction than on the valuation methodologies that were used to establish the fairness of the price.\textsuperscript{57} Thus, the efficiency of the voluntary MFW conditions in cash-flow disputes is largely a product of the ability of minority shareholders and the “special committee” to competently value a transaction and avoid bargaining failure in cases where a transaction would create value.


\textsuperscript{55} See Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 644–45 (Del. 2014) (describing the requirements to clear a conflicted transaction without being held to the entire fairness standard).

\textsuperscript{56} See id. at 644 (“[B]usiness judgment is the standard of review that should govern [freeezouts] . . . where the merger is conditioned ab initio upon both the approval of an independent, adequately-empowered Special Committee that fulfills its duty of care; and the uncoerced, informed vote of a majority of the minority stockholders.”). Delaware courts have made clear that the deferential standard of review is only available in cases where the transaction is conditioned on the relevant approvals ab initio. See, e.g., In re Synutra Int’l, Inc. Stockholder Litig., No. 2017-0032-JTL, 2018 WL 705702, at *2 (Del. Ch. Feb. 2, 2018) (“The first prong of the [MFW] framework requires that ‘the merger is conditioned ab initio upon both the approval of an independent, adequately-empowered Special Committee . . . and the uncoerced, informed vote of a majority of the minority stockholders.’” (quoting M&F Worldwide, 88 A.3d at 644)).

\textsuperscript{57} See Itai Fiegenbaum, The Geography of MFW-Land, 41 Del. J. Corp. L. 763, 796–97 (2017) (describing MFW’s “dual approval mechanism” as one “grounded in the efficacy of the positive endorsement by two qualified decisionmakers” and “believed to produce comparable benefits to intrusive judicial review in guaranteeing the best price possible for minority stockholders”).

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B. Control Rights

Unlike in the context of cash-flow rights, Delaware courts have been inconsistent in their resolution of conflicts over control rights. Control rights are, broadly stated, rights to decide on the business direction of a company, ranging from day-to-day operational to strategic management decisions. In controlled companies, control rights provide the controlling shareholder with the right to decide the company’s direction. Conflicts over control rights, like conflicts over cash-flow rights, arise either when a controller participates in a transaction where they stand on one side of the transaction and the controlled company stands on the other or when an action is taken by the corporation and it has the effect of reallocating control rights either from the minority to the controller or vice versa. Importantly, this Article does not consider conflicts that arise at the initial allocation of control rights when the company goes public or when investors decide to provide capital but rather focuses on conflicts that arise from changes to an existing allocation of control rights—midstream changes.

Section I.B.1 discusses the earlier cases in which Delaware courts have applied the deferential business judgment rule, while section I.B.2 discusses the more recent cases in which Delaware courts have moved in the direction of applying the very demanding entire fairness review. Given the two diverging sets of case law, Delaware’s existing framework for determining whether reallocations of control rights deserve the scrutiny reserved for self-dealing is incoherent.

1. Business Judgment Rule. — In applying the business judgment rule to midstream governance changes, Delaware courts must find that the challenged action taken by the corporation did not amount to “self-dealing,” regardless of the disparate effect it might have on the controlling owner and the minority shareholders. To find this, the reviewing court must conclude that the controller did not receive something “to the exclusion of, and detriment to, the minority stockholders.”

Perhaps because of the appearance of an equal pro rata legal effect in control rights conflicts, some courts have applied the business judgment rule even when charter amendments clearly resulted in the reallocation of control rights to the controlling

59. Id. at 565.
60. See generally Yu-Hsin Lin, Controlling Controlling: Minority Shareholders: Corporate Governance and Leveraged Corporate Control, 2017 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 453, 458, 486–87 (defining the “midstream” stage as the “post-IPO” stage and describing the Google and Facebook recapitalizations as “midstream changes”).
61. See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (holding that intrinsic fairness applies only when a controlling shareholder engages in self-dealing). Self-dealing is when a parent company uses its dominion over a subsidiary to cause the subsidiary “to act in such a way that the parent receives something from the subsidiary to the exclusion of, and detriment to, the minority stockholders of the subsidiary.” Id.
62. Id.
shareholder.63 Indeed, at times, Delaware courts have recognized that while the disparate economic effects of a corporate decision pose a practical conflict, such a conflict is legally irrelevant, and have thus applied the business judgment rule in their review. The discussion below summarizes, in chronological order, Delaware’s treatment of three of these midstream changes—namely, dual-class recapitalizations, tenure voting recapitalizations, and amendments relating to board representation.

a. Dual-Class Recapitalization.—In a dual-class recapitalization, a public company that has one class of shares switches to a dual-class structure.64 The controlling shareholder is typically left holding the class of shares with superior voting rights and the public shareholders are left holding those shares with inferior voting rights.65 The dual-class recapitalization results in reallocation of control rights from minority shareholders to the controlling shareholder, because it allows the controllers to maintain control without holding the majority of the company’s cash-flow rights.66

Delaware courts, however, did not review these evidently conflicted recapitalizations under the entire fairness standard. For instance, in Société Holding Ray D’Albion S.A. v. Saunders Leasing System, Inc., a minority shareholder of Saunders Leasing System, Inc., challenged a recapitalization plan that proposed to convert all existing stock into a class of stock with one vote per share (high-voting shares) and then issue a stock dividend to all holders of that class in the form of a share with one tenth of a vote per share (low-voting shares).67 Arguing that the plan was designed to achieve “the perpetuation of control” by the controller’s family—who would be able to retain majority voting power without the corresponding cash-flow rights holdings by selling the newly distributed low-voting shares—the plaintiff asked the court for a restraining order to prevent the plan.68 Though the court acknowledged that the controllers had fiduciary duties

63. See Goshen & Hamdani, Idiosyncratic Vision, supra note 28, at 606 n.141 (discussing the difficulties of identifying self-dealing in control rights conflicts).
64. See Anand, supra note 3, at 193–95.
67. No. 6648, 1981 WL 15094, at *1–3 (Del. Ch. Dec. 16, 1981). For a similar case, see Weiss v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., No. 8811, 1989 WL 80345, at *1 (Del. Ch. July 19, 1989). In Weiss, a class of Rockwell’s shareholders challenged a charter amendment that created a new class of ten-votes-per-share stock, which would be distributed pro rata as a dividend to existing shareholders. The court acknowledged that the amendment’s effect was to “cause disproportionate voting power to become concentrated significantly in the hands of Rockwell’s long term stockholders.” Id. Moreover, because of an employee savings plan that included thirty percent of Rockwell’s outstanding stock, the directors were alleged to form part of those long-term shareholders who would benefit from the amendment. Id. Though the court acknowledged that one possible outcome of such a plan was to entrench the position of the controllers, it found that the plaintiffs had failed to show that the amendment was not “a valid corporate act.” Id. at *3.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3375748
to the minority shareholders, it ultimately found that the plan was “fair to minority stockholders,” in the colloquial sense of the term, and denied the plaintiff’s request.69 Such a fast, deferential ruling suggests that the court did not find the case to be one involving self-dealing.

b. Tenure Voting Recapitalization. — Tenure voting is a regime in which shares held for a certain period of time are granted superior voting rights over those that have been held for a shorter length of time.70 In a tenure voting recapitalization, a company amends its charter midstream to provide for voting rights that change based on the length of time for which the share is held.71 Since public shareholders frequently trade their shares,72 and the controlling shareholder holds the control block for a long period of time,73 a tenure voting recapitalization, much like a dual-class recapitalization, practically results in the controlling shareholder holding shares with higher voting power than the minority shareholders. In other words, a tenure voting recapitalization reallocates control rights to controlling shareholders by increasing the relative voting power of controlling shareholders.

In Williams v. Geier, minority shareholders challenged a controlled company’s tenure voting charter amendment after it had been recommended by the board and approved by the controlling shareholders.74 The amendment granted all existing shares ten votes, but provided that once a share was sold, its voting rights would drop to one vote; the share would regain its ten votes only if held for a period of three years. Given the trading differences between public shareholders and controlling shareholders discussed above, by merely holding onto some of their existing shares, the

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69. Id. at *3. To be clear, it must be emphasized that the determination that the plan was “fair” was not part of an entire fairness valuation, but rather a legal determination of the contractual effects of the plan.


71. Berger et al., supra note 70, at 305 (“A company that recapitalizes its shares under a tenure-voting plan would give long-term shareholders more votes per share than short-term shareholders.”).

72. Id. at 298. The average holding period of public-company stocks began to decline in the early 1980s, with the rise of the takeover boom. Id. (“By 1990, the period had fallen to about two years, and by the mid-2000s it was less than a year. By some accounts, the average holding period in 2015 for individual stocks across all U.S. markets was about seventeen weeks.”).

73. Dallas & Barry, supra note 70, at 548 (noting that “[b]ecause controlling shareholders are generally long-term shareholders,” tenure voting “enhances their voting power relative to their percentage of share ownership . . . [a]nd allows the controlling shareholders to reduce their ownership in their firms while maintaining control”).

controllers could preserve control over the corporation without necessarily holding a majority of the company’s cash-flow rights. Pointing to this consequence, the plaintiffs argued that the amendment be reviewed under the entire fairness standard.

However, the Delaware Supreme Court held that the business judgment rule applies to tenure voting recapitalizations. The majority opinion recognized the unique benefit that the amendment conferred on the controllers—allowing them to sell some of their holdings without relinquishing control—but concluded that the disparate economic impact of the changes did not amount to self-dealing. By contrast, the dissenting judges urged that the charter amendment should be subject to full judicial scrutiny under the entire fairness standard because it conferred “substantial benefits on the majority shareholders.” The dissent noted that “the charter amendments worked fundamental changes in the governance” of the company by giving “the Geier Family shareholders control not only over the future composition of the Board, but over the strategic long-term planning of the company.”

c. Board Representation. — Charter amendments that affect the frequency with which board members are up for election have also been reviewed under the business judgment rule, as in eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark. Craigslist’s charter provided for a cumulative voting regime that was designed to give eBay, a minority shareholder, the ability to appoint one out of the three members of the board. The majority

75. See id. at 1378.
76. See id. (“[T]here was on this record . . . no non-pro-rata or disproportionate benefit which accrued to the Family Group on the face of the Recapitalization, although the dynamics of how the Plan would work in practice had the effect of strengthening the Family Group’s control . . . .”); see also id. at 1382 (noting that in the case “entire fairness is not an issue.”).
77. Id. at 1386 (Hartnett, J. & Horsey, J., dissenting).
78. See id. (“The proposed Plan significantly alters shareholder voting rights to the detriment of those minority shareholders who have no interest in preserving the family ownership, or whose investment objectives may have a different time frame from the Family Group.”).
79. See 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010).
80. For a discussion of cumulative voting, see Jeffrey N. Gordon, Institutions as Relational Investors—A New Look at Cumulative Voting, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 121, 127 n.8 (1994) (describing the typical cumulative voting regime in corporate settings). Classified boards work against cumulative voting by requiring increased voting power to elect a director. Consider, for instance, a board of nine individuals elected using a cumulative voting regime and a minority shareholder M who owns forty shares, corresponding to forty percent of the voting power. If the nine board members are elected annually, then M only needs to allocate eleven percent of her voting power to elect a director. Edmund A. Stephan, Cumulative Voting and Classified Boards: Some Reflections on Wellington v. Avery, 31 Notre Dame Law. 351, 354 n.5 (1956) (offering an example of this formula). However, if the board is classified, with only three directors up for election every year, then M will need to use twenty-six percent of her voting power to elect a director. Id.
81. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc., 16 A.3d at 13 (explaining that though eBay did not have a “contractual right” to fill the third board seat, “the laws of mathematics under a
shareholders, however, amended the charter to provide for a classified board, which created three classes of directors, with only one director facing an election each year. 82 The classified board amendment rendered the cumulative voting regime impractical, in that it eliminated the possibility for eBay “to cumulate votes and direct those votes towards a single director candidate,” and thereby allowed the controllers to ensure that only their candidates would be elected to the board. 83 eBay contended that entire fairness should apply because the classified board amendment benefited the controlling shareholders to the detriment of eBay. 84 While the court in eBay recognized the conflict underlying the charter amendment, 85 it refused to review the amendment under the entire fairness standard. Instead, the court held that the amendment’s disparate impact did not amount to self-dealing, and that eBay was not deprived of any right awarded to it under Delaware law. 86

2. Entire Fairness Review. — The decisions discussed above applied the business judgment rule to midstream reallocations of control rights. More recent Delaware decisions, however, seem to have implied that entire fairness is the standard of review for midstream recapitalizations. The discussion below provides a chronological overview of recent cases.

a. Google. — As explained above, 87 the plaintiffs in the Google litigation argued that Google’s move from a dual-class to a triple-class structure reallocated control rights from Class A to Class B shares. 88 Thus, they alleged that the recapitalization constituted a form of self-dealing, subject to Delaware’s exacting entire fairness scrutiny. 89 The defendants claimed
the recapitalization was aimed at long-term value-maximization rather than entrenchment and, critically, that it was approved by independent and disinterested directors, entitling the decision to Delaware’s business judgment rule review.90

Though the case ended in settlement, the corporate community was not left wholly in the dark regarding the court’s intuition. During the settlement hearing, then-Chancellor Leo E. Strine, Jr.91 suggested that the proposed recapitalization may have run afoul of expectations on the part of Class A shareholders that they might eventually, given enough time and dilution of Class B voting power, obtain a majority stake in Google.92 Moreover, he referenced “tensions” in Delaware law as to the treatment of a conflicted vote by controlling shareholders, suggesting that Williams v. Geier might not squarely dictate business judgment review in the case of midstream recapitalizations.93 Still, Strine cautioned that “it would be hazardous for anyone to predict how [the trial] would have come out.”94 Indeed, the notion that a recapitalization like the one proposed by Google might be subject to entire fairness was surprising, as such expectations of minority shareholders were never legally recognized. Moreover, the reallocation effect on minority shareholders of switching from dual-class to triple-class shares is less pronounced than the effect of switching from a one-share-one-vote to a dual-class structure or to a tenure voting regime, the latter of which received the business judgment rule protection.95 In

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90. See Opening Pre-Trial Brief for Google Inc. and Independent Director Defendants at 25–31, In re Google Inc. Class C S’holder Litig., No. 7469-CS (Del. Ch. filed June 10, 2013), 2013 WL 2728591 (“[T]he Recapitalization was approved by Google’s disinterested and independent Board for the purpose of providing the Company with the flexibility it needs to do stock-based acquisitions and issue stock-based compensation, while at the same time maintaining Google’s incredibly successful governance structure.”).

91. Strine was, until 2019, the Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court.

92. See Settlement Hearing and Rulings of the Court at *27, In re Google Inc. Class C S’holder Litig., No. 7469-CS (Del. Ch. argued Oct. 28, 2013), 2013 WL 6735045 (“[R]ight now I have a certain percentage contractual expectancy if Google pays out dividends, and then I have a certain kind of noncontractual market-based assumption about how people look at the equity of the company . . . . You’ve now taken my same interest and just divided it in half.”). Strine also noted that “it’s never been the case that interested voting power gets a pass simply because it has voting power.” Id. at *38.

93. Id.

94. Id. (“[T]he stronger argument on behalf of the defendant is that they . . . believed that this was the right thing for Google’s public stockholders and that from the beginning, everyone has been clear . . . that these founders were going public but with no . . . intention to relinquish voting control . . . .”).

95. Perhaps with this in mind, some have agreed with Strine’s assessment that it was far from guaranteed that entire fairness would have been the correct standard to apply to the Google recapitalization. See Settlement Deletes Trial over Google Stock Split, Westlaw J. Del. Corp., June 24, 2013, at *1 (noting that Professor Lawrence A. Hamermesh observed that the Google “plaintiffs’ characterization of the stock split was puzzling,” and stating, “If you
short, the Google case became the first in a series of recent cases that have cast doubt on the standard of review that applies to midstream recapitalizations.

b. Facebook and IAC. — Following Google’s settlement, Facebook and IAC each proposed amending their respective charters to authorize the issuance of a new class of nonvoting stock, citing as their motivation the flexibility to raise and deploy significant capital without diluting the ownership stakes of the founders—Mark Zuckerberg of Facebook and Barry Diller of IAC.96 Stockholders of both Facebook and IAC sued to challenge the respective recapitalizations.97 Unlike Google, however, these lawsuits did not end in a settlement. Rather, both Facebook and IAC withdrew their recapitalization plans and avoided facing the costs and uncertainty of litigation.98

c. Crane. — In IRA Trust FBO Bobbie Ahmed v. Crane, NRG Energy, Inc. (NRG) proposed a dual-class to triple-class recapitalization of NRG Yield, Inc. (Yield), a portfolio company in which NRG held a controlling stake.99 However, unlike the Google, Facebook, or IAC cases, NRG conditioned the recapitalization from the outset on the approval of both (1) a majority of Yield shares not affiliated with NRG, and (2) a fully empowered, independent special committee.100 In so doing, NRG attempted to shepherd

have corporate control, there shouldn’t be anything suspect about approving an action that keeps control exactly where it’s been since the company’s inception”).

96. See supra note 13.


98. See Facebook, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Sept. 21, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1326801/000132680117000042/form8k_92217.htm [https://perma.cc/BS4Z-9HTA]. The court, in approving a subsequent settlement, allowed the plaintiff to recover sixty-eight million dollars due to the success of blocking Facebook’s recapitalization.

99. No. 12742-CB, 2017 WL 7053964, at *3–4 (Del. Ch. Oct. 24, 2018). Similarly, IAC’s Board of Directors “determined not to pursue the Company’s previously announced plan to create a new class of non-voting stock.” IAC/InterActiveCorp, Current Report (Form 8-K), at 2 (June 21, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/891103/000110465917041328/a17-15693_18k.htm [https://perma.cc/BZM3-226Y]. In announcing its intent to abandon its recapitalization plans, IAC specifically noted the pending litigation as a motivating factor: In light of “recent developments in the stockholder litigation that made it unlikely that the litigation would be finally resolved until late 2018 or 2019, . . . the considerable legal and related expenses of the litigation, and other relevant information, the Board determined not to proceed with the Class C Recapitalization.” Id.

100. See id. at *4.
the transaction through the voluntary MFW conditions in order to lower the standard of review from entire fairness to business judgment. Crane is noteworthy for two reasons. First, the transaction structure revealed that NRG considered the risk of entire fairness review sufficiently likely to warrant the time and expense of implementing the voluntary MFW conditions. Second, and just as important, the chancery court did in fact choose to apply entire fairness review as a threshold matter, but then reduced the level of scrutiny to business judgment deference per MFW. As the court explained, entire fairness applied because the recapitalization afforded NRG “something uniquely valuable to the controller,” namely, “a means ... to ensure it would be able to retain voting control of Yield well into the future without abandoning a key aspect of its original business model.” In other words, the court found that in a reallocation of control rights, notwithstanding the pro rata legal effect, the controller receives something “to the exclusion of, and detriment to, the minority.”

d. CBS. — On May 17, 2018, CBS, a dual-class corporation controlled by National Amusements, Inc. (NAI), decided to distribute a pro rata voting-shares stock dividend to all of its shareholders, including shareholders who previously held nonvoting shares. Given the company’s dual-class structure, this move would have resulted in diluting the voting power of the controlling shareholder “from approximately 80% to 17%.” As motives for this action, CBS cited, among other things, the ability to “unlock significant stockholder value” and “more fully evaluate strategic alternatives.” For the purposes of this Article, CBS’s corporate action matters because the distribution would have reallocated control rights from the controlling shareholder to the minority. By distributing voting shares to the current owners of its nonvoting stock, CBS would effectively

103. Id. at *9 (quoting GAMCO Asset Mgmt. v. iHeartMedia Inc., No. 12312-VCS, 2016 WL 6892802, at *16 (Del. Ch. Nov. 23, 2016)).
104. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720–22 (Del. 1971) (finding no self-dealing through a pro rata distribution of dividends, but noting that “[i]f such a dividend is in essence self-dealing by the parent, then the intrinsic fairness standard is the proper standard”).
105. At the time, CBS reported that its controlling shareholder NAI owned approximately 79.7% of the company’s Class A voting stock. See CBS Corp., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 13 (June 30, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/813828/000081382818000036/cbs_20q-q32018.htm [https://perma.cc/8Q2D-WJ5T] [hereinafter CBS Corp., June 2018 Quarterly Report]. The Sumner M. Redstone National Amusements Trust in turn owns eighty percent of NAI’s voting interest and is itself controlled by the Redstone family. Id.
accomplish the opposite of what Google, Facebook, and IAC wanted and eliminate the majority voting power of its controlling shareholder, NAI.109 Unsurprisingly, NAI challenged the distribution in court.110 However, on September 9, 2018, the parties announced they had settled the dispute.111

The above doctrinal review illustrates that while Delaware courts quite consistently apply the entire fairness review and voluntary MFW conditions to conflicts over cash-flow rights, they have been unable to achieve a similarly coherent approach in the context of control rights conflicts. This asymmetry prompts the question: Why? As the next Part explains, conflicts over control rights have unique features that prevent the application of the tools that have worked well in cash-flow conflicts.

II. THE COMPLEXITY OF ALLOCATING CONTROL RIGHTS

Part I of this Article introduced the distinction between cash-flow rights and control rights and demonstrated that the Delaware courts have struggled to fashion a consistent approach to address conflicts over the reallocation of control rights. This Part argues that conflicts over the reallocation of control rights have two unique qualities that prevent their regulation like cash-flow rights conflicts. First, section II.A explains that the reallocation of control rights entails bargaining under conditions of a bilateral monopoly over an inevitably dichotomous choice between giving controllers a right to unilaterally reallocate control rights and giving minority shareholders a right to veto such reallocation. Second, section II.B shows that there are no acceptable methods, nor will there ever be, for valuing reallocation of control rights, as the value of control rights is both firm specific and individual specific. These realities make courts inherently incapable of adjudicating conflicts over the reallocation of control rights.

A. The Dichotomous Choice over Reallocation of Control Rights

To understand the dichotomous choice over the reallocations of control rights, one must first ask: Why do entrepreneurs and investors care about the allocation of control rights?

Entrepreneurs value corporate control because it allows them to pursue their idiosyncratic visions—the strategies that they genuinely believe would produce abnormal returns for the company, thereby benefiting all

110. See CBS Corp., 2018 WL 2263385, at *2. In this case, it was CBS that filed the complaint asking for a temporary restraining order to prevent NAI from interfering with the proposal by changing the composition of the board. Id. at *1–2.
111. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
An entrepreneur’s idiosyncratic vision reflects the parts of the entrepreneur’s business idea “that outsiders may be unable to observe or verify.” Given that business ideas take time to implement and require numerous decisions, ranging from day-to-day management issues to major strategic choices, investors might disagree with entrepreneurs about the company’s future direction—because of asymmetric information or differences of opinion—and prevent entrepreneurs from implementing their visions. Thus, control over corporate decisions enables entrepreneurs to pursue their visions even against investors’ objections. In other words, control matters for entrepreneurs mostly when investors might disagree with the entrepreneurs’ decisions about the company’s direction. Investors, by contrast, value control over corporate decisions because it offers protection against agency costs, like mismanagement and self-dealing.

In controlled companies, the parties allocate control rights and cash-flow rights with the aim of balancing the controller’s need to pursue an idiosyncratic vision and minority shareholders’ need for protection against agency costs. Allocating more control rights to controllers gives them more freedom to pursue their idiosyncratic visions (if they are loyal and competent) and increases the risk of agency costs (if they are disloyal and incompetent); allocating more control rights to the minority has the opposite effect.

At the initial contracting stage, such as the Initial Public Offering (IPO), the parties negotiate under competitive conditions: The investors can choose to invest elsewhere and the company may be considering multiple offers. Through the negotiation, the parties are able to reach an acceptable balance between idiosyncratic vision and agency costs that fits their preferences and the nature of the business activity. If future developments prompt a need to shift the balance the parties achieved in their initial allocation of control rights, the parties may reallocate control rights midstream. Any reallocation of control rights midstream will again raise the same tradeoff between idiosyncratic vision and agency costs that the parties faced initially. Importantly, however, while in the initial stage the parties negotiate the allocation of control rights under competitive condi-

112. See Goshen & Hamdani, Idiosyncratic Vision, supra note 28, at 566.
113. See id. at 567, 579 (“This could be because sharing the information with outsiders would destroy its value (e.g., competitors could copy the idea) or simply because the entrepreneur can present outsiders with nothing more than her strong conviction concerning the value of her idea.”).
tions, midstream changes take place when the parties are locked in a bilateral monopoly. The parties, therefore, can only agree on who will have the right to decide the new balance of idiosyncratic vision and agency cost. Either controllers will receive the right to unilaterally reallocate control rights, or minority shareholders will have a veto right over such decisions. Sections II.A.1 and II.A.2 explore this tradeoff and discuss the consequences of giving either party control rights.

1. Controllers. — To understand the effect of granting either controllers or minority shareholders the right to determine midstream reallocations of control rights, consider the Google example. Google justified the recapitalization on the basis that it would allow the controllers to continue to pursue their idiosyncratic visions while the company expands and issues equity. Over time, Google explained, circumstances or business strategy changed to an extent that required an adjustment to the original allocation of control rights. Indeed, Google’s very success and fast growth may be the kinds of changing circumstances that demand a reallocation of control rights. Should the company’s proposal thus be accepted?

The reallocation of control rights is desirable only if the expected benefit—the future increase in company value—from preserving the controllers’ ability to pursue their idiosyncratic visions exceeds the likely increase in agency costs that could arise from allowing the controllers to preserve control with a lower fraction of the company’s equity. In other words, if the parties choose to provide the controllers with the power to unilaterally reallocate control rights, the minority shareholders might benefit from the controllers’ ability to keep pursuing idiosyncratic visions, but that benefit comes at the cost of exposing minority shareholders to an increased risk of agency costs. Clearly, it only makes sense to give the controllers the power to unilaterally reallocate control rights if the benefit, as judged by the parties ex ante, exceeds the cost.

Similarly, the agency costs that arise when the controller has the power to unilaterally reallocate control rights are no different from any other case of self-dealing: Even if a reallocation would not be in the best interest of the company, controllers might pursue the recapitalization anyway and reallocate control rights from the minority shareholders to themselves. In other words, controllers might be motivated by a desire to...

117. See infra note 125 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 87–98 and accompanying text.
119. See infra section II.B.1.
120. For helpful background on this view, see Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Reinier Kraakman & George Triantis, Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and Dual-Class Equity: The Mechanisms and Agency Costs of Separating Control from Cash-Flow Rights, in Concentrated Corporate Ownership 295, 301–05 (Randall K. Morck ed., 2000); see also In re Ezcorp Inc. Consulting Agreement Derivative Litig., No. 9962–VCL, 2016 WL 301245, at *2 (Del. Ch. Jan. 25, 2016) (“As control rights diverge from equity ownership, the controller has heightened incentives to engage in related-party transactions and cause the corporation to make other forms of non-pro rata transfers.”).
entrench themselves while getting more liquidity rather than by a genuine concern about their ability to pursue idiosyncratic visions. This is the essence of the agency-costs risk.

2. Minority Shareholders. — Consider the alternative scenario: What if the minority shareholders are given the power to decide about the reallocation of control rights? Recall that the reallocation is desirable if, and only if, the expected benefit from allowing the controller to pursue its idiosyncratic vision exceeds the likely increase in agency costs. Given this objective, empowering minority shareholders to veto a proposed recapitalization raises several issues.121

First, there is a clear tension between the fundamental justification for giving controllers more control and the requirement that minority shareholders approve such reallocation of control rights. Leaving control with the company’s founders is valuable solely because it allows them to execute their idiosyncratic visions about the company’s future direction in the face of disagreement from other investors. By its nature, idiosyncratic vision is subjective and prone to differences of opinion between the controller and the minority shareholders, so persuading minority shareholders about the value of the founders’ idiosyncratic visions is challenging. Thus, “[t]he risk of investors disrupting the entrepreneur’s pursuit of her idiosyncratic vision exists even when the firm is publicly traded and investors are using stock prices as a proxy for the firm’s performance.”122

As a result, requiring minority shareholders’ approval is inconsistent with the controller’s justification for reallocating control rights. Controllers offer no “payment” for the reallocation, but instead offer an unenforceable, nonquantifiable promise that leaving control in their hands would lead to better firm performance in the future.123 Minority shareholders must decide whether they believe that the founder’s idiosyncratic vision is indeed so valuable as to justify the increased risk of agency costs. The fact that the value of the controller’s idiosyncratic vision, by its very definition, may not be fully appreciated by the minority shareholders means that value-increasing reallocations of control rights may be blocked.124


123. Id. at 579.

124. The fact that the company is already public—that investors had the opportunity to evaluate the founder’s performance—does not mean that investors surely know whether the founder’s idiosyncratic vision is sufficiently valuable. See infra section II.B.2.
Second, as already mentioned, this bargaining would take place under conditions of a bilateral monopoly. That is, there is no readily available replacement to the controlling shareholder who is seeking extra power in order to influence the direction of the company; the minority shareholders cannot force out controllers and replace them with others. The inherently subjective nature of idiosyncratic vision combined with the dynamic of a bilateral monopoly increases the risk of a negotiation breakdown.

To make concrete why the dynamic might lead to a negotiation breakdown, consider again the case of Google, but now assume that the proposed recapitalization requires the support of the Class A shareholders. When negotiating with the controlling shareholder, these shareholders will consider the expected benefit (the impact on the company in terms of the controller’s idiosyncratic vision) and the expected costs (agency costs associated with the controller’s potential for abuse and the loss stemming from the decreased probability of Class A shareholders gaining control over the company). Assume that the Class A shareholders voted “no” and that the controlling shareholders do genuinely believe that their idiosyncratic visions could substantially increase the value of the company. What can the controllers do? They have limited options in such a scenario: They can give up on the idiosyncratic vision by stopping the company from raising capital for expanding, allow the company to expand and risk losing their ability to implement their vision, or, if they can raise the resources, resort to alternative transactions such as a freezeout.

Taken together, these concerns suggest that while empowering minority shareholders will protect them from the risk of agency costs, it will also increase the risk of frustrating the controller’s pursuit of idiosyncratic vision. Therefore, the parties must choose between two imperfect regimes: Allow the controller to unilaterally reallocate control rights, thereby protecting the pursuit of idiosyncratic vision while risking high exposure to agency costs; or provide minority shareholders with a veto right, thereby protecting against agency costs, but potentially sacrificing idiosyncratic vision. This tradeoff is inherent in the allocation of control rights, and it requires the parties to estimate which risk is more costly—

125. The term “bilateral monopoly” refers to a situation “in which two parties must deal with each other.” John Girace, A Synthesis of Law and Economics, 44 Sw. L.J. 1139, 1149 (1990); Herbert Hovenkamp, Rationality in Law & Economics, 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 295, 298 (1992) (“[T]he relationship between a husband and a wife, or between the two parties to an already executed contract, is a bilateral monopoly.”).

126. This predicament ex post explains why controllers may be unwilling, ex ante, to give minority shareholders veto power over the reallocation of control rights.

127. This Article does not claim that minority shareholders will always reject the controller’s proposal. See, e.g., Anand, supra note 3, at 208–10 (describing a case in Canada in which minority shareholders voted to allow the controller of Fairfax, a dual-class company, to get more control rights subject to certain limitations). Rather, it argues that there is no assurance that such a vote would lead to value-enhancing reallocations.
exposure to agency costs or loss of idiosyncratic vision.\textsuperscript{128} Given that the answer to this question is firm specific and individual specific, the parties will have to make their choice ex ante based on their relative bargaining position and accept whatever ex post consequences result from that choice.

B. The Impossibility of Valuing Control Rights

Section II.A has shown that the parties face an inevitable tension between agency costs and idiosyncratic vision. This analysis raises the question: Can a third-party mechanism, such as judicial review, assist the parties in reaching a better midstream allocation of control rights? This Article argues that due to the impossibility of developing methods for valuing control rights, judicial review will be ineffective. Section II.B.1 demonstrates that there is no acceptable economic method for valuing control rights, and that economists are unlikely to develop such a method because these rights are both firm specific and individual specific. Section II.B.2 explains the difference between valuation and valuation models, and in so doing, shows why average market premiums or the market’s reaction to a proposed reallocation of control rights cannot serve as substitutes for valuation models.

1. Lack of Methodology to Value Control Rights. — Financial economics does not provide a methodology for valuing different allocations of control rights over a corporation. We are aware of no method—least of all one commonly accepted within the financial community—for determining the objective value of granting control over corporation A to individual B (as opposed to individual C).\textsuperscript{129} The lack of acceptable methods for valuing different allocations of control rights is not a matter of sheer coincidence. Rather, this Article contends that financial economists cannot devise a workable methodology for valuing allocations of control rights because the value of such allocations depends on firm-specific and individual-specific attributes.

A key feature of common methodologies for valuing cash-flow rights is their ability to value assets independently of the individuals that control these assets. The methods for valuing companies, for example, abstract away from the person or entity that controls or manages these companies. A firm’s future cash flows are capable of derivation from readily available objective values,\textsuperscript{130} such as a firm’s exposure to systematic risk, debt-to-

\textsuperscript{128} Moreover, entrepreneurs and investors might attach different values to these risks. See Goshen & Hamdani, Idiosyncratic Vision, supra note 28, at 586 (“[A]gency costs and idiosyncratic vision are not necessarily valued symmetrically. Thus, the entrepreneur might proportionally value control rights much more than the increase in price that the investors will demand due to their increased exposure to agency costs.”).

\textsuperscript{129} See supra note 27.

equity ratios, expected revenue, and other financial metrics, which are not inherently tied to particular officers of the firm. This abstraction from individual-specific and firm-specific factors is critical for turning these methodologies into objective measures of value that can be generalized and applied across different companies.\footnote{Some methodologies require firm-specific inputs: The DCF method for valuing companies, for example, often relies on management projections about the company’s future revenues, and these projections might reflect the past performance of those in control of the corporation. Yet, these methodologies do not purport to measure the likely contribution of specific individuals to company value.}

However, the abstraction that is so critical for modeling cash-flow rights’ valuation cannot work in the context of control rights. The goal of valuing the reallocation of control rights is to determine the value of a specific company under the control of a specific individual. The decision at issue in conflicts over reallocation of control rights is not between controlled ownership and dispersed ownership, but rather between giving more, or less, control rights to Controller A, as opposed to Controller B. Consequently, any methodology for valuing allocations of control rights would have to determine the value of a specific entrepreneur’s idiosyncratic vision for a specific company, and the potential loss from agency costs associated with granting more control to that individual, who might abuse that control.

To demonstrate the central point here, consider the valuation challenges associated with the Google and Facebook recapitalizations. Recall that these recapitalizations reallocated control rights by making it easier for the founders to preserve their voting majority while the companies continued to raise equity capital. In both cases, the companies’ principal justification for the recapitalization focused not on the price that the founders paid for the reallocation of control rights but on the benefit that the new control structure allegedly would produce for the company and its investors. Google argued that the recapitalization would allow its founders to continue steering the company without “becoming vulnerable to short-term pressures,” and Facebook emphasized the vision of the company’s founder and the need to maintain a “long-term” focus.\footnote{Opening Pretrial Brief of Defendants Larry Page and Sergey Brin at 4-10, In re Google Inc. Class C S’holder Litig., No. 7469-CS (Del. Ch. filed June 10, 2013), 2013 WL 2728581 (“By holding their shares longer than other pre-IPO holders, the Founders now have the ability, if they vote together, to elect directors who support Google’s long-term focus and unique mission.”).} Operating in the background for these companies was an additional concern that the
risk of losing control would discourage their controllers from funding growth by raising capital or making acquisitions. Taken together, both companies claimed that the recapitalizations would increase their value.134

Given these justifications, the valuation would have to determine the recapitalizations’ effect on the corporation—that is, the effect that facilitating the founders’ control over Facebook and Google would have on company value. As explained above, incontestable control allows a founder to pursue an idiosyncratic vision for the company even against investors’ objections.135 At the same time, incontestable control increases the risk of agency costs—the risk that controllers will use their dominant positions to advance their own interests at the expense of the company or its minority shareholders. Thus, any method for valuing control rights will have to objectively evaluate individual-specific traits that are difficult to observe—the controller’s idiosyncratic vision, competence to execute it, and loyalty—within a firm-specific context.

The valuation of an idiosyncratic vision is on its own particularly difficult, as idiosyncratic vision is, by its very nature, a subjective view for improvement of the firm that may run counter to market consensus. This inquiry is forward looking and inherently individual specific. For instance, the goal of the inquiry would be to determine the value of having Mark Zuckerberg’s idiosyncratic vision, and not that of any other entrepreneur, implemented at a specific company, Facebook (and not any other company). Any model would therefore need to grapple with a particular individual’s contribution to a particular firm.

The valuation of agency costs also poses challenges. The methodology would have to assign a value to the effect that increased control has on Zuckerberg’s agency costs—his likelihood of abusing control to expropriate investors—and the likely impact of these agency costs on Facebook’s value.136 And there is yet another type of agency cost to evaluate: Recall that one of the concerns underlying the recapitalizations is that, unless companies make it easier for founders to preserve their control, the companies might not raise more equity capital, thereby missing out on opportunities for growth.137 A valuation would therefore have to assess both the value of these growth opportunities and whether the recapitalization is necessary

134. See supra notes 132–133. Note that in Facebook’s case, the company also claimed that Zuckerberg agreed to new restrictions on his control shares. This Article does not address that point. See Facebook, May 2016 Proxy Statement, supra note 13, at 61–62.
136. The Google plaintiffs’ pretrial brief seems to have recognized the difficulties of this valuation. See Plaintiffs’ Opening Pretrial Brief at 55, In re Google Inc. Class C S’holder Litig., No. 7469-CS (Del. Ch. filed June 10, 2013), 2013 WL 2728583. Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that a controller “cannot take advantage of a run of success[,] even a long run of success, to change a company’s corporate governance to give him permanent voting control,” lest courts “be stuck with the invidious task of deciding how much ‘success’ was enough to justify entrenching management.” Id.
137. See supra notes 132–134 and accompanying text.
for the company to pursue them. The extent to which controllers will abuse their control, with or without the recapitalization, depends on a myriad of specific characteristics, including the controllers’ identity and personality, their liquidity position, the company’s industry, and so on.

Further, and even more difficult for accurate valuation, the model would need to make forward-looking predictions. After all, Zuckerberg may well be able to successfully execute his idiosyncratic vision today. However, a reallocation of control rights will have implications for Facebook down the line, so any valuation model will have to consider Zuckerberg’s loyalty and competence then as well as now. It is hard enough to evaluate human behavior and determine an individual’s values and incentives on the basis of today’s knowledge; it is even harder to predict human behavior in the future.

Valuation techniques are simply not equipped to consider all of these individual-specific and firm-specific factors that are crucial for valuing control rights and yet very difficult to observe. Once one abstracts away from the firm-specific and individual-specific features, there is no meaningful metric left. In other words, the goal of valuing the reallocation of control rights is to assign value to the expected idiosyncratic vision and expected agency costs of a specific individual in the context of a specific company. Abstracting away from individual-specific and firm-specific features—the basic aspect that typically enables economists to perform valuation of cash-flow rights—would contradict the precise goal of the valuation and render it meaningless in the context of reallocation of control rights. Thus, there is not, nor can there ever be, an economic methodology for determining firm value under different allocations of control rights.

2. Valuations and Valuation Models. — Section II.B.1 argues that it is inherently impossible to create valuation models for the reallocation of control rights. This claim, however, does not imply that control rights do not have value or that investors or other market actors do not value them. Indeed, investors routinely engage in valuing control rights because these rights affect idiosyncratic vision and agency costs, and hence firm value.\textsuperscript{138} But the fact that investors value control rights does not mean that there is an objective valuation method that a competent court could use while adjudicating a conflict over the reallocation of control rights. To see why, this Article focuses on two methods by which control might be valued. Section II.B.2.a discusses empirical studies that measure the average premium paid for control across other firms. Section II.B.2.b discusses the market’s reaction to a specific company’s reallocation of control.

a. Empirical Average Values of Control. — Empirical studies of control measure, using different methods, the value that the market has assigned

\textsuperscript{138} John D. Finnerty & Douglas R. Emery, The Value of Corporate Control and the Comparable Company Method of Valuation, 33 Fin. Mgmt. 91, 97 (2004) (describing different valuation methods that include the valuation of control rights because “[c]orporate control accounts for a significant portion of a firm’s value”).
to control rights. In particular, studies have calculated the average premium paid in complete acquisitions of a firm in different industries, the average premium paid for a control block in different countries, and the average premium for the superior shares of dual-class firms in different countries.

As an illustration, assume that a firm is auctioned for sale. To determine what purchase price to offer, each potential bidder will estimate the improvements that can be made to the firm (such as reducing the cost of capital, cutting operational costs, or improving sales), the synergies that can be attained with the bidder’s own business (such as cost savings due to economies of scale or scope), and any idiosyncratic vision the bidder might have. While it is possible to objectively estimate the potential improvements and synergies, it is impossible to estimate the bidder’s idiosyncratic vision, for the reasons discussed above. Nevertheless, each bidder assesses the value of their idiosyncratic vision and reflects any such value in their bid for the company. If there is more than one bid, the average control premium offered for the firm can be calculated. Similarly, with a sample of several acquisitions, one can calculate the average control premium in an industry.

Likewise, the average premium paid for control blocks reflects the fact that when a controlling shareholder is selling its control block, potential bidders will offer a premium for the same reasons as above, but may additionally do so for one other reason: Some bidders might include the


143. This Article assumes that incumbent management would leave the business. Thus, whatever idiosyncratic vision they have is no longer relevant.


private benefits of control they intend to gain from expropriating the minority in their offered bid price.\textsuperscript{147} Again, if there is more than one bidder, an average premium can be calculated, and given different transactions in control blocks, an average premium in a specific country can be calculated.\textsuperscript{148}

Lastly, empirical studies also calculate the premium at which the superior-voting-class shares trade when a corporation has tradable dual-class shares.\textsuperscript{149} This premium reflects investors’ estimates of the potential control premium they might receive or the potential cost they might suffer because of agency costs.

Despite the existence of empirical studies measuring the value of premiums paid in each of the above cases, to date, no empirical study has offered an objective method to evaluate control by a specific individual of a specific company. The fact that investors value control and buyers of control are willing to pay a control premium does not imply that there is an acceptable method for valuing different allocations of control rights over a specific company.

More specifically, the fact that empirical studies can calculate the average value of control in some markets cannot serve as a substitute for a methodology that measures the effect of providing a specific individual with more control over a specific company. In a midstream reallocation of control rights, the value of the firm will increase if a competent and loyal controller will succeed in attaining idiosyncratic vision. But the value might decrease if incompetent and disloyal controllers simply pursue agency costs, or loyal and competent controllers are simply wrong about the value of idiosyncratic vision or about their ability to attain it.

Relying upon a calculation of the average premium paid for control provides no help in this situation because by its very definition, the average value of control in a given market will reflect every breed of controller—the competent and incompetent, the successful and unsuccessful, as well as the loyal and disloyal. Yet in a midstream reallocation of control rights, the specific controller is arguing that they are loyal and that implementing

\textsuperscript{147} U.S. law allows controllers to sell their shares for a premium. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Transfers of Control and the Quest for Efficiency: Can Delaware Law Encourage Efficient Transactions While Chilling Inefficient Ones?, 21 Del. J. Corp. L. 359, 360 (1996); Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Controlling Controlling Shareholders, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 785, 787 (2003) (describing the types of private benefits that can be derived from control and the possible limits on extracting these benefits).

\textsuperscript{148} See supra note 141 and accompanying text.

their idiosyncratic vision would produce above-market returns. That is, they are arguing they are above the average. Thus, an average, as such, cannot help a court when adjudicating such claims.150

b. Market Reaction to Reallocations of Control Rights. — In a publicly traded company, any reallocation—or expected reallocation—of control rights will be priced by the market. Indeed, when Google announced its recapitalization, the market price of its publicly traded Class A shares dropped, suggesting that the market viewed the specific decision to reallocate control rights to Brin and Page as unfavorable to Class A shares.151 In the face of that market reaction, it is tempting to argue that changes in companies’ stock prices should serve as an objective measure on which courts could rely to determine the value of the reallocated control rights. While the controller’s claim that they do have idiosyncratic vision can be challenged on the grounds of bias, the market reaction is arguably unbiased; after all, investors were willing to accept a lower price for their shares and exited.

However, the market reaction to the announcement about expected reallocation of control rights cannot serve as an “objective” valuation methodology.152 This follows from the fact that underlying the concept of idiosyncratic vision is a fundamental disagreement with the market. This disagreement is not necessarily about conflict (whether the controller is disloyal and thus lying about the need to get more control rights to pursue idiosyncratic vision), but can also be about competence (whether controllers are right about the value of their idiosyncratic vision and their ability to attain it). Despite the market’s disagreement, (loyal) controllers seek to retain control in order to execute their idiosyncratic visions because they believe their idiosyncratic visions will increase the value of the company. But by its very nature, idiosyncratic vision may not be accurately priced by the market. Indeed, as explained earlier,153 this concern is an important reason for controllers’ unwillingness to provide the market—minority shareholders—with the power to veto reallocation of control rights. To subject the reallocation of control rights to a valuation based on the market’s reaction to a proposed recapitalization would be to restate the fact that the shareholders and the controller do not share the same opinion of the controller’s vision. Using market prices as the methodology for valuing

150. The average could be useful in other contexts in which the idiosyncratic vision of the manager is not at play. For instance, when claiming a negligent sale process of a firm (Revlon breach), the average premium that could be attained in the industry could serve a useful measure for damages.


152. Others have explained, in other contexts, why market prices should not be used for valuation purposes. See, e.g., Albert H. Choi & Eric Talley, Appraising the “Merger Price” Appraisal Rule, 34 J.L. Econ. & Org. 543, 546 (2018).

153. See supra section II.A.2.
reallocations of control rights would therefore be inconsistent with the fundamental justification for allocating control rights to founders. In fact, using the market reaction would be tantamount to courts routinely accepting the valuation claim of one side to the litigation.

Moreover, according to the controller, shareholders that sold their shares did so based on a misguided understanding of the controller’s idiosyncratic vision. To illustrate this point, first note that from the announcement of the recapitalization on April 12, 2012 to April 13, 2012 the Google share price dropped roughly 4.1% while the Nasdaq composite dropped only about 1.4%, suggesting a “damage” of 2.7% to the value of Google.154 However, fast-forwarding five years, the shareholders who held, or bought, the shares seem to have won out: While the Nasdaq composite rose 119.24%, Google shares rose 213.97%, beating the index by 94.73%.155 These facts are malleable and can be used by both parties in litigation regarding a midstream reallocation of control rights. While the controllers will argue that without the recapitalization Google would not have beaten the market, the opposing minority shareholders will argue that Google would have outperformed the market by an even greater percentage of 97.43% (94.73% + 2.7%), had they not reallocated control rights.156 Accordingly, although the selling shareholders choose to exit, their view about the value of the reallocation of control rights cannot be determinative because they might be wrong. The possibility of error is especially troubling in litigation that takes place immediately following the announcement of a recapitalization, before the effect of the recapitalization has materialized.157 Thus, while controllers might sometimes overestimate the value of their idiosyncratic vision, market reaction to reallocation of control rights might also be wrong, and in any case, it is far from objective.

Finally, market reaction reflects investors’ assessment of the likely impact of the new allocation of control not only on company value, but also


156. Practically, it is hard to believe that the selling shareholders estimated that Google would beat the market by 97.43%, and thus sold because 2.7% would be deducted from their expected return after the recapitalization. Where could they realistically invest their money instead and beat the market by more than 94%?! 157. Longer-term assessment of the value of such recapitalizations at other companies, in order to identify their average effect on firm value, for example, would not serve as a substitute for a valuation model. As explained above, judicial review in this context requires an objective method for determining the value of a specific controller for a specific company. See supra section I.A.1.
on minority investors’ expectation of gaining a portion of the control premium. To illustrate these two components of market reaction, consider again the case of Google. When the recapitalization was announced, Google’s share price dropped, reflecting at least some investors’ valuation that reallocation of control rights to Brin and Page would not maximize value for Google’s Class A shareholders. However, it is not at all clear why the price dropped. Some shareholders did not trade, while some sold and others bought. Were the shareholders who sold for a lower price willing to do so because they feared higher agency costs? Or did the price drop to reflect the lower likelihood that the market could eventually gain control and attain the accompanying premium? For a method that will measure the effect of different allocations of control rights on the value of Google, a price drop because of fears of increased agency costs is relevant, but a drop reflecting the loss of control expectations is not. After all, corporate law recognizes the controllers’ entitlement to avoid actions that will lead to their loss of control.158

Ultimately, as is explained in more detail below, the lack of an acceptable methodology for valuing control rights means that judicial review cannot assist controllers and minority shareholders in making better decisions, ex post, about the reallocation of control rights.

III. RESOLVING CONTROL CONFLICTS

The unique features of the reallocation of control rights—a dichotomous choice made in a setting in which a bilateral monopoly is present and acceptable methods for valuation are absent—has implications for the role of corporate law in resolving disputes over the allocation of these rights. This Part argues that the only appropriate response by courts when addressing reallocations of control rights in controlled companies is to treat the issue as a question of charter interpretation as to who has the decisionmaking power, rather than as a question of self-dealing.

This Part begins by considering the application of Delaware’s entire fairness standard—the regime that applies to self-dealing—to reallocations of control rights. Section III.A uses the example of the dual-to-triple-class recapitalization to show that the entire fairness standard, in any form, should not apply to conflicts over reallocation of control rights. The section then argues that any intermediate form of judicial review is also unlikely to be desirable. Section III.B explains that Delaware courts should regulate reallocations of control rights by deferring to the arrangement settled upon in the charter. Where the charter does not offer an answer, Delaware courts should apply the business judgment rule to midstream reallocations of control rights.

158. See Goshen & Hamdani, Idiosyncratic Vision, supra note 28, at 602 (“As courts in Delaware have long recognized, controllers cannot be forced to sell their control blocks even when doing so would clearly benefit the corporation or its minority shareholders.”).
A. The Limits of Judicial Review

This section argues that Delaware courts’ approach for adjudicating conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders is dependent on the financial community to develop valuation methodologies. Since no methodologies exist for valuing reallocation of control rights, Delaware’s existing approaches—the entire fairness review, voluntary MFW conditions, and intermediate scrutiny—should not apply to the reallocation of control rights.

1. Entire Fairness Review. — As explained above, Delaware’s regime governing self-dealing—entire fairness review—critically relies on courts’ competence to value cash-flow rights and determine their “fair price.” Under the entire fairness standard, controlling shareholders can engage in self-dealing transactions without securing the approval of independent directors or minority shareholders, as long as the transaction is subject to a judicial determination of its fairness. Judicial review of a transaction’s fairness has worked well in the context of cash-flow rights conflicts, as economic theory has long developed methodologies—on which Delaware courts rely—for valuing companies and other assets.

Subjecting midstream reallocations of control rights to entire fairness review would require the court to assess the fairness of the new allocation of control rights. However, as section II.B explains, there are no acceptable methods on which courts can rely for valuing control rights. Moreover, attempting to develop such methods is an inherently futile task because of the subjective nature of control rights. Without valuation models to guide courts, entire fairness review would be quite speculative: Courts would have no reliable methodology for identifying value-enhancing reallocations of control rights, and the outcome of judicial review would be unpredictable.

Parties will not wish to rely on speculative and unpredictable judicial review as it might fail to protect investors from agency costs, and it could deter controllers with idiosyncratic visions from attempting to reallocate

159. See infra section III.A.1.
160. See infra section III.A.2.
161. See infra section III.A.3.
162. See supra section I.A.1.
163. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983) (“The concept of fairness has two basic aspects: fair dealing and fair price.”).
164. See In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 47–48 (Del. Ch. 2013) (holding that although “the interests of the preferred and common stockholders were not aligned,” the transaction was fair (quoting In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., No. CIV.A. 1512–VCL, 2009 WL 2225958, at *7 (Del. Ch. July 24, 2009))).
165. Cf. Geeyoung Min, Governance by Business Decisions: Dividends and Shareholder Voting 33–37 (Aug. 29, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (arguing that dividend distributions that reallocate control rights should be subject either to enhanced scrutiny or to entire fairness review).
control rights.\textsuperscript{166} Under the entire fairness standard, even controllers with extremely valuable idiosyncratic visions would be subject to costly litigation.\textsuperscript{167} The deterrence effect on the controllers with valuable idiosyncratic visions might be particularly acute given the likelihood that courts will tend to underestimate the value of their idiosyncratic vision. As courts know, all controllers have an incentive to claim that they have an extremely valuable idiosyncratic vision, but many of them will be objectively wrong about the value of their idiosyncratic visions and their ability to attain them, and some of them will simply be lying. These realities might bias courts against finding that the expected value of the controller’s idiosyncratic vision exceeds the risk of agency costs.

\textsuperscript{166} To see why, assume there are 100 controlled firms in the market, each with a controller who owns 15\% of the equity. Of these 100, twenty-five will wish to reallocate control rights, and assume further that while in five of these firms the controllers have idiosyncratic vision (“A firms”), in twenty of them controllers would merely exploit private benefits of control (“B firms”). If one of the twenty B firms reallocates control rights, the controller will inflict damage due to agency costs, ranging from \$2 to \$30, with an average of \$20. If one of the five A firms with the truly exceptional controllers reallocates control rights it will add \$100 in firm value, out of which \$15 will accrue to the controller because of their equity.

To understand the deterrent effect of unpredictable valuations, assume a controller needs to first go through with an irreversible reallocation of control rights and thereafter, using an unpredictable valuation method, the court submits the bill, which requires the controller to pay damages if the allocation is found to be unfair. Given that twenty out of twenty-five firms will have agency costs, in each litigation, there is an 80\% probability that the court will find the allocation to have been unfair. Thus, in 20\% of the cases the court will believe that the controller has idiosyncratic vision and the bill will be zero, while in 80\% of the cases the bill will be positive and will randomly range from \$2 to \$30, though still maintaining an average of \$20. How would that affect the behavior of controllers? The worst controllers, those who inflict \$50 in damage, will go through with the reallocation. The “worst” that can happen to them is that the court submits the correct bill of \$30 and they break even. Any lower bill will represent a windfall and this windfall will arrive with a high probability (20\% probability to keep the \$30 and 80\% probability to pay back \$30 or less). Controllers with idiosyncratic vision will be deterred, even if they are not risk averse. If the court recognizes their idiosyncratic vision (20\% probability), the bill will be zero and they can increase value and collect their share of the gain, \$15. If the court is mistaken (80\% probability), then they might receive a bill with an average value of \$20. For the controller with idiosyncratic vision the expected value of the reallocation is negative \((20\% \times \$15) - (80\% \times \$20) = -\$13\). Once all the five A firms are deterred, and all the controllers within the twenty B firms that might consume less than \$20 in private benefits are also deterred, the court will adjust the average upward until even the worst controllers are deterred. This “equilibrium” of entire fairness valuations will practically evolve into a flat prohibition of reallocation of control rights. The result will damage diversified shareholders and the market. The prohibition blocks twenty firms from inflicting a total damage of \$400 at the price of losing the \$500 increase in value of the five firms with idiosyncratic vision.

The situation is not going to improve if, as it might be the case in reality, controllers can reverse course and cancel the reallocation after the court declines to find idiosyncratic vision and issues an injunction. See infra note 202.

\textsuperscript{167} See In re MFW S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 534 (Del. Ch. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014) (“[A]bsent the ability . . . to bring an effective motion to dismiss, every case has settlement value, not for merits reasons, but because the cost of paying an attorneys’ fee to settle litigation . . . exceeds the cost in terms of dollars and time consumed of going through the discovery process . . .”).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3375748
Moreover, loyal controllers with a genuine belief in the value of their idiosyncratic vision may expect to benefit from a reallocation mostly through their pro rata share of any positive effect such reallocation would have on firm value. Courts, however, might insist on having the controller—and not the company—bear the cost if the reallocation is found to be unfair.168 Thus, entire fairness litigation might place the competent and loyal controller at an inherent disadvantage.169

Ultimately, the possibility that courts will be unsympathetic to a controlling shareholder’s claim of idiosyncratic vision will have a deterrent effect, which will transform the entire fairness standard into a de facto requirement to receive majority-of-minority support to avoid the uncertainty of the valuation. With the odds stacked against them in this way, a controlling shareholder is left with no meaningful choice other than to seek MFW protection. In other words, although the controller is formally allowed to unilaterally reallocate control rights, practically, because of the lack of objective valuation methods, minority shareholders will always be given a veto right because a sensible controlling shareholder will make a reallocation of control contingent on their approval.

An inherently speculative and unpredictable judicial valuation is unlikely to reduce either the risk of agency costs or that of losing idiosyncratic vision. To the contrary, it will add litigation costs and an additional risk of judicial mistakes. Subsequently, courts’ inability to value control rights means that they should not assess the fairness of reallocations of control rights. In the absence of economic models for valuing different allocations of control rights, there is no reason to expect judicial review to produce an optimal allocation of these rights. The parties cannot rely on judicial review to ameliorate the inherent tension they face and must therefore themselves choose between the risk of high agency costs and that of losing idiosyncratic vision.

2. Voluntary MFW Conditions. — The analysis so far has assumed that subjecting midstream reallocations of control rights to judicial review would require courts to value the new allocation of control rights. One may argue, however, that this assumption overlooks the current state of Delaware’s entire fairness regime. After all, Delaware courts often forgo entire fairness review (and judicial valuation) by encouraging controlling

168. During the Google settlement hearing, the court repeatedly criticized the failure to have the founders personally share the settlement costs. For example, see Settlement Hearing and Rulings of the Court at *27, In re Google Inc. Class C S’holder Litig., No. 7469-CS (Del. Ch. argued Oct. 28, 2013), 2013 WL 6735045 (“So what you’re telling me here in terms of the settlement is that the founders who wish to retain voting control but not by continuing to purchase shares with an economic interest and preserving that voting control that way, they’re not taking any haircut in this.”).

169. Limiting courts to issuing only injunctions might mitigate the deterrence of controllers. But, as explained in note 166, supra, and in note 202, infra, such a regime might still produce undesirable outcomes.
shareholders to voluntarily condition the execution of a self-dealing transaction upon receiving the support of a majority of the minority shareholders and the approval of an independent special committee. With these conditions—the MFW conditions—in place, courts will grant the deal review under the deferential business judgment standard and accordingly abstain from assessing the fairness of the transaction. At first blush, this regime ostensibly sidesteps the problems inherent in judicial valuation of control rights: The majority-of-minority requirement relies on the minority shareholders’ competence to value the proposed transaction, and courts only supervise the approval process to ensure that it was uncoerced, informed, and that a majority of disinterested shareholders approved the deal. This section explains why the MFW conditions of the Delaware regime, by themselves, cannot overcome the need for a reliable model to guide courts in valuing control rights.

a. Majority-of-Minority Condition. — Delaware doctrine does not require controllers to subject a self-dealing transaction to a vote by minority shareholders. Rather, it provides the controller with an option: The controller can either subject the transaction to a vote by minority shareholders or have the court review the transaction for its fairness. The controller will therefore compare the possible outcome of negotiating with minority shareholders—including the risk of a negotiation failure—against the outcome that judicial valuation is likely to produce. If the controlling shareholder anticipates that minority shareholders will behave strategically and hold out for an unreasonable price or fail to approve a value-enhancing transaction for any other reason, the controller can avoid the negotiations altogether, force the transaction upon the minority, and simply opt to show in court that the price is fair under the entire fairness review.

Moreover, minority shareholders’ willingness to approve the proposed transaction will also be affected by the controller’s option to “walk away” from negotiations and go forward with the transaction without the minority’s approval. In other words, under Delaware’s voluntary MFW conditions, both parties, the controller and the minority shareholders, negotiate “in the shadow” of Delaware’s fair-price requirement. This judicial benchmark affects the parties’ bargaining strategies, as each side will

170. See supra section I.A.2.
171. See, e.g., In re MFW S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d at 502.
172. See, e.g., id. at 525–26.
base its demands on its estimate of the valuation result a court would reach if it were asked to determine the “fair price.”175 The judicial backstop, resting on both parties’ ability to predict how the court will evaluate the deal, incentivizes both the controlling and minority shareholders to reach an agreement. The looming presence of judicial valuation also prevents a negotiation breakdown, as the controller cannot offer too little and the minority cannot demand too much compared to the predictable outcome of “entire fairness” review.176 The dynamic changes, however, when courts cannot objectively value control rights. When both parties lack confidence in courts’ ability to objectively value control rights, the shadow of credible judicial valuation evaporates and the incentive to remain at the bargaining table is dramatically curtailed. Neither party can predict what the “fair price” will be, which renders the focal point of the negotiation elusive.

This analysis shows that Delaware’s partial reliance on some type of veto right for minority shareholders to regulate self-dealing is in fact more dependent on accurate valuation than may be immediately apparent. Thus, Delaware’s most recent approach to the reallocation of control rights is problematic. In Crane, the court held that entire fairness applied, and used the MFW conditions to reduce the level of review to business judgment.177 Given NRG’s successful implementation of the MFW conditions, the court was not required to assess the recapitalization’s fairness.178 However, if NRG had failed to condition the recapitalization on a vote by minority shareholders, the court would have been left in the position of reviewing the reallocation of control rights under entire fairness.179 But without a valuation model, how could the court determine whether the reallocation was indeed fair?

Moreover, Crane was an exceptional case in which the controller was likely to secure the majority-of-minority vote without the difficulties identified above.180 The company in Crane was an entity that owned income-producing energy assets.181 It had no management of its own and instead

175. Indeed, an empirical study has found that the premium paid under the MFW procedure is similar to the premium determined by courts under the entire fairness process. See Fernán Restrepo, Judicial Deference, Procedural Protections, and Deal Outcomes in Freezeout Transactions: Evidence from the Effect of MFW 24 (Jan. 19, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3105169 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).

176. In other words, the ability to turn to the Delaware courts for an objective valuation makes the parties more likely to reach an agreement in which the minority “sells” litigation insurance to the controlling shareholder in exchange for a larger percentage of the surplus value generated by the deal. Goshen, supra note 47, at 429.

177. See supra notes 99–104 and accompanying text.


179. The same result would follow if Delaware chose to afford the recapitalization business judgment deference and the company had failed to meet one of the required conditions for such review. See infra note 213.

180. See supra section I.B.2.

relied on its controlling shareholder, through a “Management Services Agreement,” to manage its day-to-day affairs, including placing new energy assets, which are routinely and easily evaluated, into the company.\(^{182}\) Thus, in *Crane*, the need for the operator to preserve control as the company continued to acquire assets was an *operational* issue rather than a question of idiosyncratic vision.\(^{183}\) That is, the controller was not making appeals to the company’s vision as Page and Brin were in Google’s case, but rather to the need to ensure that Crane’s regular operations were run successfully. In this way, *Crane* was an anomalous situation because it was easy to explain to the minority shareholders that reallocation of control rights was needed to prevent the fairly immediate negative consequences that could result if the controller-operator lost control. In other cases, however, where the controller’s idiosyncratic vision is at issue, persuading minority shareholders to vote for the reallocation of control rights will not be as easy.\(^{184}\)

To summarize, the *MFW* majority-of-minority condition takes on a different meaning when courts cannot evaluate the fairness of the underlying transaction. As explained above, the parties must choose between allowing the controller to unilaterally reallocate control rights and subjecting the reallocation to a veto right by minority shareholders. If courts require the majority-of-minority support to avoid valuation of reallocation of control rights, then in cases in which the parties gave the controller the right to unilaterally reallocate control rights, the judicial requirement practically overrules the parties’ choice by mandating a veto right to the minority shareholders.

b. *Special Independent Committee.* — In addition to voluntarily asking for majority-of-minority support as explained above, under *MFW*, controllers that wish to avoid entire fairness review must empower a special committee of independent directors to negotiate the transaction and approve its terms.\(^{185}\) Indeed, the requirement that independent directors approve decisions that raise conflicts of interest is common in corporate law.\(^{186}\) However, in the context of reallocation of control rights, even this requirement is problematic.

\(^{182}\) Id. at *2.

\(^{183}\) See id. at *3–4 (describing the company’s dependence on the controlling shareholder as a source of assets).

\(^{184}\) See supra section I.B.2.

\(^{185}\) In re *MFW* S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 517 (Del. Ch. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014); see also supra notes 171–172 and accompanying text.

\(^{186}\) For example, in both *Crane* and the Google settlement, courts emphasized the significance of having the recapitalization negotiated and approved by a special committee of independent directors. See *Crane*, 2017 WL 7053964, at *9 (sugesting that the presence of well-motivated and truly independent directors might play an important role in determining the scope of judicial review); supra note 94 (describing then-Chancellor Strine’s acknowledgement that approval of the recapitalization plan by Google’s independent directors was the company’s strongest argument for adjusting the standard of review).
Ideally, a special committee of independent directors should verify that the controller indeed has the idiosyncratic vision to justify the higher risk of agency costs that come with a reallocation of control rights. This means that the usefulness of a special independent committee depends on its ability to ascertain the real value of idiosyncratic vision, which requires that such vision be verifiable. But, because of the subjective nature of idiosyncratic vision, it is inherently nonverifiable. Otherwise there would be few differences of opinion between controllers and minority shareholders. Moreover, for the reasons explained in section II.B, directors—like courts—would be unable to rely on valuation experts to offer an objective assessment of the value of the company under the new allocation of control rights. If it were possible to generate such an objective valuation, courts would also be able to do so.

As a result, the role of a special committee of independent directors would ultimately boil down to deciding whether to put their faith in the controller’s claims based on their knowledge of the controller’s competence and integrity. While the directors’ access to nonpublic information may allow them to observe the controller’s behavior on a variety of occasions, there is nothing to suggest that independent directors enjoy any advantage over Delaware’s judges in decoding the human traits relevant here: competence (vision) and integrity (agency costs). As such, the inherent tension between idiosyncratic vision and agency costs will render the special independent committee impractical, as the directors’ mere trust in the controller cannot translate to validation of the existence of idiosyncratic vision.

Lastly, Delaware’s tendency to focus on the process of the independent special committee might transform the process into a “cosmetic” negotiation solely aimed at meeting the judicial desire to see give-and-take between the controllers and the independent directors. To illustrate, consider the Facebook and Google recapitalizations. Although the true consideration for the reallocation of control rights is the promise of increased value, the independent directors in these cases negotiated for

187. See Goshen & Hamdani, Idiosyncratic Vision, supra note 28, at 601 (“[A]symmetric information and differences of opinion could prevent the controller-entrepreneur from credibly communicating her idiosyncratic vision not only to investors, but also to skeptical independent board members.”). Another concern is independent directors’ dependence on the controller for continued service at the company. See Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 46, at 1274.

188. When the board approves a corporate action that amounts to doing the controller a favor, such as waiving transfer of control conditions to facilitate the sale of the controller’s shares, courts have required that the board negotiate receiving something in return. See, e.g., In re Digex Inc. S’holders Litig., 789 A.2d 1176, 1210–11 (Del. Ch. 2000) (finding that the defendant company was likely to fail the fair dealing prong of fiduciary duty because independent directors were “kept powerless” to affect negotiations in a merger proposal controlled by interested directors). In the context of reallocation of control rights, however, controllers are not asking for a favor, but rather for a corporate action they believe would benefit the company.
“concessions” from the controllers in the form of additional contractual restrictions on their control rights. Yet, when these concessions are seriously considered, it becomes evident that they were merely put in place to satisfy the court’s desire to see some compromise between the parties.

In sum, the lack of valuation methods for reallocation of control rights limits judicial application of the voluntary MFW conditions, as the tools of entire fairness used to resolve cash-flow rights conflicts will not work in the context of control rights conflicts.

3. The Intermediate Approach. — One might wonder if this Article goes too far in eliminating judicial review. Even if entire fairness cannot be applied in the absence of objective valuation methodologies, the argument goes, perhaps courts could still play a useful role in adjudicating disputes over the reallocation of control rights. Under this view, courts could adopt an intermediate standard of review—one in between entire fairness and business judgment—that does not require valuation, to prevent controllers from overreaching. Consequently, this view reasons, intermediate review by Delaware’s equity court would avoid the complexities of entire fairness valuations while arguably preventing at least some egregious cases in which midstream reallocations are driven purely by agency costs.

This approach is familiar to corporate law scholars. Delaware courts have implemented intermediate standards of review in other contexts in which business judgment review seems too deferential and the entire fairness standard seems too strict. For example, in assessing defensive measures that directors take in response to a hostile takeover, Delaware requires the board to show a good faith determination that there was a threat and that the defense was proportional (the Unocal test).190 In assessing a board action that interferes with shareholders’ voting rights, Delaware courts require that the board show a compelling justification (the Blasius test).191 The main role of these intermediate tests is to provide pre-transaction litigation, in which courts typically either block the deal or let it go through because of some legal standard rather than because of an objective valuation.

At least at first glance, the intermediate standard seems to avoid judicial valuation issues and achieve an improved balance between the risks that parties aim to minimize: high agency costs and the loss of idiosyncratic

189. See supra notes 87–98 and accompanying text.
191. Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 661 (Del. Ch. 1988) (explaining that when a board action is “done for the primary purpose of impeding the exercise of stockholder voting power” past cases have articulated that “the board bears the heavy burden of demonstrating a compelling justification for such action”). Delaware courts use a similar approach to evaluate board decisions to sell control of a company (the Revlon test). See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 184 (Del. 1986) (“[W]hen bidders make relatively similar offers, or dissolution of the company becomes inevitable, the directors cannot fulfill their enhanced Unocal duties by playing favorites with the contending factions.”).
vision. A closer look at the Delaware courts’ application of these intermedi-
ate standards, however, highlights their inherent shortcomings. Con-
sider, for instance, the Blasius standard, which requires that a corporate
board have a compelling justification when the primary purpose of a cor-
porate action is to interfere with the shareholders’ vote. Indeed, it was
already clear from the facts of Blasius itself that even a good faith attempt
to protect the firm from a financial disaster would not satisfy the compel-
ing justification test. As courts have acknowledged the practical impos-
sibility of providing a goal that would satisfy Blasius’s requirements, their
focus has shifted from the board’s goal to the means that it used to accom-
plish the challenged interference with a shareholder vote. The test has
evolved into a list of permitted and prohibited actions, allowing the board
to regulate but not dictate the shareholder vote. Scholars and judges seem
to agree that, in the already very limited circumstances when the Blasius
standard applies, cases in which the court has found the compelling justi-
fication burden met are exceedingly rare, if not entirely nonexistent. Thus,
in the Blasius context, the intermediate standard of review simply
means a judicially imposed prohibition on board interference with the
shareholder vote.

The other form of intermediate scrutiny, the Unocal test, focuses on
the motives of the boards that use defensive measures. Since a well-
advised board can prepare an adequate paper trail showing the right

192. Blasius, 564 A.2d at 661.
193. Id. at 653–59 (finding that the board acted “in a good faith effort to protect its
incumbency, not selfishly, but in order to thwart implementation of the recapitalization that
it feared, reasonably, would cause great injury to the Company”).
194. David C. McBride & Danielle Gibbs, Interference with Voting Rights: The
court never has found a justification sufficiently compelling to permit a board to thwart
the shareholder franchise.”).
195. Compare Pell v. Kill, 135 A.3d 764, 789 (Del. Ch. 2016) (“Pell has established a
reasonable probability of showing successfully that the Board Reduction Plan is preclusive.
Pell has therefore established a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits on a claim
for breach of fiduciary duty under the enhanced scrutiny standard.”), with Mercier v. Inter-
Tel (Del.), Inc., 929 A.2d 786, 788 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“[D]irectors fearing that stockholders
are about to make an unwise decision that [risks the stockholders] . . . irrevocably los[ing]
a unique opportunity to receive a premium for their shares have a compelling justification—
the protection of their stockholders’ financial best interests—for a short postponement in
the merger voting process . . . .”).
196. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
defensive measures such as a poison pill indirectly affect shareholders’ voting rights (pre-
venting some shareholders from increasing their ownership of voting shares), and reallo-
cation of control rights could also be viewed in such a way (preventing control from shifting
to the market).
motives, the *Unocal* standard has essentially evolved into business judgment review for companies that hire sophisticated counsel. Thus, in the *Unocal* context, the intermediate standard of review simply means a judicially imposed default rule according to which the use of defensive measures is allowed.

The failings of existing intermediate standards to produce meaningful judicial review should be instructive. Any prospect that subjecting mid-stream allocation of control rights to an intermediate standard of review would provide a silver bullet seems to fly in the face of Delaware’s actual practice. Assume, like in *Unocal*, that the intermediate test used to regulate control rights focuses on both the motives of the controllers, as well as the process used to make the decision. A well-advised controller can always prepare the "right" paper trail to show a good motive for maintaining control: the pursuit of idiosyncratic vision. And, as explained above, by its very nature the objective value of idiosyncratic vision—or even its existence—cannot be verified by courts. This means that only the poorly advised or naive controllers will be captured by the test. The same fate awaits any process-related inquiry. In this regard, the story of Facebook is illuminating. There, the plaintiffs alleged, after discovery, that the special committee procedure had been compromised in part because one of the members of the committee had sent Mark Zuckerberg text messages updating him on the status of the special committee’s meetings. Even if the litigation had continued and Delaware had in fact found that the special committee was compromised, the next well-advised company proposing a recapitalization would learn the lesson and quickly avoid Facebook’s mistake.

The same outcome can be expected if the intermediate test takes the approach of *Blasius* and focuses on the goal of reallocating control rights. Indeed, one might think that reallocations of control rights could be

198. Mary Siegel, The Illusion of Enhanced Review of Board Actions, 15 U. Pa. J. Bus. L. 599, 617 (2013) (“Underneath this veneer of judicial review, however, is convincing evidence that Delaware courts, in reality, heavily defer to the decision of the target directors.”); see also Mercier, 929 A.2d at 810 (“[S]ome of the prior *Unocal* case law gave reason to fear that that standard, and the related *Revlon* standard, were being denuded into simply another name for business judgment rule review.” (footnotes omitted)).

199. See, e.g., Air Products v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 103 (Del. Ch. 2011) (noting that the first prong of *Unocal* requires directors-defendants to show that after “reasonable investigation” they determined in “good faith” that the bidder’s offer presented a threat).

200. See supra note 198 and accompanying text. One might argue that the success of the company could indicate the value of the entrepreneur’s vision. Yet, business failures (temporary or not) do not necessarily imply that the entrepreneur lacks vision. In fact, control matters for the pursuit of idiosyncratic vision precisely when investors or markets believe that the controller’s vision is wrong.

201. See Deepa Seetharaman & Sarah E. Needleman, Facebook Abandons Plans to Change Share Structure, Avoiding Lawsuit, Wall St. J. (Sept. 22, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-abandons-plans-to-change-share-structure-avoiding-lawsuit-1506114877 (on file with the *Columbia Law Review*) (“In one instance, Mr. Andreessen texted Mr. Zuckerberg during a March meeting of the special committee with progress reports. ‘NOW WE’RE COOKING WITH GAS,’ Mr. Andreessen wrote.”).
viewed through the *Blasius* framework as an incident of interference with shareholder voting rights. Again, well-advised controllers will state and demonstrate the pursuit of idiosyncratic vision as their goal. As the court in *Blasius* rejected the board’s good faith goal of avoiding financial disaster as a qualified compelling justification, there is no reason to think that the goal of pursuing idiosyncratic vision would be treated differently. However, in cases of reallocation of control rights the court will not be able to come up with a list of permitted and restricted actions because all reallocations have the same effect of shifting control from one group of shareholders to another. And the court cannot prohibit *all* reallocations of control rights, as such a ruling will run counter to the parties’ agreement to allow the controller to unilaterally reallocate control rights in genuine cases of pursuit of idiosyncratic vision. Practically, an intermediate test will gradually transform into business judgment review.

One might argue that the risk of intermediate litigation, on its own, might deter some disloyal controllers from ever trying to go through with opportunistic reallocation of control rights. After all, lawyers cannot justify *every* action, and the need to persuade professional courts, with the costs involved in the process, might deter some expropriation from taking place. However, this speculative benefit should be weighed against the potential costs arising out of possible judicial mistakes. In the absence of a methodologically sound tool for distinguishing between “good” and “bad” reallocations of control rights, the likelihood of mistakes is very high. Thus, the prospect of costly litigation under an intermediate standard of review will deter even legitimate, value-maximizing reallocations by controllers with idiosyncratic vision. Given the high probability of mistakes, even if all controllers litigate midstream reallocations and courts merely engage in judicial screening—granting injunctions or allowing the action to go through—an intermediate standard of review might harm the market by allowing some “bad” reallocations to go through and stopping some “good” ones.202

202. To see why, assume again that there are 100 controlled firms in the market traded at $100 each. See supra note 166. As previously stipulated in this Article, only twenty-five of the 100 would wish to reallocate control rights, and of those twenty-five, only five have controllers with idiosyncratic vision. If one of these five firms reallocates control rights it would add $100 in firm value. However, in the other twenty firms, any reallocation of control rights would result in the controller inflicting an average of $20 damage due to agency costs. Courts are aware that only five out of twenty-five firms would have idiosyncratic vision. Thus, there is a 20% probability that courts will believe that a controller has idiosyncratic vision and would allow a reallocation to go through, while in 80% of the cases the court will issue an injunction against the reallocation of control rights. To underscore the dangers of an erroneous determination, notice the outcome of applying the statistical probabilities assumed above within each group. If 80% of the twenty firms that yield high agency costs and 80% of the five firms that yield gains from idiosyncratic vision come before the court, the following is the result: Courts would likely block sixteen of the firms that have no idiosyncratic vision (avoiding $320 in damage), but they would also block four of the firms with idiosyncratic vision (losing $400 in value). At the same time, taking 20% from each of the groups, courts would likely allow four firms (20% of twenty) with agency costs to go through.
B. Implications for Corporate Law

Section III.A argues that Delaware courts should not review reallocations of control rights for their fairness or institute a new intermediate standard of review. This section claims that this leaves courts with the task of determining whether the controller has the power to unilaterally reallocate control rights. If the court finds that the controller has the power to make a midstream reallocation of control rights without the need for a vote by minority shareholders, then it should apply the business judgment rule.203 Otherwise, the court should enforce the right of the minority shareholders to veto the reallocation.

1. Deferring to the Parties’ Choice. — Controllers and minority shareholders face an inherent tradeoff between two opposing concerns. On the one hand, allowing the controller to unilaterally reallocate control rights might lead to opportunistic control allocations that would benefit the controller without increasing company value. On the other hand, a requirement that minority shareholders approve reallocations of control rights might lead to a bargaining failure and prevent controllers from realizing their idiosyncratic visions. As explained above, judicial review cannot ameliorate this tension. Instead, the parties must themselves choose between imperfect alternatives by agreeing ex ante on the rule that will govern midstream reallocations of control rights. They can either agree that the controller will hold the power to unilaterally reallocate control rights or that the minority’s approval is required, for example, by including a charter provision to that effect. In the first case they protect idiosyncratic vision, by strengthening the controllers’ freedom to pursue their idiosyncratic visions for the company regardless of investors’ views, and risk agency costs, by increasing the controllers’ abilities to expropriate control. In the second case, they minimize the risk of agency costs but risk losing idiosyncratic vision.

This Article takes no position on the optimal allocation of the power to reallocate control rights, as it is inherently firm specific and individual specific. In our view, the best approach for corporate law is to (1) allow the

203. See supra section III.A. One could argue that the parties may incorporate the prospect of judicial review into their initial allocation of the power to reallocate control rights. For example, minority shareholders might leave the power with the controller under the assumption that its use of the power will be constrained by judicial review. As this Article explains, however, it is highly unlikely that the parties would like to subject midstream reallocation of control rights to judicial review based on an unreliable method for assessing fairness. See id.
parties ex ante to determine who should have the power to reallocate control rights and (2) judicially settle ex post disputes about whether the controller has the power to reallocate these rights without a vote by minority shareholders. The principal task of courts is therefore to determine whether the controller can reallocate control rights without receiving the approval of the minority shareholders.

In some cases, the parties may expressly address the question in the company’s charter or other foundational document. For instance, the charter may require that minority shareholders approve any reallocation of control rights by providing that certain charter amendments receive a supermajority vote or, in the case of a dual-class company, a so-called class vote.204 Alternatively, the charter may expressly authorize the controller to make future changes without a vote by the majority-of-the-minority.205 If controllers and investors agree ex ante on an allocation of control in the corporate charter that empowers the controller to recapitalize the firm, subsequent judicial rewriting of this allocation runs directly counter to the ex ante motivation for entering into this type of arrangement. Courts should not determine the fairness of midstream reallocations or review the motives of the controller. The only role for courts faced with disputes over the reallocation of control rights is to enforce the parties’ arrangement for who has the power to reallocate control rights.206 When the controller has the right to unilaterally reallocate control rights, the business judgment rule should apply to its decision to reallocate these rights. In other words, the controller’s conflict of interest notwithstanding, courts should not treat the reallocation as self-dealing. As explained in Part II, the lack of acceptable valuation methodologies prevents courts from distinguishing between value-enhancing and value-reducing allocations of control rights.

The Delaware case that best reflects the approach outlined in this section is eBay. In eBay, the Delaware Chancery Court declined to review a corporate governance decision that clearly benefited the controllers—the implementation of a staggered board that effectively denied board representation to the minority shareholder—under the entire fairness standard.207 This case fits an approach focused on charter interpretation not

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204. See, e.g., In re Delphi Fin. Grp. S’holder Litig., No. CIVA. 7144-VCG, 2012 WL 729232, at *1 (Del. Ch. Mar. 6, 2012) (describing a case in which the “deal was conditioned on a majority of the publicly held Class A shares being voted in favor, and a successful vote to amend the [company] Charter to allow [the controller] to receive the differential”).


206. As the optimal allocation of the power to relocate control rights is company specific, courts may be asked by minority shareholders to read implied limitations on the controller’s power into specific charter provisions at specific companies.

207. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 37 (Del. Ch. 2010) (“I am not persuaded that entire fairness review applies to the Staggered Board Amendments . . . .”); see also supra section I.B.1.
only because it applied the business judgment rule to a midstream reallocation of control rights, but also because the court emphasized that applying the entire fairness standard would contradict the parties’ initial decision to provide the controllers with the right to unilaterally implement this change:

The right to amend the [C]raigslist charter, however, without eBay’s consent if eBay chose to compete with [C]raigslist was a benefit Jim and Craig negotiated for and secured in the Shareholders’ Agreement. Section 8.3 [of the Shareholders’ Agreement] plainly articulates that benefit. Thus, the Staggered Board Amendments cannot be inequitable because they were exactly the sort of consequence eBay accepted would occur if eBay decided to compete with [C]raigslist.208

As such, the court plainly stated that the plaintiffs were “seek[ing] to obtain a benefit [they were] not able to obtain” in negotiations for the “Shareholders’ Agreement.”209

Moreover, this Article’s approach is also consistent with Williams v. Geier, in which the Delaware Supreme Court granted business judgment review to a controlled public company that adopted a charter amendment creating “tenure shares” resulting in an effect similar to that achieved through a dual-class structure.210 The Williams plaintiffs argued that “the action of the Board in recommending the Amendment and Recapitalization to the stockholders constituted either a breach of fiduciary duty or an impermissible effort at entrenchment, both of which are claimed to rebut the business judgment presumption and implicate entire fairness review.”211 The court squarely rejected this contention, even while acknowledging the possibility that the majority shareholders would benefit more from the recapitalization than the minority shareholders.212 As explained above, similar rulings were given in the other cases detailed in section I.B.1. Yet, all of these cases reach results similar to the approach recommended in this Article—deferring to the allocation of control rights outlined in the corporate charter—without explicitly adopting this Article’s reasoning.213 Expressly explaining that this outcome is the result

208. eBay, 16 A.3d at 39.
209. Id.
212. Id. at 1385.
213. Although these cases reached a conclusion that conforms with this Article’s recommendation, they continue to subject the outcome to judicial discretion by relying on the business judgment rule. See supra section I.B.1. This is problematic because the business judgment rule reverts to entire fairness if one of the conditions for its application fails. See Williams, 671 A.2d at 1384. Thus, granting companies business judgment review in reallocations of control rights only works if the companies “get it right”; if they fail, then the court will again be forced to evaluate the recapitalization under the fairness standard. This Article’s approach calls on Delaware to address the question as one of charter interpretation rather than one of judicial review.
of the controller’s right to reallocate control rights will importantly provide the market with better guidance.

Lastly, the analysis here also applies to the CBS dispute. This Article contends that if the dispute had not settled, the court should have focused on the parties’ ex ante arrangements about the allocation of power concerning midstream reallocation of control rights. As the default rule in controlled companies is that the controller’s control is protected by a property rule, the only way to justify the board’s discretion to take control rights from the controller is to find that the controller had agreed ex ante to grant the board such a power. The extent to which this was the case was disputed in the CBS litigation. But, if the controller had indeed so agreed, the business judgment rule should apply to the board’s decision to dilute the controller, without any further review of the board’s discretion.

The proposal to defer to the parties’ choice is driven by the need to respect the rights of sophisticated parties to adopt the corporate arrangement that is most tailored to their needs. In the control rights context, this need is reinforced by the recognition that no arrangement is generally superior. Rather, the parties must choose between two imperfect alternatives. Moreover, a clear statement from courts indicating that they will defer to the parties’ initial choice—rather than attempt to assess ex post the fairness of the reallocation of control rights—will signal to parties the need to choose at the outset the arrangements that will govern midstream reallocation of control rights. In the case of public companies with a dual-class structure, for example, investors could insist on expanding the scope of class voting rights.

In the past, corporate law scholars were skeptical about the claim that governance arrangements adopted at the IPO stage are optimal. In recent decades, however, there has been a dramatic rise in the power of institutional investors, which now own most of the shares of publicly traded corporations in the United States. These sophisticated investors are able

215. The CBS plaintiffs argued that “the fact that the certificate of incorporation of CBS (and Viacom), unlike those of some other controlled companies, authorizes the Board to approve a stock dividend that would dilute NAI’s voting power is itself evidence of CBS’s commitment to independent board governance.” CBS Corp. v. Nat’l Amusements, Inc., No. 2018-0342-AGB, 2018 WL 2263385, at *4 (Del. Ch. May 17, 2018). The defendants disagreed. Id. The court stated that it was “express[ing] no opinion” on this interpretation. Id.
to negotiate governance terms and prices with any firm wishing to go public.218 Furthermore, at least for companies with a dual-class share structure, the IPO market for governance terms seems to be quite an active one. To begin, although many founders would clearly like to go public with a dual-class structure, only a minority of firms succeed.219 Additionally, dual-class companies that go public exhibit a considerable variety of governance arrangements in their charters, providing different provisions regarding the allocation of power between controllers and minority shareholders.220 This variety suggests that founders cannot simply dictate governance terms and that some form of bargaining between founders and investors does take place at the IPO stage. Thus, whatever charter arrangements the parties have made as to midstream reallocation of control rights should be respected.

2. A Default Rule. — The approach explained in section III.B.1 would require Delaware courts to identify the parties’ choice concerning the power to reallocate control rights. Delaware courts often address disputes over charter interpretation,221 and the rules that guide courts when they interpret corporate charters will not be revisited here. However, how should courts decide cases in which the process of charter interpretation provides no answer on the parties’ agreement on the issue of control rights? And what should be the default rule?

There is substantial literature about what types of default rules are optimal;222 this literature will not be reviewed here. Instead, this section focuses on the inherent tradeoff implicating the choice of a default rule for midstream reallocations of control rights. As explained above, the two possible rules are imperfect. The rule allowing the controller to unilaterally reallocate control rights will increase both the expected benefit from idiosyncratic vision and the expected loss from agency costs. The rule

218. See id.
220. Winden, supra note 205, at 860 (conducting an empirical study of the charter provisions of dual-class companies).
221. See, e.g., In re Delphi Fin. Grp. S’holder Litig., No. CIVA. 7144-VCG, 2012 WL 729232, at *2 (Del. Ch. Mar. 6, 2012) (holding that the controller lacked the power to propose a charter amendment that would entitle it to a control premium).
providing the minority with a veto right will decrease both the expected benefit from idiosyncratic vision and the expected loss from agency costs. The expected value of each rule is the sum of both effects. Accordingly, if the expected benefits from idiosyncratic vision are higher than the expected loss from agency costs, the default rule should allow the controller to unilaterally reallocate control rights, and vice versa.223

For many years Delaware law had a single uniform default.224 Shareholders holding a majority of the votes can unilaterally amend the corporate charter.225 Indeed, in a long line of cases, described in section I.B.1 and illustrated most prominently by Williams v. Geier,226 Delaware concluded that the controller has the authority to unilaterally reallocate control rights and accordingly applied the business judgment rule. Unfortunately, this simple default lost its certainty during Google’s 2012 settlement hearing227 and culminated in the application of the entire fairness test in Crane.228 This development might have altered Delaware’s de facto default rule. While the application of the business judgment rule in earlier cases granted the controller the power to unilaterally reallocate control rights, the application of the entire fairness standard in the recent cases has practically granted the minority shareholders a veto right over reallocation of control rights.

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223. The analysis in the text discusses in the abstract the benefit from idiosyncratic vision and the loss from agency costs. A fuller account would also consider the likelihood that, given the difficulties that were identified above, minority shareholders would fail to approve value-enhancing reallocation of control rights.

224. The optimal default does not necessarily have to be identical across all types of control rights and all governance structures. For example, one default rule might apply to dual-class companies and another to companies with one-share-one-vote. This view might be reinforced by then-Chancellor Leo Strine’s comments at the Google settlement. See Settlement Hearing and Rulings of the Court at *38, In re Google Inc. Class C S’holder Litig., No. 7469-CS (Del. Ch. argued Oct. 28, 2013), 2013 WL 6735045 (“[F]rom the beginning, everyone has been clear with the people who lined up in hoards . . . to buy Google stock, with the understanding that these founders were going public but with no . . . intention to relinquish voting control . . . and that when you invested in Google, that was sort of your understanding.”). Indeed, the stock exchange rules prohibit midstream changes from single- to dual-class shares. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Kobi Kastiel, The Untenable Case for Perpetual Dual-Class Stock, 105 Va. L. Rev. 585, 597 & n.35 (2017).

225. In dual-class companies, this default rule is supplemented by the Delaware default on the conditions under which a charter amendment requires a specific shareholder class vote. See Del. Code tit. 8, § 242(b)(2) (2019). Under Delaware law, in companies with more than one class of shares, a charter amendment would have to be approved by a class of shares if it would change “the powers, preferences, or special rights of the shares of such class so as to affect them adversely.” Id. For an analysis of the differences between the Delaware approach and that of the Model Business Corporations Law, see Michael P. Dooley & Michael D. Goldman, Some Comparisons Between the Model Business Corporation Act and the Delaware General Corporation Law, 56 Bus. Law. 737, 750–52 (2001).

226. See supra notes 74–78 and accompanying text.


228. See supra note 15.
The earlier Delaware cases applying the business judgment rule preferred the protection of idiosyncratic vision over the risk of agency costs. There is no evidence to justify changing this long-standing preference, especially for companies with a dual-class share structure. While the risk of agency costs is omnipresent, so is the promise of idiosyncratic vision. For instance, a 2018 study found that only a handful of the publicly traded firms are responsible for most of the return in the stock market. Specifically, “the best-performing 4% of listed companies explain the net gain for the entire US stock market since 1926, as other stocks collectively matched Treasury bills.”

Given the wide variety of industries, and the large ninety-year window used, this study attests to the potential value of idiosyncratic vision. After all, it is the idiosyncratic vision of entrepreneurs that allows their companies to produce returns that significantly outperform the market. Even if only some of the firms in that four percent group had managers with idiosyncratic vision, the market-wide costs from losing that vision would be substantial, thereby supporting a default rule that allows controllers to unilaterally reallocate control rights.

Moreover, especially for dual-class companies, changing market realities provide another reason to question the change in the default rule suggested by the recent Delaware cases. In the past, institutional investors were less powerful, more shares were held by retail investors, and few activist attacks or hostile takeovers took place. Thus, powerful CEOs practically enjoyed uncontestable control that allowed them to pursue their idiosyncratic vision without fear of removal by investors. Consequently, the unilateral power to reallocate control rights was less crucial to preserve idiosyncratic vision. Today, with the increasing dominance of institutional investors’ ownership and the rise of hedge fund activism, managers need formal control to pursue their idiosyncratic vision even when investors think that they are wrong, and the most effective tool to accomplish that end is a dual-class structure. In fact, in the recent decade the demand by entrepreneurs for, and the use of, dual-class structures has increased, suggesting that, in today’s market environment, having legal incontestable control is increasingly perceived as essential for managers wishing to attain idiosyncratic vision. The recent Delaware cases proposing a change of

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230. See id. at 454 tbl.5 for a summary of the fifty firms with the greatest creation of wealth for their shareholders.

231. See Goshen & Hannes, supra note 217, at 304–08 (arguing that the rise of institutional investors and increased shareholder sophistication has lowered barriers to shareholder action and increased shareholder influence).

232. See Bradford D. Jordan, Soohyung Kim & Mark H. Liu, Growth Opportunities, Short-Term Market Pressure, and Dual-Class Share Structure, 41 J. Corp. Fin. 304, 305 (2016) (finding that “dual-class shares . . . can help managers focus on the implementation of long-term projects while avoiding short-term market pressure”). Unfortunately, the inevitable tension between agency costs and idiosyncratic vision cannot be resolved by the existing empirical studies on dual-class firms. Since these companies provide controllers with
the default rule go against the market reality in which it is more crucial to protect idiosyncratic vision by keeping the old default allowing unilateral reallocation of control rights.

The optimal default rule regarding reallocation of control rights depends on the relative expected benefits of idiosyncratic vision compared to the expected losses from agency costs. Past Delaware cases adopted a default rule that favored idiosyncratic vision over agency costs. Given the current market realities, there is no compelling reason to change that default.

CONCLUSION

This point cannot be overstated: Without an objective valuation, entire fairness review collapses, as there is no way to determine the appropriate payment to impose upon a controlling shareholder for engaging in the proposed action. In the context of cash-flow disputes, objective valuation has proven to be a fairly surmountable challenge. Cash flows are, intrinsically, readily capable of being assigned an objective fair value. Relying on techniques developed by financial economists—most commonly a DCF analysis—Delaware judges faced with cash-flow disputes engage in fairly complex valuation analyses to determine the fair value of a challenged transaction. Indeed, this practice has been codified into Delaware’s corporate code.233 In so doing, the Delaware courts have become renowned for their acumen in deploying the entire fairness standard bolstered by competent valuations.

However, similar valuation techniques cannot be devised for control rights. These rights are simply too firm specific and individual specific to permit a reliable, objective valuation. Thus, in assessing the reallocation of control rights, courts are unable to use the legal tools that they have successfully employed to resolve cash-flow conflicts. The entire fairness standard and Delaware’s voluntary MFW conditions both necessitate valuation models to operate. Similarly, if history is a guide, intermediate standards of review will also fail to provide any meaningful regulation and ultimately will devolve into business judgment review. As a result, Delaware is left with only one choice: to enforce the allocation of control rights for which parties have bargained in the charter and to establish a default rule for cases in which the charter is silent on the issue of reallocation. This approach

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233. Under Delaware law, “In determining such fair value, the Court shall take into account all relevant factors.” Del. Code tit. 8, § 262(h) (2019). Although section 262 as written governs appraisal rights, the Supreme Court of Delaware has held that this principle likewise governs cash-out mergers. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 715 (Del. 1983).
not only provides a sensible resolution to control rights conflicts, but also comports with a long line of Delaware jurisprudence.
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