The Protection of Investors and the Compensation for their Losses: Australia

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Working Paper N° 421/2018
October 2018

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The authors would like to thank Joanna Bird, Gill North and Kate O’Rourke for helpful comments in relation to this chapter, and to acknowledge the excellent research assistance of Lauren Perkins, Alexandra Rennie, Hannah Ryan and Mitheran Selvendran.

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Abstract

The concept of 'investor protection' has a long-standing legal pedigree in relation to the business corporation. Since the early 20th century, when Berle and Means famously highlighted shareholder vulnerability in the modern public corporation, investor protection has been an important ideal in corporate and securities law. In more recent times, the level of investor protection has been treated as a litmus test for a jurisdiction’s quality of corporate governance and, also, as directly contributing to capital market structure. An array of legal strategies exists around the world to address the perceived problem of investor vulnerability. Some of these strategies focus on shareholder protection. Others focus on encouraging greater investor participation as a self-help mechanism. Disclosure constitutes an important regulatory technique from the perspective of both investor protection and investor participation in corporate governance. Its effectiveness depends, however, on enforcement. This paper examines, from a comparative perspective, protection of investors in Australia in circumstances where the corporation has released inadequate, or false and misleading, information, on which investors rely to their detriment. The paper analyzes Australia’s “twin peaks” regulatory framework, focusing on the performance of key regulators within that framework. It also considers the distinctive public and private enforcement mechanisms available to protect investors and the continuous disclosure regime, which applies under Australian law. The paper examines whether these mechanisms provide investors, who have relied on deficient corporate information, with adequate protection and relief. Finally, the paper considers the relatively recent advent of shareholder class actions in Australia, and their impact on private enforcement and the overall regulatory matrix.

Keywords: Australia, corporate governance, comparative corporate governance, corporate law, securities law, regulation, enforcement, directors’ duties, continuous disclosure, investor losses, misleading and deceptive conduct, class actions

JEL Classifications: G18, G30, G32, G34, G38, K20, K22, K33, N20

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Legal Studies Research Paper Series

No. 18/64

October 2018

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1. Introduction

The concept of ‘investor protection’ has a long-standing legal pedigree in relation to the business corporation. Since the early 20th century, when Berle and Means famously highlighted shareholder vulnerability in the modern public corporation, investor protection has been an important ideal in corporate and securities law. In more recent times, the level of

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investor protection has been treated as a litmus test for a jurisdiction’s quality of corporate governance and, also, as directly contributing to capital market structure.\(^2\)

An array of legal strategies exists around the world to address the perceived problem of investor vulnerability. Some of these strategies focus on shareholder protection. Others focus on encouraging greater investor participation as a self-help mechanism.\(^3\) Disclosure constitutes an important regulatory technique from the perspective of both investor protection and investor participation in corporate governance. Its effectiveness depends, however, on enforcement.\(^4\)

This chapter examines the law in Australia relating to the protection of public investors in circumstances where the corporation releases inadequate, or false and misleading, information, which investors then rely upon to their detriment. The chapter discusses the public and private enforcement mechanisms available to protect investors in these circumstances and considers the extent to which they provide investors with adequate protection in practice.

The chapter is structured as follows. Part 2 discusses Australia’s broad regulatory framework from a comparative perspective. Part 3.1 provides information about the contours of Australia’s securities market. In 3.2, we consider regulation and enforcement of corporate law in Australia, focusing closely on the performance of key authorities within Australia’s regulatory framework. Part 4 examines the legal framework ensuring that investors have sufficient, and accurate, information. Part 4.1 discusses Australia's continuous disclosure regime and its enforcement. Part 4.2 examines liability for misleading or deceptive conduct or statements by a corporation. Parts 5.1 and 5.2 discuss the advent of shareholder class actions in Australia, and their impact on private enforcement. Part 5.3 looks at issues relating to conflict of laws, choice of law and enforcement of foreign judgments. Part 6 concludes.

2. **Australia’s Regulatory Backdrop**

Australia’s corporate and financial services regulatory structure shares many features with other common law jurisdictions, including the United States.\(^5\) There are, nonetheless, some important structural differences, which are worth noting at the outset.\(^6\)

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Although, like the United States, Australia has a state-based system of corporate law, the Australian states referred their powers to the federal Parliament, enabling it to pass Commonwealth legislation, the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (‘Corporations Act’).\(^7\) Whereas in the United States ‘federalization’ of corporate law (via statutes, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 and the Dodd-Frank Act 2010) has been extremely contentious,\(^8\) in Australia, it was welcomed by the business community as enhancing corporate efficiency. Another difference between Australia and the United States is that there is no clear structural dividing line between corporate law and securities law in Australia.\(^9\) The merging and centralization of corporate and securities law in Australia has also paved the way for national, rather than state-based, regulators. Australia provides an interesting contrast in this regard with another common law jurisdiction, Canada, where the creation of a national regulator has proven extremely challenging from a constitutional perspective.\(^10\)

Australia operates under a ‘twin peaks’ model of financial regulation.\(^11\) Under this model, regulatory responsibility is shared between the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (‘APRA’) and the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (‘ASIC’). APRA supervises deposit-taking, general insurance, life insurance and superannuation institutions,\(^12\) and ASIC has responsibility for business conduct and consumer protection.


\(^7\) Attempts to harmonize Australian corporate law date back to at least the early 1960s, when the various states agreed to pass uniform Companies Acts. For a detailed discussion of the evolution of Australian corporate law in this regard, see Austin, R.P. and Ramsay, I.M., Ford, Austin and Ramsay’s Principles of Corporations Law (2015, 16\(^{th}\) ed., LexisNexis), [2.170].


\(^9\) This was not always the case. Several Australian states, beginning with New South Wales in 1970, enacted separate Securities Industry Acts during that decade, however, corporations and securities law later came to be combined in a single Act. See, e.g., Ford, H.A.J., Principles of Company Law (1978, Butterworths, Sydney), 515ff.

\(^10\) See Reference Re Securities Act, 2011 SCC 66; Dharamdial, J., ‘Prospects for cooperation in the Reference Re Securities Act, 2011 SCC 66’, The Court, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, 13 January 2012. Following the Canadian Supreme Court’s 2011 decision that the proposed Securities Act, which would have created a national securities regulator, was unconstitutional, the federal government launched another initiative in 2014, via a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) regarding the Cooperative Capital Markets System (MOA), to establish a pan-Canadian securities regulator. This initiative was also challenged in the courts. In May 2017, a majority of the Court of Appeal of Québec held that the MOA was unconstitutional. An appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was set down for hearing in early 2018. See Ritchie, L.E., Yalden, R.M. and Rankin, W.D, ‘Québec Court of Appeal finds aspects of the proposed co-operative capital markets model unconstitutional’, Osler, 12 May 2017; Secrétariat aux relations canadiennes, Québec, Reference Concerning the Constitutionality of the Implementation of Pan-Canadian Securities Regulation Under the Authority of a Single Regulator, 18 October 2017.


\(^12\) As at 30 June 2017, institutions over which APRA has supervisory responsibility held approximately $6.1 trillion in assets. See ‘About APRA’, APRA webpage at www.apra.gov.au/AboutAPRA/Pages/Default.aspx.
Although there is clear conceptual differentiation between the responsibilities of each agency, some overlap exists in the financial services area. It has also been argued that some responsibilities have blurred over time as a result of capital market developments and policy changes.

Other organizations within Australia’s financial market regulatory framework include the Reserve Bank of Australia, which controls monetary policy, systemic stability, and payments systems, and the Australian Securities Exchange (‘ASX’), which is the primary securities exchange. ASX is responsible for monitoring compliance with its operating rules (‘ASX Listing Rules’) and promoting corporate governance standards.

3. The Australian Market

3.1 Securities Markets

Australia has highly developed capital markets. Its capital markets were ranked fifth globally in the 2012 World Economic Forum Financial Development Report, on the basis of depth and strength, and eleventh in terms of size, according to the World Federation of Exchanges’ 2016 rankings. The financial sector is the largest contributor to Australia’s national output, generating $152 billion or almost 9 per cent of Australian output for the 2017 financial year.

ASX is consistently ranked among the top five exchanges globally in terms of capital raising. As of December 2017, there were 2,147 companies listed on ASX, composed of

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13 For a depiction of the modern divide between conduct and prudential regulation in Australia, see Financial System Inquiry, Interim Report (Commonwealth of Australia, 2014), Chapter 7, Figure 7.2.


18 The Financial Development Report is a wide-ranging index, which ranks countries according to ‘the strength of their financial markets, and the depth and breadth of access to capital and financial services’. ‘Financial Development Index’, The Economist, 11 September 2008.

19 This ranking was based on market capitalization of listed domestic companies See Index Mundi, Market Capitalization of Listed Domestic Companies (Current US$) – Country Ranking (based on World Federation of Exchanges database), https://www.indexmundi.com/facts/indicators/CM.MKT.LCAP.CD/rankings.


2,013 domestic and 134 foreign companies, and 128 wholesale and retail debt issuers. These companies have a combined market capitalization of $1.5 trillion. There has also been a steep rise in the number of foreign companies listed on ASX. These listings doubled in the four-year period to 2017. Technology listings, too, have risen sharply and, with over 200 listings, constituted the third largest ASX sector in 2017. According to ASX, it has also developed a listing ‘sweet spot’ for companies in the $50-500 million market capitalization range. In 2010, ASX created its own dark pool, ‘ASX Centre Point’, which has experienced strong trading growth since its launch. In addition to the market for corporate securities, ASX operates a number of markets for sophisticated institutional investors, including debt securities, futures and options markets, and warrants.

Australia has high levels of capital market investment by international standards. This is at least partly attributable to its distinctive system of retirement funding (‘superannuation’). According to The Economist, as a result of superannuation, ‘Aussies are now a nation of capitalists’. According to the 2017 ASX Australian Share Ownership Study, 37 per cent of Australia’s adult population participated in the Australian securities market by holding ‘on-exchange investments’, which comprise anything traded on an exchange, including derivatives. These figures do not include share ownership interests held

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25 Ibid.

26 Ibid.


31 ‘Super-duper supers: In Australia’s superannuation scheme, everyone’s a winner’, The Economist, 28 May 2011, 6.

through superannuation funds that are not self-managed funds. If such interests were included, the share ownership figure would be much higher in view of Australia’s compulsory superannuation system. As a result of its compulsory superannuation system, Australia maintains ‘the largest pool of funds under management in the Asia-Pacific region, and the third largest in the world’. Aggregate assets of Australian superannuation funds, much of which is invested directly or indirectly in equity and debt capital markets, were A$2.5 trillion as at September 2017, and are predicted to climb to A$6.1 trillion by 2035.

It is estimated that two groups - domestic institutional investors and international shareholders - each hold approximately 40 per cent of shares in Australian listed companies, with the balance held by households. It is also estimated that approximately two-thirds of foreign share investment is held by investment institutions, such as U.S. pension or mutual funds, and global investment funds, such as Fidelity and BlackRock. This suggests that around two-thirds of all quoted Australian shares are held by institutional investors.

Although historically there has been limited research into the extent of blockholding in Australia, a 2010 study found that for the sample period 2000-04, between 39-45 per cent higher among men (44 per cent) than women (31 per cent). See Deloitte Access Economics and ASX, ASX Australian Investor Study 2017, 21, https://www.asx.com.au/documents/resources/2017-asx-investor-study.pdf.

38 Super System Review Final Report, Part One, Overview and Recommendations (‘Cooper Review’) (June 2010), 5.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
of the top 200 companies ASX-listed (‘ASX 200’) had a 10 per cent or larger blockholder; 22-30 per cent had a 20 per cent or larger blockholder; and 8-9 per cent had an absolute controlling blockholder (that is, a 50% + blockholder).\textsuperscript{44} Despite this, the OECD describes Australia as having a predominantly ‘dispersed’ ownership structure,\textsuperscript{45} with institutional share ownership in Australia slightly lower than comparable countries such as the United Kingdom and the United States.\textsuperscript{46} According to the OECD’s 2017 Factbook, financial institutions own a majority of shares in the ASX 200, but their holdings rarely exceed 10 per cent.\textsuperscript{47}

The bond market is becoming an increasingly important source of corporate finance in Australia. The value of the private bond market as at 2017 was around $1.1 trillion,\textsuperscript{48} which was equivalent to approximately two-thirds of the equity value of companies listed on ASX.\textsuperscript{49} Non-government bonds dominate the market, though there has also been a notable rise in government bonds (particularly federal government bonds) since the global financial crisis.\textsuperscript{50} Financial institutions play an important intermediating role in the bond market. Almost half of private sector bonds are issued by these institutions, mainly banks.\textsuperscript{51} According to a 2014 report, the primary investors in the corporate bond market in Australia are superannuation funds and foreign investment corporations, with retail investors directly holding less than 1 per cent of the market.\textsuperscript{52}


\textsuperscript{45} OECD, \textit{Corporate Governance Factbook} 2017 (OECD 2017), 11, available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/Corporate-Governance-Factbook.pdf. According to the OECD Factbook, only four countries, Australia, Ireland, the United Kingdom and the United States are categorized as having predominantly dispersed ownership structures. Ibid.


\textsuperscript{47} OECD, \textit{Corporate Governance Factbook} 2017 (OECD 2017), 12, Table 1.1, available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/Corporate-Governance-Factbook.pdf.

\textsuperscript{48} This figure includes issuance by both financial and non-financial corporations. Kent, C., Assistant Governor (Financial Markets), Reserve Bank of Australia, \textit{Fixed Income Markets and the Economy}, The Bloomberg Address, Sydney, 9 August 2017.

\textsuperscript{49} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{50} Ibid, Graph 1.

\textsuperscript{51} Ibid.

3.1. Regulation and Enforcement of Corporate Law

3.1.1. Australian Securities and Investments Commission

ASIC occupies a central role in Australia’s corporate law regulatory framework. An independent agency of the Commonwealth Government, ASIC is the primary business conduct regulator, with responsibility for a wide range of corporate matters. It has a far broader remit than most comparable international regulators, and, according to the 2014 Financial System Inquiry (FSI), some of ASIC’s responsibilities are ‘unique’.

ASIC has primary responsibility for investigating and enforcing the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) (‘ASIC Act’) and the Corporations Act. The following provides a quick snapshot of its current operations. In the 2016-17 financial year, ASIC employed 1,641 staff members and was responsible for the oversight of 2,500,401 companies registered in Australia. During this period, ASIC completed 75 investigations and commenced 68 new investigations. ASIC received A$342 million in appropriation revenue from the Commonwealth Government in the 2016-17 financial year to support its activities. However, a major change to its funding arrangements occurred in mid-2017, when the Australian government passed new legislation introducing an industry funding model. Under this new model, the cost of ASIC’s activities will, in the future, be borne by the regulated entities themselves.

ASIC has broad regulatory and enforcement powers. The ASIC Act expressly directs the regulator, in performing its functions and exercising its powers, to take ‘whatever action it

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54 For a complete list of matters falling within ASIC’s mandate, see Financial System Inquiry, Interim Report (Commonwealth of Australia, July 2014), Chapter 7, Figure 7.3, 3-123.

55 Ibid at 3-122.


58 Ibid at 182.

59 Ibid at 31.

60 This revenue figure includes A$27 million from the Enforcement Special Account (ESA). Ibid at 26.


can take, and is necessary, in order to enforce and give effect to the corporations legislation. ASIC’s powers include the power to conduct oral examinations, issue notices to produce books and documents, and apply for a search warrant to seize books. ASIC may give a copy of a written record of the oral examination and any related books to a person’s lawyer, if the lawyer satisfies ASIC that the person is carrying on, or is contemplating in good faith, a proceeding that relates to the examination. The purpose is to ‘enable the fruits of [ASIC’s] compulsory examination to be made available for use in civil litigation’.

Enforcement actions by ASIC can serve a variety of goals, including deterrence, punishment, investor protection, preservation of assets, corrective disclosure and compensation. Where there is a contravention of a law it administers, ASIC has said that it will pursue the enforcement remedies most suited to its regulatory goals in any given case. ASIC has a wide range of options in this regard. It can, for example:

- Refer matters to the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (‘CDPP’) for criminal prosecution;
- Apply to the court under the civil penalty regime for declarations of contravention, pecuniary penalty orders, or compensation orders for contravention of the civil penalty provisions of the Corporations Act;
- Bring civil proceedings on behalf of investors for recovery;
- Bring civil proceedings for injunctive or other relief;
- Obtain enforceable undertakings;

Securities and Investments Commission [2010] NSWCA 331, [725] (discussing the range of powers conferred on ASIC in connection with enforcement).

64 ASIC Act, s 1(2)(g).
65 ASIC Act, ss 19, 29, 30, 33 and 35.
66 ASIC Act, s 25(1).
68 See generally ASIC, Information Sheet 151, ASIC’s Approach to Enforcement, September 2013.
69 ASIC, Information Sheet 151, ASIC’s Approach to Enforcement, September 2013, 4. For discussion of factors that ASIC will take into account in deciding which remedy to pursue, see Table 2, ibid at 8-9.
71 The CDPP is an independent prosecuting agency, established under the Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1983 (Cth). It does not have investigative powers or functions. The decision to investigate matters and the decision to refer matters to the CDPP is a decision for the relevant referring agency (such as ASIC, APRA or the Australian Federal Police). See CDPP, Prosecution Policy of the Commonwealth: Guidelines for the Making of Decisions in the Prosecution Process, [1.1] – [1.3].
• Issue infringement notices;
• Issue stop orders;
• Make a banning order against a person; and
• Apply to a court for a disqualification order against a person.

In criminal matters, ASIC’s role is generally confined to investigation because the decision to lay criminal charges under the Corporations Act or the ASIC Act lies with the CDPP.\(^72\)

ASIC has standing to bring or intervene in various types of civil proceedings,\(^73\) including injunctive relief\(^74\) and to bring proceedings in the name of a third party, if as a result of an investigation or examination, this appears to be in the public interest.\(^75\) Administrative options may be utilized in connection with enforcement, including ASIC’s power to issue stop orders\(^76\) and infringement notices,\(^77\) to accept enforceable undertakings,\(^78\) to vary, suspend or cancel an Australian Financial Services licence,\(^79\) or to make orders excluding person from the financial services industry.\(^80\)

Enforceable undertakings constitute a form of negotiated resolution, distinct from litigation, administrative actions, or infringement notices.\(^81\) However, ASIC Regulatory Guide 100 notes that ASIC will use only use this form of settlement if it considers that an enforceable undertaking provides ‘a more effective regulatory outcome’ than non-negotiated

\(^72\) See ASIC Act, s 49. Primary responsibility for criminal prosecution lies with the CDPP, in accordance with a Memorandum of Understanding between the CDPP and ASIC. See Redmond, P., Corporations and Financial Markets Law (7th ed., 2017), [11.115]; Memorandum of Understanding: Australian Securities and Investments Commission and Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecution, 1 March 2006, [5.1]. However, ASIC itself has power to prosecute certain minor regulatory offences. ASIC, Information Sheet 151, ASIC’s Approach to Enforcement, September 2013, 5.

\(^73\) See Corporations Act, s 1330.

\(^74\) Corporations Act, s 1324; ASIC Act, s 12GD. See, e.g., Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Sweeney [2001] NSWSC 114; Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Pegasus Leveraged Options Group Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 310.

\(^75\) ASIC Act, s 50.

\(^76\) Used to prevent the dissemination of, and issue of securities or financial products pursuant to, defective disclosure documents: Corporations Act, s 739 (disclosure documents issued under Ch 6D) and s 1020E (for Product Disclosure Statements issued under Pt 7.9). See also Thompson v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2002) 117 FCR 159.

\(^77\) See ASIC, Information Sheet 151, ASIC’s Approach to Enforcement, September 2013, 7. Part 9.4AA of the Corporations Act allows for the issue by ASIC of infringement notices for alleged contraventions of the continuous disclosure provisions in ss 674 and 675 of the Corporations Act.

\(^78\) ASIC Act, s 93AA.

\(^79\) Corporations Act, ss 914A, 915B and 915C.

\(^80\) Corporations Act, Part 7.6, Div. 8.

\(^81\) ASIC, Information Sheet 151, ASIC’s Approach to Enforcement, September 2013, 6-7.
sanctions. ASIC will not consider an enforceable undertaking unless it has reason to believe that a relevant contravention has occurred and has commenced an investigation. Enforceable undertakings are not used ‘to forestall an investigation’.83

When ASIC selects litigation as the preferred enforcement mechanism, it has a very high success rate. In 2016-17, for example, ASIC was successful in 90 per cent of criminal litigation and 91 per cent of civil litigation.84 It is noteworthy, however, that, even though ASIC has power to bring compensation proceedings to recover damages or property on behalf of affected consumers,85 it rarely commences such proceedings, preferring instead to rely on other regulatory tools or to encourage the affected parties to take private legal action themselves.86 A high profile exception to this general approach occurred in 2010 when ASIC initiated litigation against several major Australian banks,87 to recover compensation for investors, who had suffered significant losses due to the collapse of Storm Financial.88 Nonetheless, in spite of ASIC’s general reluctance to seek compensation orders in litigation, the regulator often extracts consumer and credit compensation by other means, through, for example, negotiated agreements.89

ASIC plays a particularly important role in Australia’s civil penalty regime.90 Under this distinctive regime, which was introduced into the Corporations Act in 1993, ASIC is the

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82 ASIC, Regulatory Guide 100, February 2015, RG 100.18.

83 Ibid at 100.17.


85 ASIC Act, s 50.

86 See ASIC, Information Sheet 151, ASIC’s Approach to Enforcement, September 2013, 3, stating that ASIC uses its enforcement powers, inter alia, to ‘recover money in appropriate circumstances’ [emphasis added]. See also ibid at 6, highlighting the fact that, rather than seeking compensation on behalf of investors who have suffered loss, ASIC will often encourage them to take private legal action.


88 For background to the collapse of Storm Financial, see Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services, Inquiry into Financial Products and Services in Australia, November 2009, [3.23] – [3.32]. The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services acknowledged the ‘catastrophic’ effect that Storm’s collapse had on many investors. See Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services, Inquiry into Financial Products and Services in Australia, November 2009, [3.1] – [3.2]. The worst affected investors were double-gear Storm clients, who had not been given the opportunity to respond to margin calls. Ibid at [3.1]. The consequences of Storm’s collapse on these investors in particular were ‘financially and emotionally devastating’. Ibid at [3.5].


primary enforcement mechanism for contravention of so-called ‘civil penalty provisions’. These include provisions concerning statutory directors’ duties, related party rules, insolvent trading provisions, continuous disclosure requirements, and market misconduct offences, such as market manipulation and insider trading.91

ASIC’s role in enforcing statutory directors’ duties under the civil penalty regime has received particular attention, since it has made Australia an outlier to some other major common law jurisdictions.92 Whereas, for example, the United States and the United Kingdom rely primarily on a private enforcement model for breach of directors’ duties,93 Australia’s civil penalty regime relies mainly on public enforcement by ASIC.94 As a result, it is now widely accepted that the Australian statutory directors’ duties themselves have a ‘public’ nature.95 Enforcement tools and remedies currently available to ASIC under the civil penalty regime include: (i) pecuniary penalties (of up to A$200,000 for an individual and A$1 million for corporations);96 (ii) compensation orders;97 and (iii) disqualification orders.98

Although ASIC has power to seek compensation orders for breach of statutory directors’ duties under the civil penalty regime, data on its remedy choice supports the view that ASIC’s regulatory goal is not to obtain compensation for individual shareholder losses, and criminal liability, although the boundaries have tended to become increasingly blurred over time. See, e.g., Rich v ASIC (2004) 50 ACSR 242; Re Chemeq Ltd (ACN 009 135 264); ASIC v Chemeq Ltd (2006) 234 ALR 511, [90].

91 For a complete list of sections of the Corporations Act that operate as civil penalty provisions, see the table in Corporations Act, s 1317E(1). See, for example, items 1 (officers’ duties); item 3 (related parties rules); item 14 (continuous disclosure); item 15 (market integrity rules); item 41 (market manipulation); items 42 – 43 (false trading and market rigging); item 45 (insider trading).


96 Corporations Act, s 1317G.

97 Corporations Act, ss 1317H and 1317HA.

98 Corporations Act, s 206C.
but rather to secure ‘maximum voluntary compliance’.99 This data shows that ASIC seeks pecuniary penalty and disqualification orders far more often than it seeks compensation orders.100 This remedy pattern accords with ASIC’s self-image as a protector of the ‘public interest’.101 It is also consistent with the view that companies, shareholders and other persons who have sustained losses, possess important self-help options. For example, companies that have suffered harm can apply for compensation orders under the civil penalty regime,102 and affected individuals can bring private legal proceedings via statutory derivative suits103 or class actions, which are discussed in detail later in this chapter.

Notwithstanding the apparently broad regulatory tools and enforcement powers considered above, it has been argued in recent years that ASIC lacks some key investigatory powers104 and has been hampered by the relatively low civil and administrative penalties it can pursue, compared to other international regulators.105 For example, the power to order disgorgement is considered to be an important deterrent, as it prevents unjust enrichment. Unlike many of its regulatory peers, ASIC currently lacks power to order disgorgement.106

The Final Report of Australian Government’s Financial System Inquiry (‘FSI’), which was released in December 2014, agreed that there were some significant weaknesses in the regulatory tools at ASIC’s disposal.107 This report made a number of recommendations designed to address these concerns and to strengthen ASIC’s enforcement role, particularly in


102 See Corporations Act, ss 1317J(2) and (3).

103 See Corporations Act, Part 2F.1A. For background to the introduction of a statutory derivative suit in Australia and discussion of the preconditions that need to be satisfied for such an action to be brought, see Redmond, P., Corporations and Financial Markets Law (7th ed., 2017), [8.100].


105 A 2014 report by ASIC, which formed the basis for its submission to the Australian Government’s 2014 Financial Services Inquiry, found, for example, that penalties for corporate misconduct available to some other Australian regulators and to comparable international regulators were both broader and higher than those at ASIC’s disposal. See ASIC, Penalties for Corporate Wrongdoing, Report 387, March 2014, 5-6.

106 ASIC has stated that disgorgement is an important deterrent, which prevents unjust enrichment. Ibid at 19, [66]. For discussion of ASIC’s lack of power to order disgorgement, in contrast to regulators in Canada, Hong Kong, the United Kingdom and the United States, see, ibid, 19-21; Financial System Inquiry, Interim Report (Commonwealth of Australia, 2014), Chapter 7, 3-125 and Table 7.2, 3-125.

relation to financial market consumer protection. The report’s recommendations included the need for: improved funding arrangements (which have now been implemented via industry funding); stronger regulatory tools, including the power to order disgorgement; and significantly higher criminal and civil penalties. A Commonwealth government Senate Committee, reached a similar conclusion in 2014. This committee highlighted the need for ASIC to have sufficient enforcement tools to ensure that it is ‘respected and feared’ by the business community. Reform proposals to give effect to this aspiration are currently underway in Australia.

3.1.2. Australian Securities Exchange

Under its listing agreement with ASX, each entity admitted to the ASX official list is contractually bound to ASX to comply with the ASX Listing Rules, including the continuous disclosure obligations and the periodic reporting obligations.

In contrast with ASIC, ASX has limited investigatory and enforcement powers over listed entities. If ASX suspects a contravention of the ASX Listing Rules, it may request that an entity provide ASX with any information, document or explanation about that matter within the timeframe specified by ASX, which may be released to the market. However, ASX has no power to fine or impose any other criminal or civil penalties for breach of the ASX Listing Rules. If a listed entity refuses to comply with its obligations under the listing rules, ASX may suspend trading in its securities, in extreme cases terminate its listing, or obtain a court order requiring the entity to comply with its obligations under the ASX Listing Rules. To the extent that ASX suspects a serious contravention of the ASX Listing

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109 Ibid at 236, 250-252.

109 See The Senate, Economics References Committee, Performance of the Australian Securities Investments Commission, Commonwealth of Australia, June 2014, xxi, 454, [28.8]. The Senate Committee’s review, which was released in mid-2014, was particularly critical of ASIC. The review described it as a ‘timid, hesitant regulator, too ready and willing to accept uncritically the assurances of a large institution that there were no grounds for ASIC’s concerns or intervention’. Ibid at xviii.


112 Corporations Act, ss 793B and 793C.

113 See, in particular, ASX Listing Rule 3.1 which requires immediate disclosure by a listed entity of certain price sensitive information, See ASX Listing Rules, Chapter 3.

114 See ASX Listing Rules, Chapters 4 and 5.

115 ASX Listing Rule 18.7.

116 ASX Listing Rule 18.7A.

117 ASX Listing Rule 17.3.1.

118 ASX Listing Rule 17.12.

119 Corporations Act, s 1101B.
Rules or the *Corporations Act*, it is required to give a notice to ASIC with details of the contravention.\(^{120}\)

### 4. Investor Protection - Legal Framework

The civil penalty regime under the *Corporations Act* has important implications for investor protection. Since 2001, the civil penalty regime has included a range of financial services provisions which provide enhanced protection for investors.\(^{121}\) These financial services provisions capture, *inter alia*, continuous disclosure.\(^{122}\) Any person who ‘suffers damage in relation to a contravention of a financial services civil penalty provision may apply for a compensation order.’\(^{123}\) Furthermore, under s 1041H of the *Corporations Act* (which imposes civil liability, but is not itself a civil penalty provision),\(^{124}\) a person is prohibited from engaging in misleading or deceptive conduct in relation to a financial product or service. Any person found liable under these provisions may be subject to a compensation order if the defendant has contravened a financial services civil penalty provision and the damage resulted from the contravention.\(^{125}\) Shareholders, if they are to succeed in a claim for compensation, must therefore prove that a provision has been contravened, damage has resulted, and the damage was caused by the contravention.

These provisions are subject to both private and public enforcement mechanisms. Under the *Corporations Act* and the *ASIC Act*, shareholders have standing to seek compensation on their own behalf, by way of either a statutory derivative suit or a class action.\(^{126}\) ASIC also has standing to enforce contraventions of civil penalty provisions,\(^{127}\) including the ability to seek a compensation order for the benefit of the relevant company,\(^{128}\) or, in certain circumstances, other persons affected by contraventions, including contraventions of the continuous disclosure provisions.\(^{129}\) However, as noted earlier, recovery

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120 *Corporations Act*, s 792B(2)(c).


122 *Corporations Act*, ss 674(2), (2A), 675(2), (2A).

123 *Corporations Act*, s 1317J(3A). However, under the civil penalty provisions applying to corporations, only ASIC or a corporation, or responsible entity, may apply for a compensation order: *Corporations Act*, ss 1317J(1) and 1317J(2).

124 See *ASIC v Fortescue Metals Group Ltd* (2011) 190 FCR 364, [10].

125 *Corporations Act*, s 1317HA(1).

126 Shareholders have standing to bring a statutory derivative action under Part 2F.1A of the *Corporations Act*. However, while a class action results in compensation directly to the shareholder, a derivative action, if successful, results in any damages or compensation being for the benefit of the company with only an indirect benefit accruing to the shareholder.

127 *Corporations Act*, Section 1317J(1).

128 *Corporations Act*, s 1317H.

129 See *Corporations Act*, s 1325(2).
of compensation does not appear to be the foremost priority in ASIC’s general enforcement strategy.

4.1. Continuous Disclosure

Corporate disclosure can be either mandatory or voluntary.\(^{130}\) Mandatory corporate disclosure has become an ‘ubiquitous’ feature of current corporate regulation.\(^{131}\) This is in spite of criticism of its alleged overuse and the growing recognition, both internationally and in Australia, of its limitations as a regulatory tool.\(^{132}\)

Mandatory disclosure is underpinned by a variety of policy rationales.\(^{133}\) One of the most important of these is protection of investors, particularly unsophisticated investors.\(^{134}\) Other rationales include maintaining and restoring market trust and confidence,\(^{135}\) promoting market egalitarianism, and combating fraud.\(^{136}\) These generic policy goals lie close to the surface of Australia's continuous disclosure regime.\(^{137}\) The aim of ensuring fair and efficient markets is of particular contemporary significance, given the high levels of investment in Australian capital markets as a result of superannuation.\(^{138}\)

The continuous disclosure regime first came into effect in 1994\(^ {139}\) and constitutes a key regulatory mechanism for ensuring that public company investors in Australia are

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131 See Ben-Shahar, O. and Schneider, C.E., ‘The Failure of Mandated Disclosure’ (2011) 159 U Pa L Rev 647, 660. For discussion of why mandatory disclosure appeals to lawmakers, see ibid, 682-83.


134 It has been said, for example, that mandatory disclosure seeks to safeguard ‘the naïve from the sophisticated’. Ben-Shahar, O. and Schneider, C.E., ‘The Failure of Mandated Disclosure’ (2011) 159 U Pa L Rev 647, 649. See also Hill, J.G., ‘Images of the Shareholder – Shareholder Power and Shareholder Powerlessness’ in Hill, J.G. and Thomas, R.S., eds., Research Handbook on Shareholder Power (Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2015), 53.


adequately informed on a timely basis. The regime was designed to provide a comprehensive statutory system for the timely disclosure of market sensitive information. Its introduction was a response to loss of investor confidence following corporate misconduct in the 1980s and the stock market collapse of 1987. One of ASIC’s Commissioners has described continuous disclosure by listed companies in Australia as ‘a bedrock of market integrity’.

Australia’s continuous disclosure regime comprises a combination of securities exchange listing requirements and statutory provisions. The centrepiece of the regime is ASX Listing Rule 3.1, which requires a listed corporation to disclose market sensitive information concerning its securities to ASX immediately upon becoming aware of the information. Statutory backing for this requirement is provided under s 674(2), which appears in Chapter 6CA of the Corporations Act. The regime has been described as ‘protective legislation,’ which should, therefore, be construed in a way that is beneficial to the public. It is worth noting that the continuous disclosure regime is also beneficial to corporate insiders, because it provides a mechanism for sharing price sensitive information to

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145 See ASX Listing Rules, Guidance Note 8 – Continuous Disclosure: Listing Rules 3.1-3.1B, December 2016, [4.1]-[4.5].

146 Chapter 6CA is entitled ‘Continuous Disclosure’. Chapter 6CA commenced operation in 2002. Subsequent amendments to the provisions came into effect on 1 July 2004. Section 674(2) of the Corporations Act imposes a statutory obligation to disclose information in accordance with listing rules. However, s 674 only requires disclosure of information that is ‘not generally available’. Section 676 specifies when information is (or by implication, is not) ‘generally available’.

the market, which allows insiders to trade without fear of breaching insider trading prohibitions under the *Corporations Act*.\(^{148}\)

The continuous disclosure regime provides an interesting contrast with a number of other jurisdictions. As Martin C.J. noted in *Jubilee Mines NL v Riley*,\(^ {149}\) Australia’s corporate disclosure regime is ‘materially different’ to disclosure regimes in the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States.\(^ {150}\) In the United States,\(^ {151}\) for example, securities law has historically been based on periodic,\(^ {152}\) rather than immediate, disclosure.\(^ {153}\) This theoretically provides corporate managers with considerable discretion over the timing of corporate disclosures, though there are some notable constraints on this discretion.\(^ {154}\) Many jurisdictions, including the United States, have listing rules that contain a continuous disclosure requirement.\(^ {155}\) The New York Stock Exchange rules, for example, create a continuing obligation for corporations trading on the exchange to release all material information.\(^ {156}\) Yet, enforcement of this rule is weak, with no right to a private cause of action for violation.\(^ {157}\)

Australia’s continuous disclosure regime, however, has far more regulatory bite,\(^ {158}\) at least in theory, due to the fact that it is a ‘co-regulatory’ scheme between ASX and ASIC.\(^ {159}\)


\(^{153}\) See, for example, SEC, *Proposed Rule: Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading*, Release Nos. 33-7787, 34-42259, IC-24209 (Dec 20, 1999), stating that ‘the federal securities laws do not generally require an issuer to make public disclosure of all important corporate developments when they occur. Periodic reports…call for disclosure of specified information on a regular basis’.


\(^{155}\) See Golding, G. and Kalfus, N., ibid, 385, 412.

\(^{156}\) See New York Stock Exchange Listed Company Manual, 202.05.


\(^{158}\) See generally Boros, E. and Duns, J., *Corporate Law* (3rd ed., Oxford University Press), [15.5.1]. Nonetheless, some scholars have at times criticized enforcement of the continuous disclosure regime. See, for
This provides the listing rules with the full statutory backing of the Corporations Act, and raises the spectre of enforcement by ASIC under the civil penalty regime.

In spite of the *prima facie* breadth and stringency of Australia’s continuous disclosure regime, it should be noted that the scheme includes some important exemptions, or carve-outs, which provide management with considerable discretion concerning disclosure.\(^{160}\) These exceptions, which are contained in ASX Listing Rule 3.1A, represent an acknowledgement of the need to balance policy justifications for a high level of disclosure as expected by investors and regulators, with the ‘legitimate commercial interests’ of listed corporations and their security holders.\(^{161}\)

The exceptions have been the subject of strong criticism, with one financial commentator describing them as a ‘Handbook for Keeping Shareholders in the Dark’.\(^{162}\) Some of the exceptions are vague;\(^{163}\) others, such as an exception for information relating to an ‘incomplete proposal or negotiation’,\(^{164}\) effectively allow management itself to determine the timing of disclosure.\(^{165}\) One of the conditions for exemption from the continuous example, North, G., ‘A Call for a Bold and Effective Corporate Disclosure Regulatory Framework’ (2010) 28 Company and Securities Law Journal 331.

159 See North, G., ibid, 333. The co-regulatory model is underpinned by a Memorandum of Understanding between ASIC and ASX. See Memorandum of Understanding between Australian Securities and Investments Commission and ASX Limited ABN 98 008 691 (October 2011). See also North, G., ‘The Corporate Disclosure Co-regulatory Model: Dysfunctional and Rules in Limbo’ (2009) 37 Australian Business Law Review 75, who argues that the co-regulatory model is ‘deeply flawed’ due to the dual status of ASX as both a market operator and co-regulator.


161 See ASX Listing Rules, Guidance Note 8 – Continuous Disclosure: Listing Rules 3.1 - 3.1B, 19 December 2016, [5.1].


163 For example, ‘[t]he information comprises matters of supposition or is insufficiently definite to warrant disclosure’ (ASX Listing Rule 3.1A.1).

164 ASX Listing Rule 3.1A.1.

disclosure obligation is that the information must be ‘confidential,’ and loss of confidentiality will undo exempt status. Some Australian cases have stated that the purpose of the continuous disclosure regime is to ensure that the market is ‘fully informed.’ However, given the disclosure exceptions, it has been argued that the conceptual basis of the regime is not, in fact, full disclosure, but rather, ‘fairness.’ Several cases adopt this interpretation, asserting that the regime is designed to promote a level playing field by ensuring ‘equal access’ to information and preventing ‘selective disclosure of market sensitive information.’

Selective disclosure of confidential information surfaced as a hot topic in Australia, following the Newcrest Mining Ltd (‘Newcrest’) scandal. In mid-2014, ASIC commenced legal proceedings against Newcrest in the Federal Court of Australia (‘Federal Court’), alleging that Newcrest had selectively disclosed confidential information to analysts. ASIC argued that this disclosure resulted in loss of confidentiality, which then deprived the company of protection under the exceptions to continuous disclosure.

The Federal Court accepted this argument and held that Newcrest had become obliged to give detailed disclosure to the ASX under s 674(2) of the Corporations Act following loss of confidentiality due to the briefings. In finding that Newcrest had breached s 674(2), Justice Middleton emphasized the ‘fairness’ rationale for continuous disclosure, stating that ‘equal access to market sensitive information is paramount in ensuring that markets operate on an informed, and equally informed, basis.’ ‘Fairness’ also emerged as one of the guiding principles for financial market regulation in the final report of the Financial System Inquiry in 2014.

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166 ASX Listing Rules, Guidance Note 8 – Continuous Disclosure: Listing Rules 3.1 - 3.1B, 19 December 2016, [5.8].
167 See, e.g., ASIC v Newcrest Mining Ltd [2014] FCA 698, [30]-[34].
171 See, e.g., ASIC v Southcorp Ltd [2003] FCA 1369, [2].
174 ASIC v Newcrest Mining Ltd [2014] FCA 698, [30]-[34].
175 Ibid at [87].
Breach of the continuous disclosure regime by a listed company can result in serious consequences, and several cases have tied the stringency of the penalties for breach to the underlying importance of the regime. Under s 674(2) of the Corporations Act, which is a financial services civil penalty provision, each contravention can attract a pecuniary penalty, payable to the Commonwealth Government, of up to A$1 million. It has been said that these penalties are ‘punitive,’ rather than ‘protective,’ in nature. In ASIC v Newcrest Mining Ltd, Justice Middleton imposed a total of A$1.2 million in penalties with respect to two contraventions by Newcrest of s 674(2). According to the judge, ‘general deterrence’ was the primary consideration in fixing the penalty. Alternatively, ASIC has power to issue infringement notices for alleged contraventions of the continuous disclosure provisions, with penalties of up to A$100,000. Breach of s 674(2) is also a criminal offence. In addition to proceedings initiated by ASIC, actions for compensation may be brought by shareholders, either individually, or more commonly, by way of class actions.

Although the primary obligation is on the entity itself, breach of mandatory disclosure obligations by a listed corporation can also have severe consequences for its directors and officers. First, they may themselves breach s 674(2A) if they are ‘involved in’ the contravention. Involvement in contraventions is defined in s 79 of the Corporations Act to mean any person who has: (a) aided, abetted, counselled or procured the contravention; (b) induced, whether by threats or promises or otherwise, the contravention; (c) been in any way, 

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179 See ss1317G(1A) and 1317G(1B)(b). For discussion of the consequences generally of breach of the civil penalty regime, see Austin, R.P. and Ramsay, I.M., Ford, Austin and Ramsay’s Principles of Corporations Law (2015, 16th ed., LexisNexis), [3.390]-[3.400].
182 Middleton J. imposed a penalty of A$800,000 for the first contravention and A$400,000 for the second contravention. He considered that a lower penalty was justified for the second contravention, on the basis that it was a less serious breach and the information disclosed was less sensitive than in the case of the first contravention. Ibid at [83]-[84].
183 Ibid at [87]. For factors relevant to the level of penalty for breach of the continuous disclosure regime, see also Re Chemeq Ltd (ACN 009 135 264): ASIC v Chemeq Ltd (2006) 234 ALR 511, [90]-[99].
185 Corporations Act, ss 1311(1) and 1311(2).
187 Boros, E. and Duns, J, Corporate Law (3rd ed. 2013), [15.5.1(a)].
by act or omission, directly or indirectly, knowingly concerned in, or party to, the contravention; or (d) conspired with others to effect the contravention. Therefore, if a corporate body breaches these rules, any officer knowingly concerned in the breach is potentially liable for damages. Breach of s 674 (2A) exposes directors and officers to a penalty of up to $200,000 under the financial services civil penalty provisions. In these circumstances, they may also be liable to compensate persons who have suffered loss or damage as a result of their breach.\textsuperscript{188}

Perhaps the most significant contemporary development in relation to the liability of company directors and officers relates to what has been termed ‘stepping stone’ liability.\textsuperscript{189} The stepping stone approach to liability is a two-step process, whereby the courts may impose liability on company directors and officers for failure to prevent a corporate contravention of the law.\textsuperscript{190} There are a number of recent cases in which ASIC has brought civil penalty proceedings against directors or officers for a breach of the statutory duty of care under s 180(1) of the Corporations Act,\textsuperscript{191} using as the first step a contravention of s 674(2), or other mandatory disclosure duties, or breach of s 1041H, the misleading and deceptive conduct provision.\textsuperscript{192} Judicial acceptance of stepping stone liability in Australia has greatly increased the potential liability exposure of directors and officers for contraventions of the law by their corporations.

4.2. Misleading or Deceptive Conduct

Quality is just as important as quantity when it comes to corporate information. Investor protection demands, not only that disclosure be complete, but also that it be accurate.\textsuperscript{193} The notional benefits of mandatory disclosure would be subverted unless companies were prohibited from making bogus statements and announcements. Section 1041H of the Corporations Act fulfils this role by proscribing misleading or deceptive conduct in relation to a financial product or a financial service.

\textsuperscript{188} Corporations Act, s 1317HA.


\textsuperscript{191} See, for example, ASIC v Fortescue Metals Group Ltd (2011) 190 FCR 364, [10]; ASIC v Cassimatis (No 8) [2016] FCA 1023. Section 180(1) of the Corporations Act is itself a civil penalty provision.


4.2.1. Background

The original source of the prohibitions on misleading or deceptive conduct was section 52 of the *Trade Practices Act 1974* (Cth) as it was formerly known, a general consumer protection provision applying to misleading or deceptive conduct in trade or commerce. A shareholder successfully sued under this provision in *Fraser v NRMA Holdings Ltd* based on misleading statements made in the context of the demutualization of NRMA. Subsequently, specific prohibitions on misleading or deceptive conduct in various contexts were adopted in the *Corporations Act*, including conduct that is otherwise misleading or deceptive in relation to securities, takeover documents and fundraising documents. However, the case law on section 52 remains applicable.

4.2.2. Statutory Cause of Action

The misleading or deceptive conduct provisions in relation to financial services or a financial product are provided for in s 1041H of the *Corporations Act* and s 12DA of the *ASIC Act*. Section 1041I of the *Corporations Act* and Section 12GF(1) of the *ASIC Act* provide that a person who suffers loss or damage by conduct in contravention of section 1041H or section 12DA, respectively, may recover the amount of loss or damage by action against the person contravening the section or against any person involved in the contravention. The duties under the provisions cannot be excluded by means of a waiver or exclusion clause.

194 *Trade Practices Act 1974* (Cth), s 52 provided: ‘a corporation must not, in trade or commerce, engage in conduct that is misleading or deceptive or is likely to mislead or deceive.’

195 The former s 52 of the *Trade Practices Act 1974* (Cth) is now found in Schedule 2, s 18 of the *Competition and Consumer Act 2010* (Cth).


197 And false or misleading conduct in relation to financial services was removed from the ambit of the *Trade Practices Act 1974* (Cth), s 51AF(2).

198 *Corporations Act*, s 1041H; *ASIC Act*, s 12DA.

199 *Corporations Act*, s 670A.

200 *Corporations Act*, s 728.

201 See *National Exchange Pty Ltd v ASIC* (2004) 49 ACSR 369, [18]; *Rawley Pty Ltd v Bell* (No. 2) (2007) 61 ACSR 648, [37].

202 A similar provision relating to false or misleading statements is found in *Corporations Act*, s 1041E. However, that section requires deliberate, negligent or reckless conduct, whereas s 1041H imposes liability without any requirement of fault.

203 *Corporations Act*, s 1041H(1) provides: ‘a person must not, in this jurisdiction, engage in conduct, in relation to a financial product or a financial service, that is misleading or deceptive or is likely to mislead or deceive.’

204 *ASIC Act*, s 12DA provides: ‘a person must not, in trade or commerce, engage in conduct in relation to a financial service that is misleading or deceptive or is likely to mislead or deceive.’


206 See, e.g., *Petera Pty Ltd v EAJ Pty Ltd* (1985) 7 FCR 375.
provisions that may limit liability arising from a breach of the misleading or deceptive conduct provisions.\textsuperscript{207}

Section 670A of the \textit{Corporations Act} contains a prohibition on providing various takeover documents if there is a misleading or deceptive statement in the document. Section 728(1) of the \textit{Corporations Act} provides that a person is prohibited from offering securities under a disclosure document where there is a misleading or deceptive statement in the disclosure document, any application form accompanying the disclosure document, or any other document that contains the offer. However, unlike a contravention of s 1041H or s 12DA, a number of defences are available with respect to both provisions.\textsuperscript{208}

\subsection*{4.2.3. Proving Misleading or Deceptive Conduct}

The expression ‘misleading or deceptive’ is not defined in any of relevant legislation, however, courts have indicated that it has the same meaning across the statutory provisions.\textsuperscript{209} Whether conduct is misleading or deceptive, or is likely to mislead or deceive, is an objective question of fact to be determined by the court.\textsuperscript{210} In a general sense, conduct is likely to mislead or deceive if there is a real, but not remote, possibility of it doing so.\textsuperscript{211} Conduct may include silence where the context requires disclosure to avoid a person being misled or deceived.\textsuperscript{212} Forecasts and forward-looking statements fall within the scope of the provision.\textsuperscript{213} A person is taken to make a misleading statement about a future matter if they do not have reasonable grounds for making the statement.\textsuperscript{214} Merely causing confusion is insufficient to render the conduct or statement misleading or deceptive.\textsuperscript{215}

While conduct that was intended to mislead or deceive would fall within the scope of these provisions, there is no general requirement to prove intention.\textsuperscript{216} The provisions are drafted to focus on the consequences of the misleading statement rather than the contravener’s state of mind.\textsuperscript{217}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{207} See, e.g., s 1044B (limit of liability based on any applicable State or Territory professional standards law) and ss 1041L and 1041N (application of proportionate liability to damages claims under s 1041I or breach of s 1041H).
  \item \textsuperscript{208} \textit{Corporations Act}, ss 670D, 731, 732, 733.
  \item \textsuperscript{209} \textit{GPG (Australia Trading) Pty Ltd v GIO Australia Holdings Ltd} (2001) 117 FCR 23, [100].
  \item \textsuperscript{210} See \textit{Parkdale Custom Built Furniture Pty Ltd v Puxu Pty Ltd} (1982) 149 CLR 191, 198-99.
  \item \textsuperscript{211} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{213} See \textit{ASIC v PFS Business Development Group Pty Ltd} (2006) 57 ACSR 553, [365], [369]; \textit{Downey v Carlson Hotels Asia Pacific Pty Ltd} [2005] QCA 199 (unreported, Queensland Court of Appeal, 10 June 2005) [124].
  \item \textsuperscript{214} \textit{Corporations Act}, ss 670A(2), 728(2); \textit{ASIC Act}, s 12BB(1).
  \item \textsuperscript{215} \textit{Parkdale Custom Built Furniture Pty Ltd v Puxu Pty Ltd} (1982) 149 CLR 191.
  \item \textsuperscript{216} \textit{National Exchange Pty Ltd v ASIC} (2004) 49 ACSR 369, [27]-[28].
  \item \textsuperscript{217} \textit{Hornsby Building Information Centre Pty Ltd v Sydney Building Information Centre Ltd} (1978) 140 CLR 216, 228; \textit{Brown v Jam Factory Pty Ltd} (1981) 53 FLR 340, 348; \textit{ASIC v Online Investors Advantage Inc.} [2005] QSC 324 (unreported, Supreme Court of Queensland, 26 October 2005) [138].
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
A contravention of these provisions does not result in criminal liability, but compensation may be payable to a person for loss or damages suffered as a result of a breach. To obtain compensation, a claimant must establish a causal relationship between the alleged misleading or deceptive conduct and any loss or damage suffered. The relevant conduct must be a material cause of the plaintiff being misled or deceived, but does not necessarily have to be the primary or only cause. If the shareholder does not prove causation, he or she will not be entitled to compensation for any losses suffered.

As with a breach of the continuous disclosure regime, liability for civil damages for misleading or deceptive conduct is potentially broad, reaching any person who is ‘involved in’ the contravention. In *ASIC v Citrofresh International Ltd (No 2)*, which is an example of ‘stepping stone’ liability discussed above, the Federal Court held that the managing director of a company breached his duty of care under s 180(1) of the *Corporations Act* by authorising and facilitating a company to make a misleading and deceptive ASX announcement.

Similar to actions relating to continuous disclosure breaches, actions for breach of the misleading and deceptive conduct provisions are likely to be more viable when brought as a class action. In many cases, the same conduct will involve a breach of both the continuous disclosure provisions and the provisions prohibiting false or misleading conduct. For example, in *ASIC v Fortescue Metals Group Ltd* the Full Federal Court held that the making of a misleading statement could give rise to an obligation under the continuous disclosure provisions to correct it. However, as the Full Federal Court decision on liability was overturned on appeal to the High Court, it was unnecessary for the High Court to express a view on the relationship between the continuous disclosure and misleading disclosure provisions.

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218 *Corporations Act*, s 1041I; *ASIC Act*, s 12GF.

219 *Taco Co of Australia Inc v Taco Bell Pty Ltd* [1982] ATPR 40-303.


222 See Corporations Act, s 79.


224 A similar finding was made by the NSW Supreme Court against the CEO, CFO, company secretary/general counsel and non-executive directors of James Hardie in *ASIC v Macdonald (No 11)* [2009] NSWSC 287. The CEO did not appeal the decision at first instance. The decision against the CFO was affirmed on appeal by the NSW Court of Appeal in *Morley v ASIC* [2010] NSWCA 331. The decision against the non-executive directors and the company secretary/general counsel was affirmed on appeal by the High Court in *ASIC v Hellicar* [2012] HCA 17 and *Shafron v ASIC* [2012] HCA 18 respectively.

225 (2011) 190 FCR 364, [181].

5. Shareholder Class Actions

5.1. Procedure

As noted above, ASIC will often encourage investors who have suffered loss to take private legal action, by means of, for example, shareholder class actions, rather than the regulator itself seeking compensation on behalf of such persons.

Class actions were, however, non-existent in Australia prior to the 1990s. They were first introduced through the enactment of the Federal Court of Australia Amendment Act 1991 (Cth) which provided for ‘representative proceedings’ through inserting Part IV A into the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (‘FCA Act’). Part IVA commenced on 4 March 1992. There are essentially identical rules in New South Wales and Victoria. 227

The commencement of proceedings is straightforward as, unlike in the US regime, there is no certification requirement that requires an applicant to demonstrate compliance with s 33C of the FCA Act. The class action procedure requires that a valid class action have: seven or more people who have claims against the same person(s);228 the claims are ‘in respect of, or arise out of, the same, similar or related circumstances’;229 and the claims ‘give rise to at least one substantial common issue of law or fact.’230 The Full Court of the Federal Court has confirmed that a class action with multiple respondents does not require each person in the class to have a case against each respondent, provided that at least seven people have a case against each respondent.231 In Australia, class members are not parties to the litigation and have remained ‘essentially passive.’232 The High Court has stated that the opt-out nature of class actions in Australia means that group members ‘need take no positive step in the prosecution of the proceeding to judgment to gain whatever benefit its prosecution may bring.’233

While there is a general prohibition on solicitors charging contingency fees in all states and territories of Australia,234 it is now common for third party litigation funders to meet cost orders made against the class representative and to provide security for costs where sought by the respondent. Initially, third party litigation funding was the subject of numerous challenges based on the criticism that it permits a party with no ‘skin in the game’ to control the litigation. However, in Campbells Cash and Carry Pty Ltd v Fostif Pty Ltd,235 the High Court held that third party litigation funding was not an abuse of process or contrary to public

227 Similar regimes came into effect in Victoria on 1 January 2000, under Part 4A of the Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic.) and in NSW on 4 March 2011, under Part 10 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW).
228 Federal Court Act 1976 (Cth), s 33C(1)(a); Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic), s 33C(1)(a); Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), s 157(1)(a).
229 Federal Court Act 1976 (Cth), s 33C(1)(b); Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic), s 33C(1)(b); Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), s 157(1)(b).
230 Federal Court Act 1976 (Cth), s 33C(1)(c); Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic), s 33C(1)(c); Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), s 157(1)(c).
232 P Dawson Nominees Pty Ltd v Brookfield Multiplex Ltd (No. 2) [2010] FCA 176 at [16], [17].
233 Mobil Oil Australia Pty Ltd v Victoria (2002) 211 CLR 1 at 32.
234 See, e.g., Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW), s 325; Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules 2011, rule 12.2.
235 [2006] 229 CLR 386.
policy. More than ‘triple the number of class actions were commenced in the three years following the decision than in the three years prior.’ According to the Federal Court of Australia Case Management Handbook, ‘litigation funding has proven to be the life-blood of most of Australia’s representative proceeding litigation at Federal and State level.’

Although IMF (Australia) Ltd is the predominant third party funder in Australia, there are a number of other active funders, including: Comprehensive Legal Funding LLC; Hillcrest Litigation Services Limited; International Litigation Funding Partners Pty Limited; LCM Litigation Fund Pty Ltd; Litigation Lending Services Limited. Legislative amendments in July 2013 formally exempt litigation funders from the need to hold an Australian Financial Services Licence, but require them to maintain adequate practices for managing conflicts of interest.

Where a third party’s claim for damages against a director is likely to exceed the insurance monies available to cover the claim and the director’s legal costs, legislation in force in NSW, the ACT, and the NT imposes a charge over some or all of the insurance funds in favour of the claimant. This creates a potential conflict between directors’ contractual right to receive advances from insurers to cover litigation defence costs and the third party’s rights, under the charge, to the insurance monies.

The court has the power to terminate a class action where it is satisfied that it is in the interests of justice to do so. Persuasive factors include if the costs of group proceedings are likely to exceed the costs of separate proceedings; the relief sought could be obtained by other proceedings; the class action proceedings will not provide an efficient and effective means of dealing with the claims; or it is otherwise inappropriate to bring the claims as a class action.

Any proposed settlement between the parties requires the approval of the Court. Both sides must persuade the Court that the proposed settlement is in the interests of class members. The court will then consider whether the proposed settlement is a ‘fair and reasonable’ compromise of the claims of the class members.

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238 Corporations Amendment Regulation 2012 (No. 6) (Cth). See also ASIC Regulatory Guide 248 Litigation schemes and proof of debt schemes: managing conflicts of interest, which highlights the tensions between litigation funders, law firms and group members.


240 Federal Court Act 1976 (Cth), s 33N.

241 Federal Court Act 1976 (Cth), s 33V; Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic), s 33V; Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), s 173

242 Federal Court Practice Note CM17 (1 Aug. 2011).

243 While the legislation does not set out any criteria against which a settlement should be judged, the Federal Court has issued a practice note which sets out the Court’s general practice in considering settlements. See Practice Note CM17: Representative Proceedings Commenced Under Part IVA of the Federal Court of Australia Act (1 Aug. 11).
Recently, a number of proposed settlements have been questioned or disallowed by the courts. In a proposed settlement of a class action arising out of the collapse of Storm Financial Limited, the Full Federal Court held that the proposed distribution of the settlement sum between group members discriminated between the returns to group members who had been given the opportunity to contribute to the funding of the proceeding and those who had not. Similarly, in the Vioxx class action, the Federal Court declined to approve a settlement made by the representative applicant because it failed to differentiate adequately the respective strengths of group members.

5.2. The Australian Experience

The first Australian shareholder class action, King v AG Australia Holdings Ltd (formerly GIO Australia Holdings Ltd), commenced in the Federal Court on 31 August 1999. Since that time, shareholder class actions have become prevalent in Australia due to ‘an accessible class action procedure; statutory causes of action based on misleading or deceptive conduct and breach of continuous disclosure requirements, for which individual shareholders have standing to pursue monetary damages; increasing numbers of individual and institutional shareholders that are willing to sue; and the acceptance of third party litigation funding as a method for financing litigation, including high-value class actions.’

Since 2000, there have been numerous significant shareholder class actions, which have resulted in substantial settlements. Most shareholder class actions involve allegations that the respondent company contravened the prohibition against misleading or deceptive conduct and/or the continuous disclosure obligations. The table below identifies shareholder class action settlements over $50 million.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Settlement Date</th>
<th>Allegations</th>
<th>Settlement Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GIO</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Misleading representations in takeover, reinsurance losses, business risk</td>
<td>$112 M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aristocrat</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Continuous disclosure, profit downgrade</td>
<td>$144.5 M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sons of Gwalia</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Continuous disclosure, misleading or deceptive conduct, corporate collapse</td>
<td>$70 M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiplex</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Continuous disclosure, profit downgrade</td>
<td>$110 M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OZ Minerals</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Continuous disclosure, debt position</td>
<td>$60 M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centro</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Continuous disclosure, debt position</td>
<td>$200 M</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

244 ASIC v Richards [2013] FCAFC 89.
245 Joan Reaves v Merck Sharp Dohme (Australia) Pty Ltd (No. 6) [2013] FCA 447.
248 Data for the table was sourced from King & Wood Mallesons, ‘The Review: Class Actions in Australia 2015/16’.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Nature of Disclosure</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NAB</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Continuous disclosure, business risk</td>
<td>$115 M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sigma Pharmaceuticals</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Continuous disclosure as part of rights issue, profit downgrade</td>
<td>$57.5 M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPT</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Continuous disclosure, misleading or deceptive conduct</td>
<td>$75 M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leighton Holdings</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Continuous disclosure, misleading or deceptive conduct</td>
<td>$69.45 M</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the thirty-five new proceedings filed to 30 June 2016,²⁴⁹ seven shareholder class actions were filed alleging breaches of the continuous disclosure obligations and/or misleading or deceptive conduct.²⁵⁰ Despite this, fundamental elements that need to be proven in disclosure-related class actions in Australia have yet to be authoritatively determined.²⁵¹

In shareholder claims based on causes of action under the *Corporations Act*, the loss or damage incurred by the shareholder must ‘result from’ (in the case of continuous disclosure)²⁵² or ‘by’ (in the case of misleading or deceptive conduct)²⁵³ the conduct which has contravened the relevant statutory provisions. Where a statutory provision requires a causal link to be established between conduct and loss, Australian courts recognize the importance of assessing causation within the meaning of the relevant legislation.²⁵⁴ A historically disputed issue is whether it is necessary for each claimant to prove actual reliance on the contravening conduct (‘direct causation’), or whether the requirement can be satisfied by general notions of reliance by the market affecting the price at which each claimant purchased and/or sold their shares or securities (‘market-based causation’).²⁵⁵

²⁴⁹ See King & Wood Mallesons, ‘The Review: Class Actions in Australia 2015/16’.
²⁵⁰ Ibid.
²⁵² *Corporations Act*, s 1317HA states: ‘A Court may order a person…to compensate another person…for damage suffered…if: (a) the liable person has contravened a financial services civil penalty provision; and (b) the damage resulted from the contravention.’ Sections 674(2) and (2A), which contain the continuous disclosure obligations, are financial services civil penalty provisions: *Corporations Act*, s 1317DA.
²⁵³ *Corporations Act*, s 1041I states: ‘A person who suffers loss or damage by conduct of another person that was engaged in contravention of sections 1041E, 1041F, 1041G or 1041H may recover the amount of the loss or damage by action against that other person or against any person involved in the contravention, whether or not that other person or any person involved in the contravention has been convicted of an offence in respect of the contravention.’
Traditionally, Plaintiffs seeking to raise market-based causation rely on a line of authorities commencing with *Janssen-Cilag Pty Ltd v Pfizer Pty Ltd.* In that case, the Federal Court found that the respondent had misled consumers by making representations to the public about one of its products. The misrepresentations caused the public to purchase more of Pfizer’s product and less of the applicant’s product. As a result, Janssen-Cilag, a competitor to Pfizer, suffered reduced market share and losses even though it had not relied on the misrepresentations per se. The court held that Janssen-Cilag could recover on the basis that an entitlement to recover loss or damage was not confined to persons who relied on the contravening representations. However, ‘loss or damage must directly result from or be caused by the respondent’s conduct’. 

However, in *Janssen-Cilag*, the plaintiff suffered loss passively. If a misleading disclosure or omission causes the share price of a company to be inflated, it does not necessarily follow that a shareholder will suffer loss. The shareholder would need to take active steps to suffer the loss, for example, by making a decision to purchase during the inflation period. Later cases such as *Digi-Tech* and *Ingot* argue that investors suffering losses due to misleading or deceptive acts or omissions do not suffer loss passively and as such, must prove direct causation. Their entry into the transactions gives rise to the loss, which forms an integral link in the chain of causation.

The 2016 decision of in *HIH Insurance Limited (in liquidation)* has removed some of this uncertainty, the judgment holding that the market-based causation is applicable in shareholder claims against listed companies. Although not a class action, in that case, Justice Brereton in the NSW Supreme Court held that market-based causation was available to the shareholders as a means of connecting the company’s misconduct to the shareholder’s loss and damage. In that case, HIH released overstated financial results to the market; the market misapprehended that HIH was trading more profitably that it really was and had greater net assets than it really had; HIH shares traded on the market at an inflated price; and shareholders paid that inflated price to acquire their shares, and thereby suffered loss. The measure of loss applied was the difference between the (inflated) price paid by shareholders and the price they would have paid had a misconduct not occurred.

5.3. Conflict of Laws

In matters that arise under the *Corporations Act*, a court’s jurisdiction over a person or business is established in accordance with the normal principles of personal jurisdiction over individuals or bodies corporate. When the proceedings are brought against a

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257 *Janssen-Cilag Pty Ltd v Pfizer Pty Ltd* (1992) 37 FCR 526 at [18].


260 Ibid.


262 Or any matters that arise under the *Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001* (Cth), or any rules of court made under the *Corporations Act*.

company, the company must have some presence inside the forum to be properly subject to the jurisdiction of the forum court. This requirement is relatively easy to satisfy. If the company is incorporated within Australia, it will have a registered office in Australia.\(^{264}\) For foreign companies doing business in Australia, the \textit{Corporations Act} requires that they be registered with ASIC and have a registered office and local agent in Australia.\(^{265}\) Every foreign company must nominate a state or territory for registration, although the \textit{Corporations Act} is federal legislation.\(^{266}\)

Almost every Australian court has jurisdiction in civil matters arising under the Corporation’s Act.\(^{267}\) In international cases, the usual principals of \textit{forum non conveniens} apply to proceedings before Australian courts that relate to the internal legal relations of companies.\(^{268}\)

Choice of law rules for questions of corporate law rely on both the \textit{Foreign Corporations (Application of Laws) Acts 1989} (Cth) (‘\textit{Foreign Corporations Act}’) and the general law. The \textit{Foreign Corporations Act} gives prominence to the law of the place of incorporation as the governing law for the companies’ issues that it covers.\(^{269}\) However, the limited coverage of the \textit{Foreign Corporations Act} means that the general law still governs issues concerning foreign companies not mentioned in the Act and questions involving Australian companies.\(^{270}\)

Under Australian law, a foreign judgment will be recognized and enforced in Australia if it falls within the registration process provided for under Part 2 the \textit{Foreign Judgments Act 1991} (Cth) (‘\textit{Foreign Judgments Act}’); Part 7 of the \textit{Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010} (Cth), with respect to New Zealand judgments; or it otherwise qualifies for recognition under the common law or equity.\(^{271}\)

The \textit{Foreign Judgments Act} is based upon reciprocity of enforcement. To be enforceable,\(^{272}\) the foreign judgment must be issued by a country or court set out in the \textit{Foreign Judgments Regulations 1992} (Cth) (‘\textit{Foreign Judgments Regulations}’). For example, the United States is not listed in the Foreign Judgment Regulations, meaning a judgment from an American court is not enforceable under the \textit{Foreign Judgments Act}. The foreign judgment sought to be enforced under the Act must be a ‘money judgment.’\(^{273}\)

If a foreign judgment does not fall within the scope of the Act, a bilateral agreement or the common law may provide alternative mechanisms for enforcement. For example,

\(^{264}\) \textit{Corporations Act}, s 117(2)(g).
\(^{265}\) \textit{Corporations Act}, s 601.
\(^{266}\) \textit{Corporations Act}, s 119A.
\(^{267}\) \textit{Corporations Act}, ss 1337B-1337E. The exception is the Federal Magistrates Court.
\(^{268}\) \textit{Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd} (1990) 171 CLR 538.
\(^{271}\) Australia is not a party to the \textit{Hague Convention on Recognition of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters 1971}.
\(^{272}\) \textit{Foreign Judgments Act 1991} (Cth), s 5(1).
\(^{273}\) \textit{Foreign Judgments Act 1991} (Cth), s 1.
Australia is party to the bilateral treaty for the *Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters* 1994 with the United Kingdom. Enforcement under the common law requires:

- the foreign court must have exercised jurisdiction in ‘the international sense’;
- the foreign judgment must be final and conclusive; and
- the foreign judgment must be for a fixed (definite) sum of money.\(^{274}\)

A foreign court will have exercised jurisdiction in the international sense if the court exercised jurisdiction in circumstances which would constitute common law jurisdiction, for example, if the judgment debtor was served with the originating process of the foreign court while present in its territory or the defendant voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the foreign court. A corporation will be present in a foreign country if it carries on business there at a fixed place and for more than a minimal period of time.\(^{275}\) A defendant may voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of a foreign court by contesting the merits of the plaintiff’s claim,\(^{276}\) by appearing as plaintiff in the foreign proceedings,\(^{277}\) or by expressly agreeing to submit to the jurisdiction of the foreign court.\(^{278}\) As well as the enforcement of foreign money judgments at common law, there is equitable jurisdiction to give effect to certain foreign non-monetary judgments. For example, a foreign court order can freeze the assets of the defendant situated in the forum.\(^{279}\)

6. Conclusion

Australia’s disclosure rules are intended to ‘enhance the fairness and efficiency of the securities market by ensuring public access for investors to material company information to enable them to make informed decisions.’\(^{280}\) Where a company releases inadequate or false and misleading information, which investors rely upon to their detriment, in theory they are protected by both public and private enforcement mechanisms. However, whether these mechanisms provide investors with adequate protection in practice is subject to continuing debate. While breach of the continuous disclosure and misleading or deceptive conduct provisions are read broadly by Australian courts, the carve-out provisions can limit the breadth of the provisions in practice. Further, private enforcement of statutory breaches through shareholder class actions currently favours substantial settlements over concluded litigation, in part because key elements of the offence remain undecided by Australian courts.

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\(^{274}\) See, e.g., *Wong v Jani-King Franchising, Inc* [2014] QCA 76 relating to recognition of a Texas judgment in the amount of nearly $1 million by the Supreme Court of Queensland.

\(^{275}\) *Adams v Cape Industries* plc [1990] 1 Ch 433.


\(^{277}\) *Eisenberg v Joseph* [2001] NSWSC 1062.

\(^{278}\) *Dunbee v Gilman & Co (Australia)* (1968) 70 SR (NSW) 219.

\(^{279}\) *Davis v Turning Properties* (2005) 222 ALR 676.

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