Should Corporations have a Purpose?

Jill E. Fisch
University of Pennsylvania and ECGI

Steven Davidoff Solomon
University of California, Berkeley and ECGI

© Jill E. Fisch and Steven Davidoff Solomon 2020. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source.

This paper can be downloaded without charge from:
http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=3561164

https://ecgi.global/content/working-papers
Should Corporations have a Purpose?

Working Paper N° 510/2020
August 2020

Jill E. Fisch
Steven Davidoff Solomon

We thank participants at the 2020 BYU Winter Deals Conference, and workshops at Duke University School of Law and the University of Pennsylvania Law School, and Richard Buxbaum, Amelia Miazad, Elizabeth Pollman and Asaf Raz for their helpful comments and suggestions.

© Jill E. Fisch and Steven Davidoff Solomon 2020. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source.
Abstract

The hot topic in corporate governance is the debate over corporate purpose and, in particular, whether corporations should shift their purpose from the pursuit of shareholder wealth to pursuing a broader conception of stakeholder or societal value. We argue that this debate has overlooked the critical predicate questions of whether a corporation should have a purpose at all and, if so, why.

We address these questions by examining the historical, legal and theoretical justifications for corporate purpose. We find that none of the three provides a basis for requiring a corporation to articulate a particular purpose or for a given normative conception of what that purpose should be. We additionally challenge recent corporate commitments to stakeholder value as lacking both binding legal effect and operational significance.

We nonetheless argue that articulating a corporate purpose can be valuable, and we justify a specification of corporate purpose on instrumental grounds. Because a corporation consists of a variety of constituencies with differing interests and objectives, an articulated, measurable and enforceable corporate purpose enables those constituencies both to select those corporations with which they wish to identify and to navigate the terms of that association through contract or regulation. Our instrumental view of the corporation brings a new perspective to the purpose debate.

Keywords: Corporations law, corporate governance, charters, constituency statutes, social responsibility, CSR, shareholder primacy, value & profit maximization, stakeholders, environmental, social & governance purpose, ESG, public benefit corporations

JEL Classifications: G30, G38, K20, L21, P120

Jill E. Fisch*
Saul A. Fox Distinguished Professor of Business Law
University of Pennsylvania, School of Law
3501 Sansom Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104, United States
phone: +1 215 746 3454, fax: +1 215 573 2025
e-mail: jfisch@law.upenn.edu

Steven Davidoff Solomon
Professor of Law
University of California, Berkeley School of Law
693 Simon Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720, United States
phone: +1 510 642 1769
e-mail: steven.solomon@law.berkeley.edu

*Corresponding Author
Should Corporations Have a Purpose?

Jill E. Fisch  
*University of Pennsylvania*

Steven Davidoff Solomon  
*UC Berkeley Law School*

This paper can be downloaded without charge from the Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection:  
SHOULD CORPORATIONS HAVE A PURPOSE?

JILL E. FISCH & STEVEN DAVIDOFF SOLOMON*

ABSTRACT

The hot topic in corporate governance is the debate over corporate purpose and, in particular, whether corporations should shift their purpose from the pursuit of shareholder wealth to pursuing a broader conception of stakeholder or societal value. We argue that this debate has overlooked the critical predicate questions of whether a corporation should have a purpose at all and, if so, why,

We address these questions by examining the historical, legal and theoretical justifications for corporate purpose. We find that none of the three provides a basis for requiring a corporation to articulate a particular purpose or for a given normative conception of what that purpose should be. We additionally challenge recent corporate commitments to stakeholder value as lacking both binding legal effect and operational significance.

We nonetheless argue that articulating a corporate purpose can be valuable, and we justify a specification of corporate purpose on instrumental grounds. Because a corporation consists of a variety of constituencies with differing interests and objectives, an articulated, measurable and enforceable corporate purpose enables those constituencies both to select those corporations with which they wish to identify and to navigate the terms of that association through contract or regulation. Our instrumental view of the corporation brings a new perspective to the purpose debate.

There’s a shift going on. When I went to U.S.C., it was all about maximizing value for shareholders. But we’re moving into a world of stakeholders. It’s not just about shareholders. Your employees are stakeholders, so are your customers, your partners, the communities that you’re in, the homeless that are nearby, your public schools.

* Jill E. Fisch is the Saul A. Fox Distinguished Professor of Business Law at the University of Pennsylvania Law School; Steven Davidoff Solomon is Professor of Law at the University of California Berkeley, School of Law. We thank participants at the 2020 BYU Winter Deals Conference, and workshops at Duke University School of Law and the University of Pennsylvania Law School, and Richard Buxbaum, Amelia Miazad, Elizabeth Pollman and Asaf Raz for their helpful comments and suggestions.
Everyone else has a purpose. So what’s mine?

-- Purpose, Avenue Q

INTRODUCTION

Purpose is currently the hottest topic in corporate governance. Not only are commentators demanding that corporations formally articulate a purpose, they are insisting that corporate purpose encompass the interests of non-shareholder stakeholders or society more generally. In August 2019, the Business Roundtable made international headlines when it issued a new statement on the purpose of the corporation which replaced its former support for shareholder primacy with the proposition that corporations be run for the benefit of all stakeholders – customers, employees, suppliers, communities and shareholders. In November 2019, the British Academy published a report proposing a new formula for corporate purpose – “the purpose of business is to profitably solve problems of people and planet, and not profit from causing problems.” Blackrock CEO Larry Fink has stated that “[w]ithout a sense of purpose, no company, either public or private, can achieve its full potential.” And the new Restatement of Corporate Governance, a project of the American Law Institute, has proposed that the statement on the objectives of the

1 Interview with Mark Benioff, USC Start-up News, Jun. 15, 2018, available at https://incubate.usc.edu/marc-benioff-of-salesforce-are-we-not-all-connected/
2 Commentators have used the term “stakeholder” in various ways. We distinguish in this Article between those who have direct relationships with a corporation, such as creditors, employees and suppliers, and others who are arguably affected by corporate decisions, referring to the latter interests as societal interests. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Roberto Tallarita, The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance, https://ssrn.com/abstract-3544978 (2020) (exploring variation in the use of the term stakeholder).
corporation from predecessor Principles of Corporate Governance be “modified substantially.”  

The shift is more than semantic.  The debate over corporate purpose is part of a broader effort to reorient corporate decision-making away from economic value maximization in favor of broader societal objectives, not simply as a choice, but as an affirmative obligation.  The Davos Manifesto seeks to mandate that all corporations have the purpose of creating value for the benefit of all their stakeholders.  Senator Elizabeth Warren has introduced legislation which would require corporations to be run for the benefit of constituencies with mandatory employee representation on the board.  Around the world, commentators are arguing that corporations should be redirected towards an environmental, social and governance (“ESG”) oriented purpose.  And corporations themselves are increasingly laying claim to constituency-minded or social purposes.  At the extreme, some commentators suggest that  

---

10 See World Economic Forum Davos Manifesto 2020 (“The purpose of a company is to engage all its stakeholders in shared and sustained value creation.  In creating such value, a company serves not only its shareholders, but all its stakeholders – employees, customers, suppliers, local communities and society at large.”).  
11 Accountable Capitalism Act, 115th Congress (2017-2018) S. 3348.  See also Elizabeth Warren, Companies Shouldn’t be Accountable Only to Shareholders, THE WALL ST. J., Aug. 14, 2018 (outlining the parameters of her legislative proposal and stating her act would “require corporate directors to consider the interests of all major corporate stakeholders— not only shareholders—in company decisions.”).  
12 Other countries including the UK and the European Union have been even more aggressive and is moving toward a stewardship model with many stewardship codes explicitly specifying social as well as economic objectives.  See FCLT Global, Harnessing Stewardship Codes for Long Term Value Creation, available at https://www.fcltglobal.org/research/tools/stewardship-codes (“Twenty-four stewardship codes have been introduced around the world, mostly since 2016.”).  
13 See, e.g., Benioff Interview, supra note 1; Nestle S.A., Our Purpose (“Our purpose Enhancing quality of life and contributing to a healthier future.  Driven by our purpose we want to help shape a better world and inspire people to live healthier lives.  This is how we contribute to society and ensure our long-term success.”), available at https://www.nestle.com/aboutus.  See generally Omar Rodriguez Vilá & Sundar Bharadwaj, Competing on Social Purpose, HARVARD BUS. REV. (Sept.-Oct. 2017) (“Consumers increasingly expect brands to have not just functional benefits but a social purpose.  As a result, companies are taking social stands in very visible ways.”)
corporations should be encouraged to make decisions that deliberately sacrifice economic value in favor of the public interest.14

These arguments run counter to the traditional view that corporations should be managed with the primary goal of pursuing economic value for shareholders, often referred to as shareholder primacy. Although commentators widely agree that shareholder primacy affords officers and directors substantial latitude to consider the interests of non-shareholder constituencies, and indeed that principle is formalized in many areas of corporate law such as the business judgment rule, statutes authorizing corporations to donate money to charity, and, in many states, constituency statutes, the new discussion calls for corporations to shift their primary objective to a public purpose.15 In advocating this shift, commentators identify several justifications, including the claims that (a) by focusing on short-term profit maximization, corporations are inflicting substantial external harm on non-shareholder groups, (b) such behavior is a misuse of the state-conferred privileges associated with the use of the corporate form, and (c) repurposing large corporations offer the only practical solution to persistent regulatory failures in addressing societal problems such as wealth inequality and climate change.

In this Article we address the fundamental issue of corporate purpose. We do so by reframing the argument. More specifically, arguments today about the purpose of the corporation do not address the key predicate questions: what it means for a corporation to have a purpose, whether corporations should have a purpose at all and, if so, why. We believe that only by answering these questions can we lay a theoretical framework for further defining the aims, goals and regulation of the corporation.

The technical concept of corporate purpose has its roots in the statutory requirement that corporations articulate in their charter the purpose for which they are formed. This requirement goes back to the time of special purpose charters, which were drafted to meet statutory limitations on the use of the corporate form.16 The specification of a corporation’s purpose in its charter operated as a legally enforceable constraint on corporate operations. Actions by

14 See, e.g., Dorothy S. Lund, Making Corporate Social Responsibility Pay, at 3. (“The difficult question, however, is how to encourage corporations to make public interested choices that are bad for business, or at least, not clearly good.”). See also Einer Elhauge Sacrificing Corporate Profits In The Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 733, 738 (2005) (“Corporate managers have never had an enforceable legal duty to maximize corporate profits. Rather, they have always had some legal discretion (implicit or explicit) to sacrifice corporate profits in the public interest.”)
15 We discuss this further infra at Part III.C.
16 See infra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
the corporation that exceeded the scope of its charter could be attacked as *ultra vires*.17

Modern corporation statutes eliminated the restrictions on the use of the corporate form and do not specify or limit the permissible purposes for which a corporation may be formed so long as those purposes are “lawful.”18 As a result, most corporate charters contain a generic statement that the purpose of the corporation is to engage in any lawful activity. The DowDuPont charter illustrates the typical formulation:

The purpose of the Company is to engage in any lawful act or activity for which a corporation may now or hereafter be organized under the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware.19

Notably, this formulation neither explicitly endorses a for-profit purpose nor imposes any meaningful guidelines on managerial decision-making. At the same time, the statutes do not appear to restrict charter provisions that either endorse or reject a shareholder profit maximization norm. As such, the statutory requirement raises the first question implicated by the debate over corporate purpose – are those advocating a reform to corporate purpose proposing that corporations amend their charters and, if so how? Assuming that charter provisions articulating a purpose weighted towards societal interests are permitted by existing statutory law (and we believe they are), would they be prudent, and would they have any legal effect on corporate actions?

As we detail below, we doubt that proponents of a shift in corporate purpose are contemplating such broad-based revisions to the corporate charter. Among the concerns raised by such an approach are how a corporation would articulate its purpose through a charter provision, the process by which corporations would implement this new purpose and the impact of a reconceptualized corporate purpose on officer and director fiduciary duties and legal liability.20 Indeed, although we believe that the pursuit of stakeholder and

---

17 We discuss this further *infra* at notes 33-39 and accompanying text.
18 See Delaware General Corporate Law § 102(a) (“The certificate of incorporation shall set forth (3) The nature of the business or purposes to be conducted or pursued. It shall be sufficient to state, either alone or with other businesses or purposes, that the purpose of the corporation is to engage in any lawful act or activity for which corporations may be organized under the General Corporation Law of Delaware . . . .”)
20 There are also technical issues associated with a mid-stream charter amendment such as whether departing from shareholder primacy represents the type of fundamental change that requires increased protection of the interests of dissenting shareholders such as through
societal interest can be reflected in the purpose provisions of traditional for-profit corporations (as opposed to public benefit corporations), few corporations have any language in their charters reflecting a commitment to societal value, and those that do so frame that commitment in such a way as to provide questionable legal impact. The proponents of a revised corporate purpose appear to intend something different -- a mission statement of the corporation’s operational objectives or as a set of principles constraining the corporation’s behavior. The challenge then, is to understand first how a purpose fits within the existing framework of corporate law and second, how such a statement might be useful.21

We believe that careful attention to these questions and the issues that they raise about the structure and use of the corporate form are critical to evaluating the existing debate over corporate purpose. Our starting point, in Part I, is the history of formal corporate purpose as articulated in the corporate charter. We show that the concept of corporate purpose is one of historical accident rather than intention. The idea that corporate purpose should address profit maximization (or an alternative operational objective) is not one that has ever been explicitly reflected in the black letter law. And the statutes that require corporate charters to identify their purpose have never required that corporations articulate or adhere to a purpose of profit maximization or shareholder primacy.

Having explored the historical context, we next consider in Part II the argument that a corporation is legally required to have as its purpose a shareholder wealth maximization norm. We examine the caselaw and history behind this concept and conclude that, despite widespread claims that corporate appraisal rights. Until recently, for example Delaware provided dissenting shareholders with appraisal rights when a traditional corporation converted to a benefit corporation. D.G.C.L. § 363(b)) (appraisal rights available if a corporation amends its charter to convert from a corporation to a public benefit corporation or a public benefit corporation changes its purpose). This provision was eliminated in 2020. See An Act to Amend Title 8 of the Delaware Code Relating to the General Corporation Law, House Bill No. 341, House of Representatives, 150th General Assembly (2020), https://legis.delaware.gov/json/BillDetail/GenerateHtmlDocument?legislationId=48122&legislationTypeId=1&docTypeId=2&legislationName=HB341.

21 We note that these questions are independent of the question that underpins much of the current debate over corporate purpose: the normative question of what a corporation’s purpose should be – that is, the debate between shareholder primacy and some broader notion of societal value. See David G. Yosifon, The Law of Corporate Purpose, 10 Berkeley Bus. L. J. 181 (2014) (highlighting that corporate law scholars differ both on the positive question of what is a permissible corporate purpose and the normative question about what corporate purpose should be). We note, in particular, that the debate over corporate purpose is not limited to the question of whether corporations should focus exclusively on maximizing economic value for shareholders. Some commentators advocate for the reduction or elimination of negative externalities, some argue that corporations should consider or actively further the interests of one more stakeholder groups, and some seek to have corporations operate in the best interests of society generally (or the planet).
decisionmakers are legally required to focus exclusively on maximizing shareholder economic value, legal support for this proposition is surprisingly thin. Moreover, the mutability of the corporate charter and the flexibility of the business judgment rule give corporate managers ample discretion to consider stakeholder and societal interests. We thus conclude that shareholder profit maximization may be a norm, but it is not the legally-defined purpose of a corporation.

In Part III we consider theoretical justifications for a corporation to have a purpose that are not grounded in legal requirements. We explore the economic rationale for shareholder primacy and find it lacking. We analyze and reject the claim, grounded in the personhood theory of the corporation, that the corporation has ethical, moral or social obligations that generate an entity-level purpose independent of the objectives of its constituencies.22 We interrogate the claim that corporate purpose enables corporate decisionmakers freedom to depart from the shareholder primacy norm and question its potential for doing so effectively. In this regard, we further examine existing non-charter statements of corporate purpose and mission. We find them to be largely aspirational rather than legally binding or constraining. In all these cases, we find no clear support for the proposition that a corporation should have a purpose and if so, what its scope or content should be.

We then seek in Part IV the definitional content that history, law and economics do not provide. We argue that the purpose debate fails to account for the instrumental nature of the corporate form itself. Corporations involve a variety of constituencies – including the corporation’s officers, directors, shareholders, creditors, employees, customers and suppliers – each of which, through different mechanisms, has a stake in making a claim with respect to the corporation’s priorities. We argue for a novel understanding of corporate purpose as a tool to manage these expectancy interests. Corporate purpose signals a corporation’s priorities and enables constituencies to determine their willingness to engage with the corporation based on the degree to which they share those priorities. Corporate purpose identifies the metrics by which managers are to be held accountable. Corporate purpose also informs stakeholders as to the degree to which they must seek alternative mechanisms to protect their claims through contract or regulation. Notably, in our instrumental account, corporate purpose provides coherence, transparency, and coordination to corporate decisions. The rationale for corporate purpose is not primarily to operate as a legal constraint.23 Rather traditional contract and governance

23 Under our view of corporate purpose, a corporation might commit to prioritize particular stakeholder or societal values in its charter, in the same manner as a public benefit corporation. We posit that such a commitment would be legally enforceable in the same
mechanisms enable corporate participants to hold managers accountable for adhering to the corporation’s articulated purpose.24 We conclude, however, that although existing statements of purpose indicate a market-based need, they are largely ineffective. We argue that, although corporate purpose need not operate as a binding legal constraint, to be functional a corporate purpose must both provide concrete guidance with regard to the corporation’s operations, priorities or goals and meaningfully constrain corporate action. Many if not most of the statements of corporate purpose today lack such content.

Ultimately, our findings are designed to provide more rigor and a framework to the current debate about corporate purpose. The world is certainly in flux, as is the corporation. But a sustainable and workable vision of the corporation requires a theoretical foundation – one which we provide in this article and which we will further develop in later work.

I. The History of Corporate Purpose

A. The Accidental Corporate Purpose

In 16th century England, the mechanism of chartering was responsible for the requirement that early corporate firms explicitly specify a purpose. Because there was no form of self-chartering available, meaning that a business could not secure the right to operate in the corporate form simply by filing a charter, the first English corporate entities were required by law to receive Parliamentary sanction for a formation charter. Prospective firms sought to operate in the corporate form for a specified purpose and so by default Parliament placed this purpose in their charters. Notably, the earliest corporate charters were not utilized for for-profit businesses but for churches, municipalities and universities.25

By the 17th century, Parliament began to issue corporate charters to trading companies.26 Thus, the infamous South Sea Company27 created to manner as any other charter provision that limited a corporation’s power or operations. See generally Ofer Elder, Designing Business Forms to Pursue Social Goals, VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (discussing the use of incentivizes and organization structure for corporations to effectively pursue social mission).

24 We further observe that the purpose debate has proceeded largely independent of an important range of process questions. One such question is the applicable default for a corporation that has failed to articulate a specific purpose. A second is, to the extent that a corporation can and does identify a purpose, can that purpose be changed and how?

25 Margaret M. Blair, Corporate Personhood and the Corporate Persona, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 785, 789.

26 Id. at 791-92.

27 The official name of the company was “The Governor and Company of the merchants of Great Britain, trading to the South Seas and other parts of America, and for the
reduce the British national debt had a monopoly charter on trading in South America and the nearby seas (which due to lack of knowledge of geography was assumed to be the Pacific South Seas). Notably, however, the purpose reflected in these businesses could be called a public purpose to a very limited extent. Although the state’s interests in trade and economic development (and from not having to fund that development through public debt) were served by these charters, the primary rationale for the corporate form (and its predecessor, the joint stock company) was to rationalize the role and interests of private suppliers of capital.28

The practice of requiring corporations to specify a purpose in their charters was transferred to America. Until the late 1800s, chartering was subject to state legislative approval.29 A corporation would be formed to operate trains, and its corporate purpose legislatively specified in its charter its right to do so. During the 1800s, legislative mistrust of corporate entities – a legacy of Jeffersonian ideals -- often led to limited grants of authority and purpose for commercial corporations.30 In addition, “the size and level of business activity had not yet evolved to a point of needing the legal benefits provided by the corporate form.”31 As a result, most early U.S. corporate charters were issued for public purposes – religious organizations, cemeteries and charities.32

Not only were early corporations required to identify a specific corporate purpose in their charters, but the requirement had legal ramifications. State law required that corporations confine their operations to the specific purpose identified in their charter, and activities outside the scope of that specification were beyond the corporation’s legal power or ultra vires.33 Such actions were either void ab initio or could be voided at the behest of the shareholders. The ultra vires doctrine served to protect the expectancy interests of the encouragement of fishing”. See L.W. HANSON, CONTEMPORARY PRINTED SOURCES FOR BRITISH AND IRISH ECONOMIC HISTORY 1701-1750, at 1712 (Cambridge Press 1963).


29 Early use of the corporate form in the United States was also limited to entities organized for a public purpose. See Blair, supra note 25 at 793 n. 47 (citing research by Andrew Creighton reporting that prior to the American Revolution, only seven corporations in the U.S. colonies were chartered for businesses other than public works, banks or insurance). See also ANDREW LAMONT CREIGHTON, THE EMERGENCE OF INCORPORATION AS A LEGAL FORM FOR ORGANIZATIONS 39 (1990) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University).


32 Id.

33 See generally Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 173, 186-87 (1985) (“Before the Civil War...the ultra vires doctrine was strictly applied by American courts...By 1930, the ultra vires doctrine was, if not dead, substantially eroded in practice...”)
corporation’s investors, who understood the enterprise into which their money was being placed and the potential risks and rewards associated with that enterprise. The doctrine limited the scope of business discretion afforded to corporate management. Finally, the doctrine protected the public by placing limits on the scale and range of corporate operations.

A classic example of the ultra vires doctrine is the English case of *Introductions Ltd. v. National Provincial Bank, Ltd.*[^34] In that case the court held that it was ultra vires for a company with a purpose to originally provide visiting facilities for the Festival of Britain and which subsequently operated a business providing deck chairs at a seaside resort to engage in pig breeding. As the court put it, “one cannot have an object to do every mortal thing one wants, because that is to have no object at all. There was one thing that this company could not do and that was to breed pigs.”[^35]

Similarly in the United States, the historical application of the doctrine is illustrated by U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in *Thomas v. R.R. Co.*,[^36] in which the Court rejected the view that a railroad company had the power to lease its property to the plaintiffs in exchange for a receipt of half the plaintiffs’ profits. As the court explained: “the powers of corporations organized under legislative statutes are such and such only as those statutes confer.”[^37] The Court noted, in particular, that a corporation exercised its powers by virtue of a franchise granted by the state, a franchise that was “intended in large measure to be exercised for the public good.”[^38] Engaging in actions beyond those authorized by the franchise were, in the view of the Court, contrary to “the relations which the charter has arranged between the corporation and the community.”[^39]

This historical view and the legal guardrails of corporate purpose were transformed by two developments. One was the industrial revolution, which led to increased demand for the corporate form to facilitate the aggregation of the substantial amounts of capital necessary for the growing scale of business activity.[^40] The other, prompted by a growing acceptance that it was appropriate to allow the use of the corporate form for general commercial operations, was a transition from special charters to general charters which allowed corporations

[^34]: 1 All E.R. 887 (1969)
[^35]: Id.
[^36]: 101 U.S. 71 (1880).
[^37]: Id. at 82.
[^38]: Id. at 83.
[^39]: Id. at 84.
[^40]: The origins of the capital markets in the United States grew out of the needs of railroads and other types of operations that required large scale capital. See JOHN STEELE GORDON, *THE GREAT GAME: THE EMERGENCE OF WALL STREET AS A WORLD POWER*, 1653-2000 76 (1999)
to meet the statutory requirement by stating generally that they were intended to engage in any lawful purpose or business activity. New York adopted a broadly available incorporation statute in 1811, and Connecticut followed in 1837 with a statute that allowed incorporation for any lawful purpose, but the general purpose corporation did not take off until 1894 when New Jersey transitioned to a self-chartering format which permitted general purpose statements. Other states, including Delaware followed. This legislative transition enabled corporations to define their purpose as engaging in any action permitted by law. Corporations no longer had to adhere to a specific mission, one approved by a state legislature. Instead they could do anything within the bounds of the law.

Today, the ultra vires doctrine has fallen into disrepair. In part, corporations began to use the doctrine in an opportunistic manner, avoiding obligations to third parties when it was desirable to do so. The court and statutory response was to limit the remedy available under the doctrine to injunctions of the act (to the extent it was not completed) rather than personal liability of the officers or directors involved. In addition, the transformation of corporate charters to provide that a corporation could engage in any lawful business, severely limited the scope of actions that could be characterized as beyond the scope of a corporation’s power. In other words, today the corporate purpose of a corporation is frequently unconstrained by charter language that

42 Christopher Grandy, New Jersey Corporate Chartermongering, 1875-1929, 49 J. Econ. Hist. 677 (1989);
44 See R. Franklin Balotti & Jesse A. Finkelstein, A Brief History Of The General Corporation Law Of The State Of Delaware And The Amendatory Process in BALOTTI AND FINKELSTEIN'S DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS (3rd Edition, 2020-1 Supplement). That the scope of corporate purpose can serve a role in protecting the expectancy interests of corporate participants is important, however, and a point to which we will return shortly.
45 DGCL § 124 (“No act of a corporation and no conveyance or transfer of real or personal property to or by a corporation shall be invalid by reason of the fact that the corporation was without capacity or power to do such act or to make or receive such conveyance or transfer, . . . ”)
46 See, e.g., Kent Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives! A Stakeholder Analysis Of Corporate Illegality (With Notes On How Corporate Law Could Reinforce International Law Norms), 87 Va. L. Rev. 1279, 1310 (explaining that creditors and suppliers “began to be the victims of the doctrine”).
47 DGCL § 124.
48 But see, e.g., Greenfield, supra note 46, at 1282 (arguing that ultra vires doctrine can be used to make “compliance with the law an enforceable obligation within corporate law”).
allows any action permitted by law. The consequence is that there is little left
of corporate action which can be the grounds for an *ultra vires* action.

**B. Modern Purpose Provisions in Charters**

As a result of the developments described in the preceding section, the
purpose of a corporation, as set out in its charter, has become an unspecified one.
The modern corporate charter may have a general purpose provision such as that
in the DowDupont charter described in the introduction\(^{49}\) or a more expansive
articulation of the scope of the corporation’s operations. In either case, the
language of the charter neither operates as a meaningful constraint on the
corporation’s business activity nor takes a position on the relative importance of
shareholder versus stakeholder interests.

Although the vast majority of modern corporations appear to rely on general
purpose provisions, some provide greater specification. For example, the
purpose provision in Pepsico’s corporate charter spans two pages and explains
that the corporation’s purposes include, *inter alia*, manufacturing and distributing
beverages, acquiring factories, warehouses and stores, acquiring property, and
applying for patents and trademarks.\(^{50}\) Similarly, Ford Motor Company, which
incorporated under the name Eastern Holding Company in 1919, has a corporate
purpose that spans a page and includes the manufacture of automobiles as well
as airplanes.\(^{51}\) Even these more specific charters avoid specifying a corporate
purpose akin to that which existed in the early 1800s.

Notably the typical corporate charter is silent with respect to the
shareholder/stakeholder/society debate. It neither identifies a purpose of
maximizing profit for the benefit of shareholders or otherwise nor articulates a
broad societal mission. Indeed, although Salesforce is widely recognized for
its public statements asserting its commitment to pursue broad societal value,
the purpose provision in Salesforce’s charter reads: “[t]he purpose of the

\(^{49}\) See also Philip Morris Articles of Incorporation Article II (“The purpose for which the
Corporation is organized is the transaction of any or all lawful business not required to be
specifically stated in these Articles of Incorporation.”) available at
https://www.pmi.com/resources/docs/default-source/our_company/articles-of-
incorporation.pdf?sfvrsn=dfe2b0b5_0; Tesla Charter Article III (“The nature of the business
or purposes to be conducted or promoted by the Corporation is to engage in any lawful act
or activity for which corporations may be organized under the DGCL”) available at
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1318605/000119312510017054/dex31.htm

\(^{50}\) See Amended and Restated Articles of Incorporation of Pepsico Inc., Art. 4, available at
https://www.pepsico.com/docs/album/corporate-
governance/amendedandrestatedarticlesofincorporation.pdf?sfvrsn=e84ce4e_12

\(^{51}\) See Restated Certificate of Incorporation of Ford Motor Company, Art. Third, available at
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/37996/000003799601000014/0000037996-01-
000014-0002.txt
Corporation is to engage in any lawful act or activity for which a corporation may be organized under the General Corporation Law of Delaware. 52

A handful of corporations go further. 53 For example, Nestlé, a Swiss Corporation, has the following articulation of purpose in its Articles of Association:

**Article 2 Purpose**

1. The purpose of Nestlé is to participate in industrial, service, commercial and financial enterprises in Switzerland and abroad, in particular in the food, nutrition, health, wellness and related industries.

2. Nestlé may itself establish such undertakings or participate in, finance and promote the development of undertakings already in existence.

3. Nestlé may enter into any transaction which the business purpose may entail. Nestlé shall, in pursuing its business purpose, aim for long-term, sustainable value creation. 54

The language about long-term sustainable value creation was added through amendments adopted in 2008 and supported by 99% of shareholders. 55

Novo Nordisk, a Danish company, states on its website that it is “one of only four companies in the world who have incorporated our philosophy into our company bylaws. As a result, the three pillars of TBL—Social Impact, Environmental Responsibility, and Financial Performance inform everything we do and guide every decision we make.” 56 Novo Nordisk’s actual governing document is more modest. Its articles of association state that:

---

53 We note that in Hobby Lobby, the US Supreme Court quoted Hobby Lobby’s statement of purpose as “[h]onoring the Lord in all [they] do by operating the company in a manner consistent with Biblical principles.” See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 703 (2014). The Court did not specify how this statement was incorporated into the company’s governing documents or address the question of whether it was legally binding.
The Company’s objects are to carry out research and development and to manufacture and commercialize pharmaceutical, medical and technical products and services as well as any other activity related thereto as determined by the Board of Directors. The Company strives to conduct its activities in a financially, environmentally, and socially responsible way.57

Notably, these articulations are incredibly vague. They do not forswear the pursuit of shareholder economic value, even if it comes at the expense of stakeholder or societal interests. Nor do they reflect actual commitments, other than commitments to striving for sustainability. Significantly, Philip Morris International, which manufactures cigarettes and is hardly the poster child for pursuing long term societal value makes the same commitment, albeit not in its charter.58 On its website, the company explains that “[w]e strive to continuously improve the sustainability of our business and to contribute to the global sustainability agenda.”59 To date, it is unclear how the statement in Nestlé’s charter has affected its operations or is any different than the broad, enabling statements of corporate purpose. Nor is it clear how these statements, in a charter or elsewhere, would be legally enforced.

Furthermore, we see no indication that the purpose movement contemplates an effort to revise corporate charters even along the lines of Nestlé or Novo Nordisk, either to incorporate aspirational sustainability language or more concrete objectives such as gender equality, environmental responsibility or restraint in the production and sale of hazardous products. To be clear, we are not certain that the vague language in these two charters is constraining or enforceable in a meaningful way. However, we believe that more explicit charter provisions would be valid methods of constraining corporate operations, consistent with the historical role of the corporate purpose provision in managing the expectations of a corporation’s constituencies (as well as the state and the general public). The question then is, when a corporation’s charter states that its purpose is to engage in any lawful business, can that corporation nonetheless have some other statement of purpose and, if so, what does it mean? In particular, is the corporation’s purpose implicitly to earn a profit for shareholders? We turn to that question in the next part.

58 The charter provides that: “The purpose for which the Corporation is organized is the transaction of any or all lawful business not required to be specifically stated in these Articles of Incorporation.” Philip Morris International Inc. Amended and Restated Articles of Incorporation, Article I, available at https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1413329/000119312508023093/dex31.htm (last accessed Feb. 20, 2020).
II. Purpose and Shareholder Profit Maximization

As the use of the corporation shifted to private commercial enterprises, the conception of corporate purpose in terms of shareholder economic value solidified. Despite the fact that neither profit maximization nor shareholder primacy has ever been articulated as statutory requirements, a few courts began to incorporate these concepts into corporate purpose. As early as 1901, one court observed that “[t]he real object and purpose of a corporation for profit is to make a profit and to make dividends for the stockholders, and a person who holds the stock of a company has a right to have the business of the company conducted, as far as practicable at least, so that it will make profits and pay dividends.”

A. Case Law and Shareholder Profit Maximization

The view that corporations should be managed with the objective of maximizing shareholder economic value found perhaps its most explicit articulation in the seminal 1919 case of *Dodge v. Ford*. In *Dodge v. Ford*, the Michigan Supreme Court held that a corporation’s purpose was to maximize shareholder profit. More specifically, the court in that case stated “[a] business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end.” The case, which is widely discussed by commentators (but not widely cited by courts) forms the central foundation of the argument that the purpose of the for-profit corporation is to maximize value for shareholders. In the wake of *Dodge v. Ford* there have been a few other non-Delaware cases which have addressed the issue, but none as specifically as *Dodge*. The most notable of these is *Shlensky v. Wrigley* which upheld the decision of a board of directors to

63 Id. at 507.
64 According to Sheppard’s, as of Aug. 1, 2020, the case has been cited only in 75 opinions in over 100 years.
refuse to install night lights at the stadium for the Chicago Cubs citing the holding of Dodge and the discretion afforded directors to act in “the best interests of the corporation and the stockholders.”

This argument is buttressed by Delaware case law from the 1980s involving mergers and acquisitions. In *Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.*, the court held that a board facing a change of control was required to obtain the “highest price for the benefit of the stockholders.” *Revlon* explicitly rejected the argument that, at least in the context of a case sale, a corporate board could prioritize the interests of a non-shareholder constituency (noteholders) over the interests of the shareholders.

*Revlon* is widely cited for the principle that a board’s sole duty is to maximize economic value for shareholders regardless of the impact of its decision on non-shareholder constituencies. However, reading *Revlon* to incorporate a broad requirement of shareholder primacy into Delaware takeover law may be overly expansive. In *Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co.*, the Delaware Supreme Court held that when a corporation took defensive action in response to a takeover threat, the board must show it had “reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed . . . .” Notably, however, unlike *Revlon*, *Unocal* did not explicitly identify shareholders as the only constituency relevant to the board’s assessment. Instead, the court described the board’s obligation as evaluating the effect of the takeover bid “on the corporate enterprise.” The court went on to explain that the board’s analysis could include, *inter alia*, “the impact on "constituencies" other than shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the community generally).”

Similarly, in the subsequent case of *Time v. Paramount*, the Delaware Supreme Court provided more equivocal guidance on the importance of shareholder primacy. As with *Revlon*, the court emphasized that the board’s obligation in the takeover context ran to shareholders. In addition, the court described this obligation in terms of economic value, explaining that the board’s “mandate includes a conferred authority to set a corporate course of action,

---

68 Id. at 182.
69 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
70 Id. at 955.
71 Id.
72 Id.
74 See, e.g., eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newsmark 16 A.3d 1, 32 (Del. Ch. 2010) (describing *Time* decision as the court’s “muted embrace” of the board’s effort “to protect a specific corporate culture”); id. at 33 (“Promoting, protecting, or pursuing non-stockholder considerations must lead at some point to value for stockholders”).
including time frame, designed to enhance corporate profitability.”75 The Court qualified this mandate however by noting that the board is “not under any per se duty to maximize shareholder value in the short term, even in the context of a takeover.” In addition, the Court noted, without criticism, that the primary objective of Time’s outside directors, in pursuing a transaction with Warner rather than Paramount, was to preserve Time’s culture, more specifically “the editorial integrity and journalistic focus” of Time.

B. Academic Discourse and Shareholder Profit Maximization

Beyond this handful of takeover cases in Delaware and non-takeover cases outside Delaware, support for the claim that corporate law requires shareholder value maximization has come largely from academic discourse. In the 1930s, Professors Berle and Dodd debated this point in the Harvard Law Review.76 Dodd argued that corporations should be run to serve the public interest, believing that corporate managers, if they did so, would “use their corporations to resolve the economic and social problems of the Great Depression.”77 Although Berle’s position is commonly characterized as defending shareholder primacy, Professors Bratton & Wachter read Berle as sympathizing with Dodd in terms of corporate purpose but viewing a more confined objective of maximizing shareholder value as necessary to limit managerial agency costs.78

The shareholder primacy component of Berle’s argument gained considerable traction in the post-war era. In 1970, Milton Friedman famously argued that corporations should focus on maximizing profits and that any conflicting social goal was illegitimate and inefficient.79 A host of corporate leaders and academics embraced Friedman’s arguments.80 This was reinforced

75 Paramount Communications, Inc., 571 A.2 at 1150 (emphasis added).
76 See Adolf A. Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARVARD L. REC. 1148 (1932) (asserting that “all powers granted to a corporation or to the management of the corporation . . .[are]at all times exercisable only for the ratable benefit of the shareholders.”); E. Merrick Dodd, For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARVARD L. REV. 1145, 1148 (1932) (arguing that the corporation is an “economic institution which has a social service as well as a profit-making function”).
77 Id. at 1153.
79 Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG. 32 (Sept. 13, 1970) (theorizing that the only “social responsibility of business is to increase its profits”)
by the 1997 statement of the Business Roundtable that “the paramount duty of management and of boards of directors is to the corporation’s stockholders.”

C. The Limits of a Shareholder Wealth Maximization Requirement in Delaware

We question, as have other commentators, whether the handful of cases and academic debate provide a sound legal foundation for the claim that corporations are obligated to focus on maximizing shareholder value. Dodge and Shlensky are old cases and neither involves a Delaware court applying Delaware corporate law. More significantly, Revlon, Unocal and Time all arose in the specialized takeover context. Takeover decisions differ from traditional operational decisions for a number of reasons including last period problems and questions about the scope of authority delegated to the board. As such, takeover law provides a variety of distinctive legal rules including heightened fiduciary duties, greater disclosure obligations and enhanced shareholder decision-making and exit rights, that are not present in day-to-day corporate decisions. In addition, Delaware’s approach to takeover differs from that of other states, many of which have explicitly declined to follow Unocal, Revlon or both. Even if the Delaware case law is properly understood as conveying a strong commitment to shareholder primacy in the takeover context, we question its relevance to the day-to-day operational decisions that are the focus of the current purpose debate.

Perhaps the most difficult case to understand from the perspective of corporate purpose is eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark. In eBay, the Delaware Chancery Court applied the Unocal test to assess craigslist’s adoption of a poison pill against its own shareholder, eBay and found that it exceeded the board’s authority. The Court did so by criticizing the grounds the craigslist board asserted to justify invocation of the poison pill, namely that eBay was attempting to force the company to earn more profit. The Court rejected this argument however stating that “[t]he corporate form in which craigslist operates, however, is not an appropriate vehicle for purely philanthropic ends, at least not

82 See Stout, supra note 60.
83 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010).
84 Id. at 28.
85 Id.
when there are other stockholders interested in realizing a return on their investment.\textsuperscript{86}

Although this language, like that in \textit{Time}, appears to contemplate that a corporation’s purpose involves profit maximization, the decision neither characterizes profit maximization as the exclusive permissible objective nor evaluates a corporation’s potential tradeoff between the interests of shareholders and those of other constituencies. Instead, eBay can be understood as a limitation on the ability of controlling shareholders to pursue their idiosyncratic objectives at the expense of minority shareholders, a concern that fits better within the duty of loyalty framework than within the scope of corporate purpose.\textsuperscript{87} More broadly, the court’s decision was limited to prohibiting craigslist from implementing a poison pill,\textsuperscript{88} a decision that, again, is based on the special context of corporate takeovers. The decision does not conclude that the craigslist board acted improperly by “providing a website for online classifieds that is largely devoid of monetized elements” and in fact, the court observes that the craigslist founders and controlling shareholders are “perfectly able to ensure the continuation of craigslist’s ‘culture’ so long as they remain majority stockholders.”\textsuperscript{89} Critically, nowhere does the court’s decision suggest an obligation to monetize the website in a manner that increases shareholder value.

Indeed, all of the decisions commonly cited as requiring shareholder primacy can arguably be understood as implicating the duty of loyalty rather than the duty of care. As Professor Lynn Stout has observed, \textit{Dodge v. Ford} is perhaps better understood not for the premise that corporations have a duty to prefer shareholder interests to those of other stakeholders but for the principle that controlling shareholders have a duty “not to oppress minority shareholders.”\textsuperscript{90} Similarly, as Professor Zachery Gubler explains, an “animating principle” behind \textit{Revlon} and the other Delaware takeover cases is regulating inherent conflicts of interest. This principle is based on the concern that conflicts of interest are both ubiquitous in takeover cases and that in the

\textsuperscript{86} Id. at 34.
\textsuperscript{87} See id. (observing that the craigslist founders were acting “because of their own personal preferences”).
\textsuperscript{88} Id (“I cannot accept as valid for the purposes of implementing the Rights Plan a corporate policy that specifically, clearly, and admittedly seeks not to maximize the economic value of a for-profit Delaware corporation for the benefit of its stockholders”) (emphasis added).
\textsuperscript{89} Id. We view the eBay case as consistent with the Delaware court’s holdings that fiduciaries cannot take inequitable conduct. The court in eBay cited Schnell v. Chris–Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del.1971) for this proposition. eBay, 16 A.3d at 39.
takeover context the costs of inadequately policed conflicts are particularly high.91

The argument that these cases are about managerial loyalty rather than shareholder primacy is reinforced by recent developments in the Delaware courts’ Caremark jurisprudence. The Caremark doctrine requires a board to undertake a good faith effort to “to exercise oversight” and to monitor the corporation’s operational viability, legal compliance, and financial performance.”92 Although Caremark duties were originally articulated as a component of the duty of care,93 the Delaware courts subsequently explained that the fiduciary duty violated by a lack of director oversight is, instead, the duty of loyalty.94

At the same time, recent Delaware decisions have suggested that insufficient attention to stakeholder interests may itself be legally actionable. In Marchand v. Barnhill, the Delaware Supreme Court refused to grant a motion to dismiss a Caremark claim that Blue Bell ice cream’s board failed to implement a board level food safety program despite the presence of both “red” and “yellow” flags.95 The Court specifically highlighted the importance of customer interests to Blue Bell’s continued operational success. The Court stated in this regard that “[a]s a monoline company that makes a single product—ice cream—Blue Bell can only thrive if its consumers enjoyed its products and were confident that its products were safe to eat.”96

In the wake of Marchand there has been an uptick in Caremark claims in the Delaware courts.97 There has also been a renewed focus by corporations

93 See, e.g., Peter D. Bordonaro, Comment, Good Faith: Set In Stone?, 82 Tul. L. Rev. 1119, 1135 (2008) (“Caremark liability was originally based on a violation of the duty of care”).
94 See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (“It follows that because a showing of bad faith conduct, in the sense described in Disney and Caremark, is essential to establish director oversight liability, the fiduciary duty violated by that conduct is the duty of loyalty.”).
95 Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, at 809.
96 Id.
97 See, e.g., In re Clovis Oncology, 2019 WL 4850188, at *1 (Del Ch. 2019) (refusing to dismiss Caremark claim when complaint alleged board ignored “red flags that Clovis was not adhering to the clinical trial protocols, thereby placing FDA approval of the drug in jeopardy.”); Hughes v. Hu, C.A. 2019-0112-JTL (Del. Ch. Apr. 27, 2020), https://courts.delaware.gov/Opinions/Download.aspx?id=304680 (denying motion to dismiss where complaint “alleges facts that support an inference that the Company’s Audit Committee met sporadically, devoted inadequate time to its work, had clear notice of irregularities, and consciously turned a blind eye to their continuation”).
on risk assessment and compliance. 98 While Caremark claims and the renewed interest in them do not directly raise purpose claims, they highlight the importance of a board’s attention to ESG considerations rather than merely short term profit maximization, particularly in regulated industries. 99

D. Other Limits to a Shareholder Profit Maximization Rule

Our analysis of the extent to which shareholder primacy is legally required has focused largely on Delaware law. Outside Delaware, the situation is more complicated. First, in the Hobby Lobby decision, the U.S. Supreme Court explicitly read the statutory right of a corporation to be organized for any lawful purpose as providing corporations with the legal authority to further humanitarian objectives, at least in addition to economic value. As the Court explained:

Each American jurisdiction today either expressly or by implication authorizes corporations to be formed under its general corporation act. While it is certainly true that a central objective of for-profit corporations is to make money, modern corporate law does not require for-profit corporations to pursue profit at the expense of everything else, and many do not do so. 100

To be sure, the Hobby Lobby decision was based in part on the fact that a corporation had such a small number of shareholders that its idiosyncratic purpose was discernable and expressed. Nonetheless, Hobby Lobby appears to stand for the proposition that a corporation can have an alternative purpose, albeit one determined by the shareholders themselves, providing that purpose can be ascertained. 101


99 See John Mark Zeberkiewicz & Robert B. Greco, In re Clovis: Considering Caremark Claims after Marchand, 22 INSIGHTS (11), at 3 (Nov. 2019) (“The Clovis opinion signals that, post-Marchand, the Delaware courts, in assessing Caremark claims at the pleading stage, may hold boards operating in highly regulated industries to a somewhat elevated standard for monitoring and assessing compliance with mission-critical regulatory regimes.”)


101 Notably, the Court did not identify the formal manner in which Hobby Lobby articulated or committed to its purpose.
Second, a majority of U.S. states have adopted so-called constituency statutes that expressly authorize corporate officials to consider a range of stakeholder interests in addition to shareholder interests. An example is the Wisconsin Constituency statute which provides that, in discharging their duties, corporate officers and directors may consider the effect of their actions on “employees, suppliers and customers of the corporation,” “the communities in which the corporation operates,” and “[a]ny other factors that the director or officer considers pertinent.” These statutes were adopted in the 1980s and were principally designed to address takeovers. Some specifically apply only in the case of takeovers. Delaware has not adopted such a statute, but some Delaware corporations have adopted equivalent positions in their charters. We are unaware of any Delaware case exploring the validity or legal significance of such a charter provision.

In no case though do these statutes specify how corporate decisionmakers are to weigh or prioritize the interests of different constituencies, though their text clearly authorizes corporate decisions that do not focus exclusively on maximizing economic value for shareholders. Nonetheless, both the *Hobby Lobby* case and constituency statutes provide some support for

---


103 Wis. §180.0827.


106 See, e.g., Restated Certificate of Incorporation of the McClatchy Corp., Art. V (“In the consideration and approval of all policies and actions of the Corporation, the Board of Directors shall have the right to consider all relevant factors which are in the best interests of the Corporation and its stockholders, including and in addition to the financial interests of stockholders, community standards and values, the welfare of employees, and the quality and independence of the Corporation and its publishing enterprise.”), available at https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1056087/000119312506154574/dex31.htm. See also Ofer Eldar, *The Role of Social Enterprise and Hybrid Organizations*, 1 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 92, 189 (2017) (discussing the use of charter provisions for companies to pursue social purpose).

107 See generally Debow & Lee, supra note 104, at 403 (discussing the role of shareholder interests in constituency statutes).
the claim that shareholder primacy is not legally compelled, at least as a matter of positive law.  

III. Theories of Corporate Purpose

If history and law do not provide definition to corporate purpose, can we obtain guidance from theoretical constructs of the firm? We turn, in this part, to three such constructs. We first examine economic theories of the corporation; we then turn to personhood theories of the corporation. Finally, we consider the potential for corporate purpose to overturn the shareholder primacy norm. We conclude that none of these theories in and of themselves provide a rationale for a corporation having a purpose.

A. Economic Theory and Corporate Purpose

For many years, economic theory has defended shareholder primacy on normative grounds, as the most efficient operating principle. The argument reasons that, because shareholders are the residual claimants in a corporation, maximizing shareholder value has the effect of maximizing firm value. This argument directly supports shareholder primacy but as a means not an end, in that the ultimate economic objective is maximizing the value of the firm itself. Under a utilitarian perspective and, assuming no negative externalities, maximizing firm value is consistent with maximizing social welfare.

Three subsidiary efficiency considerations apply. First, shareholder economic value is a particularly transparent metric, especially in the context of public corporations in which it can be measured, albeit perhaps imperfectly and noisily, by observing stock prices. Second, there are reasons to think that shareholder interests are “largely unitary” in the sense that “[m]anagers maximizing the wealth of shareholders as a group generally help all shareholders pro rata.” Third, because corporate law vests shareholders with some

---

108 See also Geczy et al., supra note 102, at 115 (arguing that constituency statutes “signal a change in the law” and “expand director authority).

109 See Del. Gen Corp. L. § 281 (providing for distribution of all remaining assets of a dissolved corporation to its shareholders).

110 See, e.g., Michael Jensen, Value Maximization and the Corporate Objective Function, dated Jan. 2, 2000 (“200 years' worth of work in economics and finance indicate that social welfare is maximized when all firms in an economy attempt to maximize their own total firm value.”), available at https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/00-058_f2896ba9-f272-40ca-aa8d-a7645f43a3a9.pdf.

111 See Mark E. Van Der Weide, Against Fiduciary Duties to Corporate Stakeholders, 21 Del. J. Corp. L. 27, 62 (1996) (“Therefore, maximizing the present value of the corporation's earnings stream maximizes the total value of the corporation and, thus, maximizes the corporation's contribution to social wealth”).

decision-making authority, through their power to elect directors and vote on certain structural issues such as mergers and bylaw and charter amendments, shareholders have legal powers by which to hold officers and directors accountable.113

Notably, however, specifically, maximizing shareholder value as an overall operating principle need not dictate allocational issues. At least some of those who advocate shareholder primacy do so not out of a normative conviction that shareholder interests should dominate but out of the expectation that shareholders as governing agents will maximize profits, resulting in value creation for all firm stakeholders.114 But this is largely a governance argument, not one that mandates how boards of directors should operate the firm.

Scholars have also offered a number of challenges to the economic rationale for shareholder primacy. First, modern commentators typically reject the view that shareholders are the sole residual claimants in the firm.115 Importantly, to the extent that other stakeholders are not fully protected by contract, regulation or otherwise, maximizing shareholder value may result in transfers to shareholders from those other claimants rather than increasing overall firm value.116 Summer Kim has also uncovered evidence that, as historical matter, a variety of stakeholders have been treated as the residual claimants of the corporation.117 Other commentators have attacked the norm as creating wealth-destroying externalities.118 Moreover, the principle itself has

113 See Rock, supra note 7 (arguing that corporations have a purpose to maximize shareholder profits in part due to the structure of Delaware law which provides shareholders structural control over the corporation). These attributes are likely overstated. For example, non-shareholder stakeholders can control corporate decisions by contract and can use contractual remedies to hold decisionmakers accountable. See, e.g. Michael Ohlrogge, Bankruptcy Claim Dischargeability and Public Externalities: Evidence from a Natural Experiment (Feb. 14, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3273486 (describing environmental covenants in lending agreements.).


115 See Amir Licht, The Maximands Of Corporate Governance: A Theory Of Values And Cognitive Style, 29 Del. J. Corp. L. 649, 652 (2004) (“The traditional law and economics perspective holds that in determining the maximands of the corporation, exclusive priority should be given to its residual claimants. . . .This position, however, does not, in reality, hold true.”)

116 See Van Der Weide, supra note 111, at 522; Lee, supra note 114, at 565. See also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Unocal at 20: Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers, 31 Del. J. Corp. L. 769 (2006).

117 See Summer Kim, A Multi-Criteria Assessment of Corporate Residual Claimants, July 15, 2020, at 6 (“Depending on which of the theories of rent, interest, wages, or profit was adopted, each of landlord, capitalist, laborer, and entrepreneur have been the residual claimants of the corporation over time”).

118 See generally Lee, supra note 114, at 539-562 (discussing academic arguments that shareholder primacy creates wealth-destroying externalities).
been attacked head-on for creating short-termism in corporations.\textsuperscript{119} In this regard, scholars have noted that shareholders themselves have heterogeneous interests, making it difficult to decide exactly to whom, among a group of shareholders, directors and the firm should cater.\textsuperscript{120}

More problematically, even if shareholder value is correlated with firm value, the shareholder primacy view can be challenged by recognizing that, as a practical matter, some societal interests will not fall within the contours of the firm. To the extent that maximizing shareholder (or firm) value sacrifices these interests, that operating policy creates negative externalities. Economic theory does not supply an answer to the normative question of how corporate law or individual operational decisions should weigh these costs, but any broad-based efficiency theory must grapple with them.

Ultimately, we conclude that the debate over the economic foundations of the firm appears secondary to the fundamental issue at hand which is whether corporations should have a purpose. These theories instead take corporate purpose as a given and debate over how the firm should operate based on an economic theory of the firm. These theories do not at the end of the day do more than this by establishing a definitive belief – without legislative decision as to its superiority as a policy matter – that shareholder primacy or another ends should be that purpose. Ultimately, economic theory in these instances can provide an orientation for purpose, at best. But more commonly these theories provide a governance principle implying a corporate purpose without first establishing purpose. We thus need to look elsewhere if we are going to find a foundational basis for corporate purpose.

B. Personhood and Corporate Purpose

Commentators have looked to personhood theory and, in particular, the view that a corporation is a person and thereby has the obligations associated with personhood to identify a basis for corporate purpose. Notably, the personhood theory differs from economic theory in that it tends to be used to justify a corporate purpose that is altruistic or concerned with increasing societal welfare. Characterizing a corporation as a person opens the door to attributing


to corporations the moral and ethical duties of regular people. The corporate social responsibility movement was premised on the position that economic entities have moral obligations and offered various rationales for these obligations.

The personhood theory of the corporation is articulated most frequently in connection with cases concerning the legal rights of the corporation. In a series of decisions in the 1800s the Supreme Court granted a variety of legal protections to corporations, including the right to sue and be sued, due process rights and contract rights. More recently, the Supreme Court considered the political and religious rights of corporations. Thus, in 

_Citizens United v Federal Election Commission_, the court revisited its 1970s decisions on political donations and found that corporations had rights to expression underlaid by their associational status. In 

_Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc._, the Supreme Court held that corporations could have religious rights under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.

Although some scholars draw upon these cases for the principle that a corporation should be recognized as a legal person to attribute to the corporation moral or ethical obligations of personhood, such a reading misconstrues the rationale behind the decisions. The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in these cases does not extend constitutional rights on the basis that corporations are like natural persons but instead relies on the provision of rights to corporations in the

---

121. See, e.g., Susannah Ripkin, _Corporations Are People Too: A Multi-Dimensional Approach To The Corporate Personhood Puzzle_, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 97, 117 (2009) (“If the corporation is a real person in society, it should have the same sorts of moral and social responsibilities that individuals have. As a citizen of a larger community, it enjoys certain rights and privileges, but it should also bear the corresponding duties of a citizen ‘to be sensitive to the impact of its activities on others, including not just its investors, but also employees, creditors, consumers, and the larger society in which it operates.’”). These arguments rely on the claim that individual persons have particular moral and social responsibilities, an issue that we do not address here.


126. _Id._ at 389-90 (Scalia, J., Concurring) (arguing that First Amendment protections apply to the speech of artificial legal entities).


128. _Id._ at 719.

service of protecting shareholder individuals. As Professor Elizabeth Pollman has argued, “the so-called doctrine of corporate personhood does not provide guidance for determining the scope of corporate rights.” It instead is a theory of the expression of these rights, based on an associational view of the corporation.

The personhood theory could still serve as the basis for corporate purpose that is grounded in the purpose of individual corporate participants. The challenge with this approach is, as we discuss further below, corporations are comprised of a variety of stakeholders with widely varying objectives. Even if the inquiry is limited to shareholders, a corporation’s shareholders vary as to their timeframe, their liquidity needs, their tax situation as well as the ESG issues that they consider important and their willingness to prioritize those interests over economic value. Personhood theory can serve as a basis for imputing a corporate purpose only under the misguided assumption that shareholders either have homogenous interests or that the tools of corporate decision-making such as majority shareholder voting or delegation to corporate directors are a basis for resolving intra-shareholder differences, an issue that we consider in further detail below.

More broadly, even if a corporation were to have the legal or ethical obligations of a natural person, imputing such obligations provides little guidance in identifying a particular corporate purpose. Natural persons have a wide variety of purposes, objectives and self-imposed constraints on their pursuit of those objectives. These constraints may be social, moral, ethical, political, religious or philosophical in origin. There is widespread disagreement on the appropriate scope of these constraints and therefore on what constitutes ethical behavior even among individuals. Thus personhood theory is not capable either of answering the question of whether a corporation should have a purpose or, if so, what that purpose should be.

C. Corporate Purpose and Shareholder Primacy

A third rationale for corporate purpose is to confront and ultimately overturn the shareholder primacy norm. The Business Roundtable statement responds to the concern that the arguments for shareholder primacy have unduly

---

131 Id.
132 See Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 120. See also Stephen Bainbridge, The Implications of Investor Ideology for Delaware’s Shareholder Ratification Doctrine, ProfessorBainbridge.com (July 11, 2018), available at http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2018/07/the-implications-of-investor-ideology-for-delawares-shareholder-ratification-doctrine.html (noting that investors have heterogenous preferences and accordingly questioning the message sent by a shareholder vote).
influenced the behavior of corporate decisionmakers. Whether or not these claims are sound, commentators reason that corporate officials are likely to accept them and therefore to focus on shareholder value and, even more problematically, on short term stock price, in making operational decisions.

The Business Roundtable posits that a newly-purposed stakeholder model of the corporation offers an alternative to shareholder primacy. Even if a corporation explicitly identifies non-shareholders in its purpose statement, however, the effect of a statement on the operating priorities of corporate officials is unclear and, we argue, highly problematic. Premising the utility of corporate purpose in its capacity to function as an operational constraint comingles several of the conceptual distinctions that we highlighted in our introduction. The following table attempts to distinguish among the relevant animating principles:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Long-Term Shareholder Value Purpose</th>
<th>Long Term Stakeholder Value Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

For purposes of this discussion, we assume that the Business Roundtable Statement is intended as a true statement of intentionality by its signatories. We note that others have characterized the statement as "largely a rhetorical public relations move", a description that we neither accept nor reject here. See Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 2, at 3.

See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, The Toxic Side Effects of Shareholder Primacy, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 2003, 2020 (2013) (arguing that shareholder primacy can, by focusing managers on short term stock price, have the effect of harming "harm[ing] public corporations' abilities to generate future products and profits, to the collective detriment of creditors, employees, consumers, suppliers, and long-term shareholders alike").

See also Lynn M. LoPucki, Repurposing the Corporation, July 26, 2020 draft at 7 (explaining that the developing ESG information system will change "the corporation's purpose in the most meaningful sense—from private economic gain to a fully integrated combination of economic, social, and environmental gain").

A number of commentators have highlighted the fact that stakeholder value defenders are often unclear about the extent to which consideration of stakeholder interests is intended as a means to promote shareholder value or an end in itself. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 2, at 3 (describing these as "two different versions of stakeholderism"); Adam B. Badawi & Frank Partnoy, ESG and Litigation: Is there a Relationship between Being "Bad" and Getting Sued?, working paper (2020), draft at 9 (explaining that ESG metrics can be understood as "capturing ways in which a focus on ESG is consistent with maximizing shareholder returns" or alternatively "measur[ing] deviations from shareholder returns that inure to the benefit of stakeholders"). While we agree with this characterization, we argue that it captures only half the story.
As the table suggests, corporate purpose can have positive legal bite to the extent that it creates an affirmative obligation for corporate decisionmakers to consider particular interests or objectives in operational decisions, or it can be merely aspirational. Existing constituency statutes are examples of the latter in that they authorize but do not compel corporate officials to consider non-shareholder constituencies in the takeover context and, depending upon the statute, in other decisions. In addition, a theory of corporate purpose could both identify specified objectives as normatively desirable and privilege those objectives over alternatives. Traditional shareholder primacy privileges the interests of shareholder over those of other stakeholders.

Let us consider options presented by the table. It is somewhat unclear how the options in the red and green boxes change the corporation’s purpose from shareholder primacy or add to the traditional constraints imposed by fiduciary principles. Presumably if the duty of corporate officials is to focus primarily on maximizing shareholder value, and a consideration of stakeholder interests contributes to shareholder value, then properly-informed corporate officials will do so and they will do so regardless of whether the consideration of such interests constitutes a distinct obligation. In addition, given the latitude afforded by the business judgment rule, it is difficult to expect these approaches to effect a meaningful change in corporate operations. We note in particular that the business judgment rule, particularly in the operational context, affords officers and directors broad discretion. In the overwhelming majority of cases, attention to stakeholder and societal interests can rationally be defended as consistent with the pursuit of long-term shareholder value, and existing fiduciary principles.137

---

137 Although a cynic might argue that the business judgment rule encourages corporate officials to defend stakeholder-oriented decisions disingenuously in terms of shareholder value, we believe for the reasons discussed infra at notes 142 through 162 and accompanying text, that deliberate decisions to sacrifice shareholder value in the interests of other stakeholders are unlikely.
Indeed, to the extent that ESG and shareholder interests are consistent with maximizing shareholder value, a claim supported in some measure (though not entirely) by empirical studies, corporate officials would be remiss, even under a shareholder primacy norm, if they failed to take those interests into account. As such, a case can be made that the approach set out in red box, required by existing law, and mild support for such a view can be found in cases like *Marchand*.

The approaches in the brown and blue boxes describe an affirmative shift away from shareholder primacy and, perhaps, a modification of the scope of existing fiduciary obligations. The brown box—“Power but not obligation to consider non-shareholder interests irrespective of their effect on long term shareholder value”-- presents a formulation of corporate purpose that is, we think, most consistent with the view espoused by purpose advocates and is embodied in the Business Roundtable statement. It takes the position that the consideration of stakeholder interests is normatively desirable and legally permissible when those interests are unrelated to or even inconsistent with shareholder value but that this consideration is not mandatory. It further takes the view that consideration of stakeholder interests may but need not trump shareholder interests or the pursuit of economic value.

As noted in Part II, *supra*, we are skeptical of the claim that existing corporate law imposes a binding obligation of shareholder primacy, at least outside the context of takeovers and self-dealing transactions, although we note that the position in these boxes is in tension with some of the cases we discuss, particularly the *eBay* decision. Moreover, existing black letter law authorizes corporate officials, at least in some cases, to consider non-shareholder interests regardless of whether those interests have a relationship to firm value. Many state statutes explicitly authorize charitable donations, for example, irrespective of their relationship to firm economic value. Similarly, constituency statutes

---


140 Every state corporate law statute authorizes corporations to make charitable donations and none limits such donations to those that explicitly increase firm value. See R. Franklin Balotti & James J. Hanks, Jr., *Giving at the Office: A Reappraisal of Charitable Contributions by Corporations*, 54 BUS. LAW. 965, 970 (1999) (“These statutes are
empower but do not compel corporate officials to consider stakeholder interests without a requirement that those interests be aligned with shareholder interests. Accordingly, we believe there is at least an arguable basis for believing that the theory of corporate purpose reflected in the brown box is consistent with existing law.

Whether or not it accurately describes existing law, there are two limitations on the effectiveness of the approach reflected in the brown box, however. One is the lack of enforceability. Unless corporate officials are compelled to consider and even to prioritize non-shareholder interests, there is little reason to believe they will do so. Corporate law relies primarily on shareholder-based mechanisms such as capital markets pricing and director elections to hold managers accountable. This system is not immutable. Corporate law could be revised, as per Senator Elizabeth Warren’s proposal or the two-tiered board structure used in Germany to require labor representation on corporate boards, thereby increasing manager accountability to workers. Executive compensation could be structured in a way that creates incentives for managers to pursue identified stakeholder or societal objectives such as reducing a company’s carbon footprint. And stakeholders could impose constraints by contract, such as provisions in a credit agreement that restrict pollution.

In this regard, we note the availability of alternative forms which have structural support for the consideration of non-shareholder constituencies such as the non-profit and the public benefit corporation. The Sierra Club’s generally unrestrictive as to amount of the contribution and its beneficiaries”). In six states, including New York and California, the statutes explicitly authorize such donations “irrespective of corporate benefit.” Id. at 971.

141 Indeed, several constituency statutes explicitly provide that no particular interest, including that of the shareholders, “is to be considered ‘dominant’ or ‘controlling.’” Eric Orts, Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate Constituency Statutes, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 14, 73-74 (1992) (citing statutes of Iowa, Indiana and Pennsylvania).

142 See Bechuk & Tallarita, supra note 2.


144 See Bechuk & Tallarita, supra note 2 (providing evidence that corporate signatories to the BRT statement are not seeking to align management compensation with stakeholder interests through their compensation structures).

145 See Ohlrogge, supra note 145, at 52-53 (describing credit agreements imposing environmental constraints on borrowers such as inspections or insurance).

146 Corporate governance in the non-profit context raises a variety of issues concerning the non-profit’s public benefit purpose and its effect on officer and director fiduciary duties. See Thomas Lee Hazen & Lisa Love Hazen, Punctilios and Nonprofit Corporate Governance - A Comprehensive Look at Nonprofit Directors’ Fiduciary Duties, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 347, 362-63 (2012) (exploring the question of whether current nonprofit law is adequate in addressing nonprofit directors’ accountability).
original purpose, for example, as set forth in its articles of incorporation was “[t]o explore, enjoy and render accessible the mountain regions of the Pacific Coast . . . .”  

This purpose was legally enforceable and involved an environmental interest. The stakeholders of the Sierra Club were its members, but the board of directors was and is self-elected, replacing itself. To the extent there is an enforcement mechanism of the Sierra Club’s mission it comes from the California State Attorney General which acts as an oversight mechanism for the Sierra Club. But even then the well-known slack in charitable compensation and mission creep for non-profits creates inefficiencies that this enforcement mechanism is not suitable for. Similarly, the public benefit corporation offers corporate participants a structure in which they can credibly commit to a multi-stakeholder corporate purpose. Notably, however, as commentators have observed, most PBC statutes rely exclusively on shareholders to enforce the interests of non-shareholder stakeholders.

A more significant problem is determining when an operational decision sacrifices shareholder value in the interests of other stakeholders. Some

---

147 Sierra Club, Articles of Incorporation (Original Version), dated June 4, 1892, available at https://www.sierraclub.org/articles-incorporation
148 Compare this to the current purpose which is akin to the statements of corporate purpose in for-profit charters. It reads in full:

[!]he purposes of the Sierra Club are to explore, enjoy, and protect the wild places of the earth; to practice and promote the responsible use of the earth's ecosystems and resources; to educate and enlist humanity to protect and restore the quality of the natural and human environment; and to use all lawful means to carry out these objectives.”

149 The Sierra Club is organized as a non-profit corporation under the laws of the state of California and as such is subject to oversight by the state attorney general. See California Non-Profit Corporation Law § 5250.
151 See, e.g. Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Managerial Duties in Social Enterprise: The Public Benefit Corporation, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL ENTERPRISE LAW 508 (2019) (explaining that public benefit corporation statutes enable a corporation’s purpose to “include[] the dual purposes of pursuing pecuniary gain for investors and pursuing a public benefit.”).
152 See DGCL §367 (vesting shareholders with exclusive authority to enforce PBC directors’ fiduciary duties); Julian Velasco, Shareholder Primacy in Benefit Corporations (December 19, 2019). FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS IN BUSINESS (Cambridge University Press 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3506824 (explaining that PBCs do not overcome shareholder primacy effectively because they rely on shareholders to enforce their altruistic objectives).
commentators have argued that such trade-offs are ubiquitous.\footnote{See Bebchuk & Tallarita, \textit{supra} note 2, at 19 (“potential trade-offs between shareholders and stakeholders are ubiquitous”).} We disagree. Indeed, for the reasons that Professor Dorothy Lund has identified, we believe that a variety of considerations affect the relationship between stakeholder interests and shareholder value and that these considerations are often unknown and unknowable to a corporate manager at the time of an initial decision.\footnote{See Lund, \textit{supra} note 14 (describing potential effects of one company’s socially responsible decisions on its competitors, suppliers and the market as a whole). Melvin Eisenberg observed more than twenty years ago that seemingly purely altruistic corporate behavior might nonetheless provide a benefit to the corporation. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, \textit{Corporate Conduct that Does Not Maximize Shareholder Gain: Legal Conduct, Ethical Conduct, the Penumbra Effect, Reciprocity, the Prisoner’s Dilemma, Sheep’s Clothing, Social Conduct, and Disclosure}, 28 STETSON L. REV. 1 (1998).} These considerations include the effect of a stakeholder-oriented decision on a corporation’s reputation and subsequent sales, the possibility that competitors will adopt similar policies, resulting in a level playing field, the prospect of averting more burdensome obligations imposed through regulation, the possible changes in supply chain practices, and more. As a result, a range of business decisions that might appear to sacrifice short-term profitability may be rationally related to long-term corporate value and, as a result, within the scope of managerial discretion afforded by the business judgment rule.

Consider Dick’s Sporting Goods decision to stop selling guns in some of its stores following the school shooting in Parkland, Florida.\footnote{See Nathaniel Meyersohn, \textit{Dick’s Sporting Goods removes Guns and Ammo from 125 Stores}, CNN BUSINESS, Mar. 14, 2019.} Initially, the media characterized the decision to ban some gun sales as “at the expense of revenue.”\footnote{Sarah Nassauer, \textit{How Dick’s Sporting Goods Decided to Change Its Gun Policy}, WALL ST. J., Dec. 4, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-dicks-sporting-goods-decided-to-change-its-gun-policy-1543955262} Dick’s CEO Edward Stack believed the company would lose a quarter of a billion dollars from the decision.\footnote{Terry Nguyen, \textit{Dick’s Sporting Goods destroyed $5 million worth of guns it pulled from its stores}, Vox, Oct. 8, 2019. Not only did Dick’s stop selling the guns, it destroyed more than $5 million worth of guns in its inventory rather than returning the weapons to the manufacturers. Id.} Dick’s also faced the prospect of boycotts and protests from gun owners.\footnote{See, e.g., Rich Duprey, \textit{Gun sales: Will Dick’s Sporting Goods be hurt by a gun owners’ boycott?}, \textit{The Motley Fool}, May 17, 2018, https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/retail/2018/05/17/dicks-sporting-goods-hurt-by-gun-owners-boycott/34999931; Rachel Siegel, \textit{Dick’s Sporting Goods reports strong earnings as it experiments with reducing gun sales}, \textit{WASH. POST}, Aug. 22, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/08/22/dicks-sporting-goods-stock-surges-strong-nd-quarter-earnings/ (reporting that the decision sparked customer boycotts and employee resignations).} Stack defended the decision as the right thing to do, and was quoted as saying “I don’t really care what the financial
implication is.\textsuperscript{159} We note that, despite Ed Slack’s statement that Dick’s made its decision to reduce gun sales without regard to its financial effect, no shareholder has challenged Dick’s decision, and we are skeptical that any shareholder could do so successfully. Moreover, in hindsight, the tension between societal and shareholder value is less clear. Sales grew at the stores where the company discontinued gun sales, and Dick’s removed guns from more stores.\textsuperscript{160} A year after its initial announcement, Dick reported a jump in same-store sales, and its stock price increased by more than 4 percent.\textsuperscript{161} In March 2020, Dick’s announced that it would remove guns from an additional 440 stores, and its stock price increased by 13%.\textsuperscript{162}

These concerns suggest a possible reason why corporate constituency statutes, which purport to redefine the corporate purpose by allowing boards to consider other constituencies, do not appear to have a tangible impact on corporate operations.\textsuperscript{163} First, there is no guidance on how these constituencies should be considered.\textsuperscript{164} Second, the extent to which most operational decisions implicate trade-offs among multiple constituencies is often unknown and unknowable. Third, they do not modify the fact that shareholders ultimately control corporate decisions through their voting power and the capital market discipline.

The position in the blue box, which seems to be the position espoused in the Davos Manifesto, suffers from some of the concerns identified with respect to the brown box, but it raises additional concerns. The principal issue is that we

\textsuperscript{159} Nassauer, supra note 156.
\textsuperscript{160} Meyersohn, supra note 155.
\textsuperscript{161} Siegel, supra note 158.
\textsuperscript{164} See Anthony Bisconti, Note and Comment: The Double Bottom Line: Can Constituency Statutes Protect Socially Responsible Corporations Stuck in Revlon Land?, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 765, 794 (2009) (observing that “constituency statutes do not provide any guidance as to the relevant weight directors should afford to non-shareholder interests”). The same criticism can be leveled at PBC statutes. See, e.g., Roxanne Thorelli, Note, Providing Clarity for Standard of Conduct for Directors Within Benefit Corporations: Requiring Priority of a Specific Public Benefit, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1749, 1765 (2017) (observing that the Model PBC Act “does not delineate how the director should ‘consider’ the interests of stakeholder groups or otherwise prioritize them”).
find no support for the blue box in positive law. State corporation statutes could impose an obligation on corporations to act in the public interest—indeed, public benefit corporations adopt this approach\textsuperscript{165}—but there does not appear to be any basis for inferring such an obligation from the language of general corporation statutes or existing case law.\textsuperscript{166} We believe (contrary to the view of some scholars),\textsuperscript{167} that current law allows corporations voluntarily to commit in their charters to prioritize stakeholder or societal interests, and that such commitments would be legally enforceable, but we have found no examples of corporations that have done so, and, as we observed above, the corporate purpose movement does not seem to be advocating the wide-scale amendment of corporate charters. The few existing corporate charters that contain a more expansive formulation of corporate purpose seem to be deliberately structured so as to limit their potential as legal constraints, for example, by stating that a corporation will “strive” to act in a sustainable manner.\textsuperscript{168} A notable example is the charter of Clif Bar & Co., which describes its purpose as “to engage in any lawful act or activity . . . except as its acts and activities are limited by its business model of aspiring to sustain the viability of its brands, sustain the viability of its business; sustain the working and living morale of its employees; sustain the community; and sustain the planet.”\textsuperscript{169} Although the Clif charter goes further than most, its language is largely aspirational, and the extent to which it commits the corporation to undertake or avoid particular business decisions is questionable.

Notably, we observe that the blue box, unlike the three others, has the potential to make a meaningful difference in corporate operations, thereby offering the potential to address operational externalities and regulatory failures.\textsuperscript{170} For example, the approach reflected in the blue box, would seemingly provide a basis for requiring Dick’s Sporting Goods to stop selling guns even if gun sales were profitable or compelling energy companies to reduce

\textsuperscript{165} Although, as noted above, the potential enforcement of this obligation is quite limited. See note 152 supra.
\textsuperscript{166} Whether it would be normatively desirable to amend state corporation statutes to mandate such an approach, we leave for future work.
\textsuperscript{167} See Rock, supra note 7.
\textsuperscript{168} Plaintiffs have attempted, in a few cases, to hold corporations accountable for such statements under misrepresentation theories, but such efforts have been largely unsuccessful. See, e.g., In re Sanofi Sec. Litig., 155 F. Supp. 3d 386, 401 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (holding that statements in Sanofi’s Corporate Social Responsibility Report about “Sanofi’s maintenance of an “effective compliance organization”” and “Sanofi’s “efforts toward transparency, accountability, and disclosure” are too general to cause a reasonable investor to rely on them”); Ruiz v. Darigold, Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155384, *2 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 31, 2014) (dismissing claim by customers that they “relied on false assurances of ethical treatment for cows and workers when they chose to purchase Darigold products”).
\textsuperscript{169} Amended and Restated Articles of Incorporation, Clif Bar & Co. Art. II., May 3, 2010. Clif Bar was advised on this clause by Professor Richard Buxbaum, and this Article has been informed by his observations on that process.
\textsuperscript{170} See, e.g., Elhauge, supra note 14.
their investment in oil and gas production. But how would this obligation be structured? If Dick’s were required to prioritize stakeholder interests, which interests would dominate? Should it prioritize the interests of its customers who want to buy guns or those who favor a ban? Should it prefer the interests of local communities in reducing the likelihood of school shootings or consider the interests of its employees who object to the ban? This is akin to a corporate constituency statute without definition.

These problems highlight two difficulties inherent with trying to use corporate purpose statements as a legally binding mechanism for effecting operational change – they are neither concrete nor enforceable. A purpose statement saying that a corporation will promote the interests of its workers, unlike a minimum wage law, neither identifies the way in which worker interests will be protected nor allows workers or a regulator to enforce those interests. Moreover, the malleability of such a purpose statement increases the enforcement challenge. This does not mean that the statement could not result in the reallocation of resources among corporate constituencies. To be sure, we believe it is likely to have such an effect. But purpose statements, even if they effect a change in positive law along the lines indicated in the blue box, are unlikely to effectuate substantial operational changes.

This view is consistent with observed practice. The Business Roundtable statement, in its own words, “supersedes” the Roundtable’s prior commitment to shareholder primacy in favor of a “commitment to a free market economy that serves all Americans.” These signatories included the CEOs of Amazon, Cigna, and Chevron, each of whom now professes a commitment to pursue societal value. Without taking a position on overall extent to which these

171 Professor Madison Condon offers such an example, involving decisions by Exxon and Chevron to curtail production with a resulting negative impact on the firms’ profitability and share price. See Madison Condon, Externalities and the Common Owner at 35 (April 26, 2019), WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW, Forthcoming, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3378783.
172 It is for this reason, among others, that we believe that issues regarding risk and externalities of the corporate form should not be dealt through corporate purpose but rather regulation of the company. The issues and judgements involved in such an assessment are better situated to be dealt with through legislation, the administration process and even courts such as through the Caremark line of cases. But see Steven L. Schwarcz Misalignment: Corporate Risk-Taking and Public Duty, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2016) (arguing that systemically important firms should have a “public governance duty”).
173 BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE STATEMENT, supra note 4.
companies are committed to stakeholder or societal welfare, it is worth observing that each has been subject to extensive criticism on precisely this point. Amazon has been criticized for taking advantage of loopholes to pay a miniscule amount of federal income taxes. Cigna has been criticized for bribing insurance brokers with luxury vacations to sway their recommendations to the employer-providers they advise. And according to one source, Chevron’s ESG rating puts it exactly in the middle of companies in the extraction industry.

Similarly, although a substantial number of corporations have issued public statements of their purpose or mission, many of these statements are aspirational and vague, providing neither ascertainable standards by which stakeholders can determine whether the corporation is meeting its identified goals nor a mechanism for holding corporate officials accountable. For example, Mastercard’s purpose manifesto is “Connecting Everyone to Priceless Possibilities.” Bank of America’s “clear purpose” is “to help make financial lives better through the power of every connection.” Target’s purpose is “[t]o help all families discover the joy of everyday life.”

What does it mean for corporations to identify these as their purposes or for CEOs to pledge their commitment to the Business Roundtable statement? A cynical view would characterize the statements as virtue-signaling, designed either as marketing tools or to reduce the firm’s political exposure or vulnerability to regulation. Alternatively, we could view a corporation’s company most admired for its people, partnership and performance” The Chevron Way, available at https://www.chevron.com/documents/pdf/chevronwayenglish.pdf (last accessed Aug. 1, 2020).


181 Such motivations could potentially serve to promote long term shareholder value, taking us from the brown box to the green box.
articulation of its purpose as something akin to a corporate New Year’s resolution – the corporation’s identification of an area in which, according to some baseline set of normative principles, it hopes to do better and an expression of its desire to do so. Unfortunately, the analogy is likely to prove true in the sense that, absent some form of legal compulsion, a corporation’s commitment to pursue societal value is, like a New Year’s resolution, easily made, but also easily broken.182

In sum, our analysis suggests that existing statements of corporate purpose are more akin to mission statements. They are largely aspirational rather than legally binding or constraining. As such, we question the potential for these statements to affect the operation of the corporation in any meaningful way. Even if they have the potential to affect corporate behavior, they do not establish a raison d’etre for corporate purpose. Instead, they put forth vague goals and principles that appear largely to jibe with the economic success of the company.

IV. An Instrumentalist View of Corporate Purpose

The foregoing discussion suggests that the rationale for corporate purpose cannot readily be found in history, law or theory. One might conclude, from this discussion, that we are corporate purpose skeptics. To an extent, we are. We do not believe that corporate purpose is a tool that can be used to compel corporations to act as benevolent social planners. Nor do we think that, by pledging their commitment to the Business Roundtable statement, corporate CEOs will change their behavior and pay workers higher wages, reduce their carbon footprint or stop manufacturing and selling hazardous products.

We do, however, believe that there is value in corporations’ articulating their purpose. We argue in this Part IV for understanding corporate purpose from an instrumental perspective. Corporate purpose, we claim, can be used to direct and manage the expectancy interests of the corporation’s stakeholders. Because a corporation is a collective enterprise, individuals and entities that interact with it and make decisions on its behalf have different interests and goals. Corporate purpose allows a corporation to signal its priorities to its stakeholders, enabling them both to sort – identifying interactions that are likely to further their individual goals -- and to negotiate – determining the regulatory or contractual protections necessary to constrain corporate decisions that are inconsistent with those goals.

182 Studies show that New Year’s resolutions have a failure rate of 80%, and most are broken by February. See Marla Tabaka, Most People Fail to Achieve Their New Year’s Resolution. For Success, Choose a Word of the Year Instead, Inc., Jan. 7, 2019, available at https://www.inc.com/marla-tabaka/why-set-yourself-up-for-failure-ditch-new-years-resolution-do-this-instead.html (last accessed Feb. 26, 2020).
Many of the limitations that we identified in Part III similarly constrain the effectiveness of corporate purpose in serving the function we identify here. Accordingly, in subpart A we explain the instrumental justification for an articulated corporate purpose. In subpart B we provide the principles necessary for a statement of purpose to serve this function and explain the parameters by which it can do so. In subpart C we apply this theory and principles to the current debate over legal purpose and the mission statements and other proclamations which the Business Roundtable and others have put forth. We note that the instrumental justification we identify does not provide a normative basis by which to select a specific shareholder purpose. We leave for future work both the normative question of what a corporation’s purpose should be and appropriate procedure that a corporation should employ to select or modify its chosen purpose.  

A. Corporate Purpose as Managing Expectancy Interests

Our starting point is to recognize that the corporation is a collective enterprise. A multiplicity of individuals and entities interact with the corporation, and each corporate constituency has plausible claims with respect to how the corporation is run. Employees seek to maximize their wages and improve their working conditions. Customers want a low-cost and high-quality product. Creditors want repayment of their loans with minimal risk. The local community wants the corporation to refrain from polluting. Society as a whole wants the corporation to operate in a sustainable manner and to avoid exhausting the planet’s natural resources.

Notably, however, the interests and preferences of individuals within each constituency group vary as well. Some shareholders prefer short-term profit maximization; others favor the creation of long-term sustainable value. Some customers prioritize cost while others care about product quality. Some employees prefer the potential rewards of fast-paced corporate growth, while others care about long term job stability.

The modern contractual theory of the corporation recognizes that the terms of the corporate contract enable each of its participants to seek its

---

183 The debate over opt-out versus mandatory rules is a vigorous one in corporate law in part based on an economic view of the corporation. See John C. Coffee, Jr. The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618, 1661-64, 1671-74, 1689 (1989); John C. Coffee, Jr., Lecture, No Exit?: Opting Out, the Contractual Theory of the Corporation, and the Special Case of Remedies, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 919 (1988). For reasons we will delineate in future work we believe that a purpose can be modified in the corporate charter, provided certain procedures and monitoring functions are in place.
objectives and to coordinate those efforts with those of other participants.\textsuperscript{184} The nexus of contracts theory argues that a corporation consists of a series of contracts that serve to accommodate these interests.\textsuperscript{185} We argue that corporate purpose can serve as an implicit term within these contracts. As such, it both enables corporate participants to have a shared understanding among corporate participants about their rights and provides them with clarity about those rights.

What exactly does such a purpose mean? On one hand, a corporation can articulate its purpose simply in terms of its business and the products or services that it seeks to provide. At a fundamental level, every corporation has such a purpose. ExxonMobil’s purpose is to provide energy; Home Depot’s purpose is to supply home improvement products. A review of corporate purpose and mission statements indicates, however, that these statements attempt to do something more. They communicate the manner in which the corporation will operate, the values to which the corporation will adhere, and the constituencies that the corporation will consider or prioritize in its operations. It is purpose in this sense that the Business Roundtable and Larry Fink are promoting.

In this vein, purpose has several advantages over traditional contracting. First, it reduces the transaction costs that would be necessary to allocate rights and responsibilities among a wide range of stakeholders, including stakeholders like society at large that are not parties to explicit contracts nor represented in the corporation’s decisionmaking structure. Second, contracts are private and are typically accessible only by their signatories. Purpose provides a publicly-accessible mechanism. Thus, customers in choosing to support corporations with fair pay practices can learn about the corporation’s commitment to those practices from its purpose statement. Third, a corporation’s commitment to its purpose is enforceable through market forces and by market participants, in contrast to a contract that typically does not provide third party beneficiaries with a cause of action for breach.\textsuperscript{186} Finally, purpose can serve as a background or standard term that need not be negotiated does not need to be negotiated in


\textsuperscript{185} See generally David Millon, \textit{Theories of the Corporation}, 1990 Duke L.J. 201.

\textsuperscript{186} See, e.g., Kishanthi Parella, \textit{Protecting Contract’s Hidden Parties} (July 2020 draft) (identifying problems in enforcing corporate contracts addressing externalities in global supply chains).
each individual employment, credit and supply contract, thereby reducing transaction costs.\textsuperscript{187}

Notably, the scope of a corporation’s purpose and the interests reflected therein need not be purely economic. As the Supreme Court explained in Citizens United, corporations serve as a vehicle for associations of citizens to band together, to formulate their views and objectives, and to communicate those views.\textsuperscript{188} These objectives may include expressive, humanitarian and altruistic goals. As the Court explained in Hobby Lobby:

For-profit corporations, with ownership approval, support a wide variety of charitable causes, and it is not at all uncommon for such corporations to further humanitarian and other altruistic objectives. Many examples come readily to mind. So long as its owners agree, a for-profit corporation may take costly pollution-control and energy-conservation measures that go beyond what the law requires.\textsuperscript{189}

As Citizens United recognized, “the procedures of corporate democracy” allow corporate participants to coordinate their expectations and impose those expectations on corporate decisionmakers.\textsuperscript{190}

In this light, corporate statements about purpose or values can be explained as aligning and regulating stakeholder goals. Nike’s recent campaign with Colin Kaepernick, for example, can be seen as reaching out to its consumer base to signal that its values align with its consumers.\textsuperscript{191} Similarly Ben & Jerry’s has made a business of pursuing stakeholder values even as a subsidiary of Unilever, the giant food conglomerate.\textsuperscript{192} Indeed Ben & Jerry’s structure within

\textsuperscript{187}There is some empirical support that this instrumental use of corporate purpose is value-enhancing. A recent study found that, although corporate purpose was not itself related to firm financial performance, firms with a high clarity of purpose had higher stock market performance and accounting returns. Claudine Madras Gartenberg, Andrea Prat & George Serafeim, \textit{Corporate Purpose and Financial Performance}, 30 ORG. SCI. 1 (2019).

\textsuperscript{188}Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 354 (2010).


\textsuperscript{190}Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 362.

\textsuperscript{191}See Joshua Hunt, \textit{Colin Kaepernick, Nike, and the Myth of Good and Bad Companies}, \textit{THE ATLANTIC}, Sept. 5, 2018 (“For Nike, Kaepernick’s cause is simply good business—if it were anything other than a cynical branding exercise, the company would surely not be simultaneously doing business with the NFL, which has done its best to stifle Kaepernick’s protest movement.”)

\textsuperscript{192}See Simon Mainwaring, \textit{Purpose At Work: How Ben & Jerry’s Combines Growth And Brand Activism}, \textit{FORBES}, dated Feb. 26, 2020 (“In the last six years, our focus has been around activism. We’re doing that in the context of being a wholly owned subsidiary of Unilever. The actual governance agreement is that Unilever has operational control of our business. However, we have an independent board of directors that has legal oversight over our social mission and brand equity.”)
Unilever was designed to enable it to retain a separate progressive identify and "[t]o make, distribute and sell the finest quality ice cream and euphoric concoctions with a continued commitment to incorporating wholesome, natural ingredients and promoting business practices that respect the Earth and the Environment."\footnote{Ben & Jerry, Our Values, available at \url{https://www.benjerry.com/values} (last accessed Aug. 1, 2020).}

Multiple stakeholders may share similar objectives with respect to corporate purpose, thereby deriving value from a mechanism that enables both signaling and commitment. In addition, a stakeholder group may benefit indirectly from the corporation’s ability to make itself more attractive to other stakeholders. For example, statements about corporate purpose that attract customers who share that purpose may result in higher sales, increasing value for shareholders. In addition, a corporation’s articulated purpose of serving customers may attract shareholders who value that objective independently of its effect of economic value. These congruencies extend to other stakeholder groups. Corporations publicly express their values as a method to attract and retain the best talent for positions. In fact corporate managers only acknowledge that many of the value positions they take today are in response to demands by millennial and socially conscious employees. Similarly, Professors Barzuza, Curtis and Weber have theorized that much of the social activism by investors is in order to recruit socially conscious millennial investors.\footnote{Michal Barzuza, Quinn Curtis, Quinn & David H. Webber, Shareholder Value(s): Index Fund Activism and the New Millennial Corporate Governance, 93 SOUTHERN CAL. L. REV. (Forthcoming 2020), \url{https://ssrn.com/abstract=3439516}.}

Importantly, corporate purpose is a mechanism for resolving conflict not merely between constituencies but also within constituencies. Within any particular corporate constituency, individual members may have very different visions of the good. Trinity Wall Street may want Wal-Mart to sacrifice profits in favor of eliminating the sale of guns; a retired NRA member may disagree both with the willingness to sacrifice profits and the idea that stopping the sale of guns furthers societal interests. We note the traditional structure of the corporation provides that, by and large, such conflicts are resolved by majority decision and that, in the end, shareholders are likely to hold the trump card. We also recognize the limitations of both principles and, in particular, the risk that agency issues and the concentration of power caused by intermediated ownership\footnote{See also Matteo Gatti, It's My Stock and I'll Vote If I Want to: Conflicted Voting by Shareholders in (Hostile) M&A Deals, 47 U. MEM. L. REV. 181, 206–7 (2016) (explaining that shareholder voting that is tainted by conflicts of interest may not “effectively and efficiently aggregate shareholder preferences”).} creates the possibility that shareholders may reject a stakeholder...
purpose in favor of pursuing short-term economic value. On the other hand, large shareholders may seek to pursue idiosyncratic social agendas for private reasons or that do not reflect the interests of shareholders more generally. An example may be BlackRock’s efforts to cause corporations to focus more on ESG. With respect to these issues, purpose may provide greater clarity, but it does not necessarily provide a solution.

In our instrumental account then, purpose serves two distinct functions. First, corporate purpose serves a signaling function. It allows individuals to identify a corporation’s objectives in order to determine the degree of fit between the corporation’s operational goals and their individual goals. It enables shareholders and creditors to contribute capital according to a set of terms that governs their rights with respect to that contribution. It allows officers and directors to make operational decisions, protected by settled principles of authority and process. It protects employees with the existence of a legally responsible entity that stands behind the decisions of individual managers. It offers customers, suppliers and others who deal with the corporation guidance about the history, stability, and financial condition of the counterparty to their dealings. In short, corporate purpose provides a framework that allocates the rights and responsibilities of the participants in the collective enterprise that constitutes the corporation’s business foundation. As such, it offers a way of managing expectancy interests relevant to the decision whether to associate with the corporation.

Second, purpose enables those who interact with the corporation to identify the ways in which the corporation’s purpose may create a tension with their individual goals and to navigate that tension by contract. For example, a bank may want to lend money only to businesses that are carbon neutral. If a corporation’s primary purpose is to pursue economic value, it may not make costly operational changes that reduce its carbon footprint. However, the lender can both demand those changes through conditions in the loan agreement and create incentives through the terms of the loan to induce the corporation’s agreement to those conditions.

Corporate purpose not only sets expectations, it provides a standard for monitoring which can be measured and assessed. It offers a basis for prioritizing among competing claims by reducing those claims to a common metric. For example, purpose enables a corporation to weigh interests in the environment with concerns about workplace safety. It also provides a basis for evaluating

---

197 See, e.g., Stout, supra note 134 (identifying this concern).
corporate decisions and holding corporate decisionmakers accountable. ExxonMobil for example posts on its website that its mission is “fueling the world safely and responsibly.”199 The mission statement continues for a paragraph and concludes “we [] explore for oil and natural gas on six continents. . . while addressing the risks of climate change.” Regardless of the views of specific shareholders on the importance of responding to climate change, they should reasonably demand that ExxonMobil corporate officials report more tangible efforts to respond address climate change than Chevron which has, as its “vision” being “the global energy company most admired for its people, partnership and performance.”200

B. Enforceability and Purpose

For corporate purpose to serve the instrumental function that we have detailed, it must reflect a meaningful commitment. We believe that this requires two components. First, a corporation’s purpose statement must be sufficiently concrete that stakeholders and the general public can ascertain whether the corporation is operating in a manner that is consistent with that purpose. In particular, we question the value of corporate purpose statements that are vague, aspirational or cannot be evaluated by reference to publicly-available metrics. Perhaps the most robust statement along these lines is that recently issued by Airbnb. In 2018, the company released a statement in which it asserted that it wanted to be “a 21st-century company with two defining characteristics: We will have an infinite time horizon. We will serve all of our stakeholders.”201 On January 17, 2020, the company issued a second statement identifying five stakeholders “Guests,” “Hosts,” “Communities,” “Shareholders” and “Employees.”202 The company then put forth principles to follow for each of these such as “We prioritize the safety of our community” for “Guests.” Airbnb also released metrics reporting on its success in pursuing these objectives such as “Number of personal safety incidents . . . .”203

199 Kershaw & Schuster, supra note 8.
203 Id. Along similar lines Shell, an oil company, has a compensation scheme which is designed to incentive executives to reduce carbon emissions by the company (but not presumably its product). See Radhakrishnan Gopalan, John Horn and Todd Milbourn, Shell is tying executive pay to carbon emissions. Here’s why it could create real impact, CNN BUSINESS, Dec. 14, 2018, available at https://www.cnn.com/2018/12/14/perspectives/shell-executive-pay-carbon-
Second, a corporation’s purpose must be enforceable. As we observed earlier, legal enforcement was an available mechanism in the 1800s when corporate purpose is to provide visiting facilities and not breed pigs. But in today’s broadly-worded enabling statutes and open-ended corporate charters, the existence of purpose and the enforceability of purpose, at least through tools such as ultra vires or fiduciary duty litigation are not necessarily aligned.

We believe instead that, in the first instance, corporate purpose statements are largely enforceable through market-based mechanisms. To the extent that corporate purpose informs the expectations of those who deal with the corporation, those individuals and entities can disassociate themselves with the corporation, take action within corporate law such as replacing directors or amending the bylaws, or seek to bind the corporation by contract. Customers who are attracted by a corporation’s commitment to the welfare of its workers will sanction the corporation’s lack of attention to working conditions in its supply chain by refusing to buy its products. Employees increasingly seek corporations with strong environmental and social policies, and corporations that do not adhere to their commitments will be unable to retain them. Purpose thus enables discipline by a variety of market participants, and to the extent that purpose extends beyond share price, it expands the role of markets beyond the capital markets to the product and labor markets.

We also believe that a corporate purpose can be implemented through structural and governance mechanisms rather than legal rules. A corporation can both credibly commit to a particular purpose and incentivize its officials to act in accordance with that purpose through provisions including contract
terms, board composition and the structure of its executive compensation. Indeed, to the extent that a corporation’s purpose today is shareholder primacy—this purpose is reinforced by a number of structural and governance mechanisms in the corporate form including the right of shareholders to elect directors, vote on charter and bylaw amendments and approve structural changes. This does not mean that as an optional matter corporate purpose may be not more specific, but that as a default matter the current charter statements are sufficient, and enforcement will come through other means. A corporation’s identification and disclosure of tangible metrics both reinforces its commitment to the objectives identified in its purpose and renders its statement of purpose enforceable. We view for example the pursuit of metrics to assess compliance with corporate ESG goals as an attempt to monitor and measure corporate performance in line with corporate purpose.

In this regard, legal purpose provides a guidestar and guardrails. If a corporation deviates substantially, shareholders can seek legal enforcement, and, although the circumstances in which corporate decisionmakers face likely liability to actions that depart from a corporation’s articulated purpose would be quite rare, concepts like Revlon, entire fairness review for conflicts of interest and ultra vires offer tools to police those outer limits. But within the guardrails, purpose is enforced through market forces, structural and governance mechanisms. Although the guardrails of corporate purpose can be very wide so as to limit the prospect of legal enforcement, that limit does not undermine its utility.

C. The Current Debate

Our theory thus informs the current debate over corporate purpose. It provides a rationale for corporations to identify a purpose and specifies the conditions under which an identified purpose is likely to provide value. It also informs the issue of whether corporations should incorporate more specific statements of purpose into their certificates of incorporation.

For example, We’s S-1 disclosed that Founder Adam Neumann’s voting rights were tied to a requirement that he make a billion dollars’ worth of charitable contributions over a 10-year period. See Annie Palmer, WeWork CEO Adam Neumann has incentives tied to the company’s stock value and his charitable donations, CNBC, Aug. 14, 2019, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/08/14/wework-ceo-adam-neumann-has-incentives-tied-to-stock-value-giving.html.

See Rock, supra note 7 (arguing that the structural nature of the corporation and shareholder favorable mechanisms dictate that the purpose of the corporation is to maximize the value of the firm for shareholders).

See generally Jill E. Fisch, Making Sustainability Disclosure Sustainable, 107 GEORGETOWN L. J. 923 (2019). Lynn LoPucki argues that the development of an ESG information system with standardized metrics will “change the corporation’s purpose from private economic gain to a fully integrated combination of economic, social, and environmental gain.” LoPucki, supra note 135 at 2.
As we have documented above, much of the current talk about corporate purpose is vague and aspirational. These statements may have value for branding, virtue-signaling or public relations, but they neither offer legal constraints nor the prospect of effecting meaningful operational changes. One solution is the option to specify corporate purpose more concretely in charters, an option that is virtually unlimited in scope. Although we believe that such formal charter provisions are permissible and, if appropriately drafted can commit a corporation to pursue objectives other than shareholder wealth maximization, we do not argue that purpose advocates are demanding that corporations do so. Nor do we believe that formal charter amendments are necessary to obtain the instrumental value that we identify in this Article. In the absence of a charter-specified purpose, the purpose of the corporation can be implemented via the structure of the corporation. In the U.S. model this structure is shareholder-centric, providing shareholders the ability to mold and specify purpose.210

Ultimately in a world where purpose remains unspecified in charters, purpose will remain a structural and market construct. Within this market we see that current efforts to reshape corporate purpose through increasing attention to ESG and through the use of PBCs are growing and are largely the product of shareholder-driven initiatives. We view these efforts as evidence that purpose is (and can be) enforceable through market forces. We believe that these forces are consistent with the economic mission of the corporation by defining purpose in a manner which sets the expectations of the corporation’s stakeholders and commits them to the enterprise.

We argue, however, that the rule of purpose in the traditional corporation is currently under-realized. This is largely due to the vague and aspirational purpose statements that we describe in Part IIIC. For corporate purpose to meet the objectives that we identify, such a purpose should be articulable and enforceable. Aspirational mission statements that lack specificity and enforcement may be useful for branding, but they are not pragmatic tools for accomplishing the instrumental function of corporate purpose. In the absence of more concrete and enforceable corporate purpose statements, the structure of the corporate form will require corporations to cater primarily to shareholder interests.

210 The reporter for the ALI Restatement on Corporate Governance, which purports to be a statement of the current law, has proposed a draft that asserts that the purpose of the corporation is to “promote the value of the corporation for the benefit of the shareholders, within the boundaries set by law.” Rock, supra note 7. To justify this position, the formulation relies heavily on the structure of the corporation. See generally Edward B. Rock, For Whom is the Corporation Managed in 2020?: The Debate over Corporate Purpose (May 1, 2020). https://ssrn.com/abstract=3589951.
CONCLUSION

The purpose of the corporation is currently a topic of fervent debate. As we highlight in this Article, however, the debate has raged in the absence of any theoretical work exploring whether a corporation should even have a purpose. We fill this gap. Although we examine and reject conventional theories of corporate purpose, including as well as the claim that corporations are required to maximize either shareholder or societal value as a matter of positive law, we identify an instrumental value to corporate purpose in mediating among the interests and expectancies of a corporation’s stakeholders.

Our theory provides a needed foundation for arguments over corporate purpose. We argue that, when placed in context, the current arguments that corporations can or do have the purpose of maximizing stakeholder or societal welfare are rhetorical. We reject the claim that the principles espoused by the Business Roundtable reflect legal constraints and challenge their potential impact on operational decisions as no more likely to be effective than New Years’ resolutions. Instead, we offer both a theoretical frame for the existing debate and a principled basis for a theory of corporate purpose. By putting forth a theory of corporate purpose we ultimately frame and clarify the debate over whether corporations should have a purpose, and if so, what that purpose is.
The European Corporate Governance Institute has been established to improve corporate governance through fostering independent scientific research and related activities.

The ECGI will produce and disseminate high quality research while remaining close to the concerns and interests of corporate, financial and public policy makers. It will draw on the expertise of scholars from numerous countries and bring together a critical mass of expertise and interest to bear on this important subject.

The views expressed in this working paper are those of the authors, not those of the ECGI or its members.
ECGI Working Paper Series in Law

Editorial Board

Editor
Amir Licht, Professor of Law, Radzyner Law School, Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya

Consulting Editors
Horst Eidenmüller, Freshfields Professor of Commercial Law, University of Oxford
Martin Gelter, Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law
Geneviève Helleringer, Professor of Law, ESSEC Business School and Oxford Law Faculty
Curtis Milhaupt, Professor of Law, Stanford Law School
Niamh Moloney, Professor of Law, Department of Law, London School of Economics and Political Science

Editorial Assistant
Úna Daly, ECGI Working Paper Series Manager

https://ecgi.global/content/working-papers
**Electronic Access to the Working Paper Series**

The full set of ECGI working papers can be accessed through the Institute’s Web-site (https://ecgi.global/content/working-papers) or SSRN:

|----------------------|----------------------------------------|